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Abstract 
 
 
 
Ian David Cooper 
 
‘Networks, News and Communication: Political Elites and Community Relations 
in Elizabethan Devon, 1588-1603’ 
 
Focusing on the ‘second reign’ of Queen Elizabeth I (1588-1603), this thesis 
constitutes the first significant socio-political examination of Elizabethan Devon 
– a geographically peripheral county, yet strategically central in matters 
pertaining to national defence and security. A complex web of personal 
associations and informal alliances underpinned politics and governance in 
Tudor England; but whereas a great deal is now understood about relations 
between both the political elite and the organs of government at the centre of 
affairs, many questions still remain unanswered about how networks of political 
actors functioned at a provincial and neighbourhood level, and how these 
networks kept in touch with one another, central government and the court. 
Consequently, this study is primarily concerned with power and communication. 
In particular, it investigates and models the interconnected networks of 
government within late-Elizabethan Devon and explains precisely how the 
county’s officials (at every level) shared information with the Crown and each 
other. The raison d’être of this study is, therefore, to probe the character and 
articulation of the power geometries at the south-western fringe of Elizabethan 
England. The closing years of the reign of Queen Elizabeth I represent a 
decisive phase in the evolution of the English nation state, one that saw the 
appointment of lord lieutenants on a more widespread and long-standing basis, 
the consistent training of certain sections of the county militias, the expansion of 
the pre-existing government post-stage service, a heightened degree of 
dealings between every echelon of administration and an obvious increase in 
the amount of information that flowed from the localities into the capital. The 
primary causes of each of these developments were the Elizabethan war with 
Spain (1585-1604) and the rebellion in Ireland (1594-1603), and it is 
demonstrated throughout this thesis that Devon, a strategically essential county 
during this period of political turmoil, provides an excellent case study for 
evaluating the impact that each had on the Crown’s ability to control the 
periphery whilst being spatially anchored at the court. Furthermore, by 
examining each of these developments the thesis fundamentally undercuts the 
tenacious assertion that geographically marginal regions of Tudor territory were 
inward-looking, remote and disconnected from events that were unfolding on a 
national and international level. 
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1 
Introduction  
 
Concentrating on the years 1588 to 1603, this thesis examines political-military 
networks, social connections, postal arrangements, letter production and the 
circulation of news and intelligence within and beyond Elizabethan Devon and 
represents the first major socio-political study of the county for the late-Tudor 
period. Intricate networks of personal relationships and social connections 
formed the bedrock of power in early modern England; but while much is 
already known regarding the linkages between both individuals and institutions 
at the epicentre of the realm, a great deal remains to be revealed and 
understood about networks operating at regional and local levels, and how 
these were linked with each other, central government and the court. This study 
engages directly with issues of connectivity and governance in an English 
county. It focuses on late-Elizabeth Devon, a county that was spatially distant 
from London yet, between 1588 and 1603, noticeably pivotal in national affairs 
and questions of security. Simply put, the thesis explores the interlocking 
structures of governance within late-Elizabethan Devon and articulates the 
ways in which the county community interacted and communicated with 
central political and social hierarchies.  
The study therefore investigates the sinews, dynamics and operational 
mechanics of Elizabethan political networks through the prism of a county-
based case study. Concentrating on the Armada years, it examines what John 
Brewer has described as the ‘sinews of power’ at the south-western periphery 
2 
 
of the Tudor state.1 The final fifteen years of the Elizabethan era is arguably a 
crucial period in the development of the English nation state, one that witnessed 
the establishment of the office of lord lieutenant on a more permanent basis, the 
improvement and professionalisation of the county militia, the widespread 
engagement of an Exchequer-funded royal post-stage service, an increased 
level of interaction and communication between all levels of government, and 
an apparent rise in the circulation of news and intelligence from the provinces 
into London. The Elizabethan war with Spain (1585-1604) and the Nine Years’ 
War in Ireland (1594-1603) were the main catalysts for these developments and 
it is argued throughout this thesis that Devon – a frontline county during both 
conflicts – provides an ideal case study for analysing the impact that each had 
on central government’s ability to govern the realm from the confines of 
Whitehall.  
This thesis examines the connectedness of the ruling elite in Devon, a 
county on the periphery of Tudor territory, in the period from the Spanish 
Armada (summer 1588) until the Stuart accession (spring 1603). The recently 
discovered Seymour Manuscripts have formed the central archive for this 
thesis, highlighting relations between Queen Elizabeth I, her Privy Council, the 
Lord Lieutenant of Devon, his deputies, local landed and civic elites and the 
wider county community in the 1590s, and in particular their activities in 
mustering, training and levying the county’s militia during the Elizabethan war 
with Spain and the Nine Years’ War in Ireland. Viewed alongside other locally 
and centrally held collections (all of which are outlined in detail below) the study 
exploits these papers to recover and interpret evidence of the networks that 
existed amongst those who contributed to the governance (in its widest sense) 
                                               
1
 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: 
Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
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of the county’s affairs, and who provided a connection with the centre through 
their willingness to serve at national level.  
The interconnectedness of ruling elites is explored at all levels of 
government, from the national and regional political scene down to a 
community, neighbourhood and parish level, revealing how links were 
maintained, channels opened up, bonds created and alliances cemented. It 
stresses the importance of the informal in the political, emphasising the 
significance of the personal relationships and social connections of Devon’s 
Lord and Deputy Lieutenants in a political system where the line between the 
public and the private was so blurred. Furthermore, it examines the function of 
Devon’s lieutenancy in relation to the maintenance of the county militia and 
unravels the extent to which central government was able to acquire the 
consent and cooperation of the wider county community for their incessant 
military demands. Central is the issue of what motivated the inhabitants of 
Devon to behave in particular ways: whether individuals operated independently 
or as a part of distinct groups; how far they were influenced by self-interest or 
wider utilitarian responsibilities; the extent to which they acted in accordance 
with factional lines, according to ideological or religious principles, or were 
acquisitive and motivated by financial remuneration. Moreover, through an 
analysis of the Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage service, Devon’s intra-
county postal arrangements, travel conditions, secretaries, letter-writing, chain 
copying and the circulation of news and intelligence (oral and scribal), the study 
explores the degree of connectivity between different tiers of government 
spanning the centre and the periphery as well as within the county itself. How 
far Devon was connected to events at the centre is thus a fundamental area of 
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investigation as is the extent to which local issues and grievances found 
representation and redress at the Elizabethan court. 
By pursuing these lines of enquiry the thesis aims to contribute 
fundamentally to the reassessment of the traditional view of the early modern 
south-west as an introspective, distant and cut-off region of Tudor territory. 
Helen Speight has argued that during the 1530s ‘the counties of Devon and 
Cornwall formed a fairly distinctive province on the periphery of the realm. It 
was both introverted and conservative in character.’ Furthermore, she suggests 
that ‘Cornwall, in particular, where cultural and linguistic differences 
accentuated the geographical isolation of the county, the line of command and 
communication between central government and the county was especially 
attenuated.’2 In contrast, research reported in this thesis will show that the 
inhabitants of late-Elizabethan Devon were highly integrated and co-opted into 
a national political framework, a phenomenon which can be seen most 
markedly in the contribution that the county’s inhabitants made to England’s war 
effort. This study therefore neatly fills the gap between research conducted by 
Mary Robertson and John Cooper on early Tudor Devon, and research 
conducted by Mary Wolffe and Mark Stoyle on seventeenth-century Devon, to 
provide a new insight into Devon’s political and social connectivity during the 
Armada years.3   
 
                                               
2
 Helen Speight, ‘‘The Politics of Good Governance’: Thomas Cromwell and the Government of 
the Southwest of England’, HJ, 37:3 (September, 1994), 623-38 (p. 624). 
3
 Mary L. Robertson, ‘‘The Art of the Possible’: Thomas Cromwell’s Management of West 
Country Government’, HJ, 32:4 (1989), 793-816; John P. D. Cooper, Propaganda and the Tudor 
State: Political Culture in the Westcountry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003); Mary Wolffe, 
Gentry Leaders in Peace and War: The Gentry Governors of Devon in the Early Seventeenth 
Century (Exeter: Exeter UP, 1997); Mark Stoyle, Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in 
Devon During the English Civil War (Exeter: Exeter UP, 1994); id., Exeter in the Civil War 
(Exeter: Devon Archaeological Society, 1995); id., ed., From Deliverance to Destruction: 
Rebellion and Civil War in an English City (Exeter: Exeter UP, 1996); id., Devon and the Civil 
War (Exeter: Mint Press, 2001). 
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‘New’ Tudor political history 
 
In the context of existing historiography the thesis thus makes a substantial 
contribution to what Professor Patrick Collinson defined as ‘new’ Tudor political 
history during his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History at 
the University of Cambridge in November 1989. For Collinson, ‘new’ Tudor 
political history had three key objectives: ‘to explore the social depth of politics’; 
‘to find signs of political life at levels where it was not previously thought to have 
existed’; and ‘to disclose the horizontal connections of political life at those 
lower levels as coexistent with the vertical connections which depended upon 
monarchy and lordship and which have been the ordinary concerns of political 
history’.4 The underlying motivation behind this concept was both to vanquish 
the view put forward by Sir Geoffrey Elton ‘that the only political units worthy of 
study are sovereign and separate states’ and destroy any misguided belief that 
the counties of early modern England were ‘hermetically sealed’ autonomous 
political units whose political culture consisted of ‘a thinnish carpet with no 
underlay, [and] no social depth’.5 However, as Stephen Alford, Natalie Mears 
and, indeed, Collinson himself have acknowledged, this seemingly abrupt new 
departure for Tudor political history was, in reality, the product of a much more 
gradual historiographical process.6 As Mears puts it, Collinson’s views 
eloquently  
tapped an existing vein of dissatisfaction with the perceived failure of 
revisionist history to deal with questions first raised by Conyers Read 
                                               
4
 Patrick Collinson, ‘De Republica Anglorum: Or, History with the Politics Put Back’, in 
Elizabethan Essays, ed. by P. Collinson (London and Rio Grande: The Hambledon Press, 
1994), pp. 1-30. 
5
 Collinson, ‘De Republica Anglorum’, pp. 9, 11 and 22. 
6
 Stephen Alford, ‘Politics and Political History in the Tudor Century’, HJ, 42:2 (1999), 535-48; 
Natalie Mears, ‘Courts, Courtiers, and Culture in Tudor England’, HJ, 46:3 (September, 2003), 
703-22. 
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and Sir John Neale in the early twentieth century about the role of 
ideology and social connections in politics.7  
 
Thus, there exists a substantial corpus of research dating from both 
before and after Collinson’s seminal lecture which bears many of the hallmarks 
of the ‘new’ Tudor political history that he advocated. In relation to central 
government and the court, scholars have been increasingly eager to emphasise 
the importance of personalities and social connections in Tudor politics. In a 
series of landmark publications between 1977 and 1987, David Starkey 
unearthed the personal and social nature of Henrician politics by highlighting 
the significance of the chief gentlemen of King Henry VIII’s Privy Chamber and 
revealed the vital role that they played as informal intercessors between the 
King and the formal institutions of Tudor government.8 Eric Ives similarly 
focused on the role of the personal in the political in his pioneering study, 
Faction in Tudor England, depicting a political system ‘where relationships and 
events are determined by groups thinking mainly of personal advantage’.9 
Subsequent research on the court of Queen Elizabeth I has attached the same 
importance to personalities, ideology and social dynamics. Simon Adams has 
conducted seminal research on the personality and patronage of the Queen’s 
most famous favourite, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, while other historians 
have identified the increasingly abrasive and uncompromising character of 
Leicester’s step-son, Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, as being crucial 
                                               
7
 Mears, ‘Courts, Courtiers, and Culture’, p. 704. 
8
 David Starkey, ‘Representation Through Intimacy: a Study in the Symbolism of Monarchy and 
Court Office in Early-Modern England’, in Symbols and Sentiments: Cross Cultural Studies in 
Symbolism, ed., by I. Lewis (London: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 187-224; id., ‘Court and 
Government’, in Revolution Reassessed: Revisions in the History of Tudor Government and 
Administration, ed. by C. Coleman and D. Starkey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 29-58; 
id., ‘Intimacy and Innovation: the Rise of the Privy Chamber, 1485-1547’, in The English Court: 
from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War, ed. by D. Starkey et al. (Harlow: Longman, 1987), 
pp. 71-118; id., The Reign of Henry VIII: Personalities and Politics (London: George Philip, 
1985; reprinted 2002).   
9
 Eric Ives, Faction in Tudor England (London: Historical Association, 1979), p. 2. 
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in the formation of factional groupings at the Elizabethan court during the 
1590s.10 Gender has provided a particularly fruitful avenue of enquiry for ‘new’ 
Tudor political historians. Barbara Harris and James Daybell in particular have 
revealed that aristocratic Tudor women often acted as important informal 
political actors and have therefore successfully exploded any notion that women 
were mere bystanders who watched passively from the political sidelines.11 
Natalie Mears has subsequently embellished this premise via a study of the role 
of the chief gentlewomen of Elizabeth I’s Privy Chamber, arguing that these 
women provided politicians with an informal ‘point of access’ to the Queen in 
much the same way as the chief gentlemen of King Henry VIII’s Privy Chamber 
did during his reign.12 Indeed, it is not just in relation to Tudor England that 
historians have sought to explore the social depth of sixteenth-century politics. 
Sharon Kettering, in particular, has produced numerous publications on French 
‘political clientelism’ which she has defined as ‘a system of patron-broker-client 
ties and networks that dominate a society’s politics and government.’13    
Elements of Collinson’s ‘new’ Tudor political history can also be found in 
research conducted on England’s local administration. A. G. R. Smith, for 
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example, dedicated an entire chapter of his book, The Government of 
Elizabethan England, to local government in recognition that ‘it is difficult today, 
in an age of ever-increasing centralization, to appreciate the enormous 
importance of the agencies of local government in sixteenth-century England.’14 
Similarly, Penry Williams included in his study, The Tudor Regime, a chapter 
entitled ‘The Chains of Command’ which sought to answer the question: ‘who 
made up the links in the chains of command that ran between the central 
government and the regions?’15 This paved the way for Alfred Hassell-Smith, 
Wallace MacCaffrey, Peter Clark and Diarmaid MacCulloch to begin to unpick 
the intricate tapestry of county politics and thereby expose the social depth of its 
underlay through the prism of four exceptionally detailed county-based case 
studies.16 The participation of the counties’ inhabitants in a national political 
culture has received a similar level of scholarly attention, especially during the 
two decades that have followed Collinson’s clarion call.17 Specifically, ‘new’ 
Tudor political historians have looked to expose political participation and 
uncover the sinews of governance at an increasingly localised level. In 
particular, Steve Hindle and Eamon Duffy have delved right down to the ground 
floor of Tudor government; excavating the extent of popular political 
participation at a parish level.18 In doing so, they have underlined that 
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governance and power in Tudor England was negotiated, a cooperation 
between those who occupied government positions at court and those who 
assumed political office on a regional, county, civic and parish basis. 
 What then is left to explore and verify for the current crop of ‘new’ Tudor 
political historians? Existing theories on the importance of the personal, informal 
and social elements of sixteenth-century politics at the centre of affairs need to 
be more extensively applied to the local political scene in order to understand 
the nature of Tudor politics more fully. Additional scrutiny on how intra-county 
political networks and structures functioned and interacted must be pursued to 
appreciate further the consent and cooperation that was needed in the 
provinces for the Crown to secure popular political allegiance throughout the 
realm. Detailed reconstructions of the post and communication network that 
facilitated and underpinned the ever increasing interaction between political 
actors at all levels of Tudor government (from the national and regional political 
scene, all the way down to a community, neighbourhood and parish level) are 
essential to clarify exactly how the channel of communication between 
Whitehall and the parishes was made possible. And forensic examinations of 
local news and intelligence networks are necessary in order to underscore the 
importance of the provinces in servicing the centre with vital pieces of 
information that could be used to modify and develop central government policy. 
Of course this is not an exhaustive list, it merely re-emphasises the avenues of 
enquiry that this thesis pursues in relation to late-Elizabethan Devon.     
A more in-depth focus on local power structures and their interaction with 
central government and each other is particularly relevant for the late-
Elizabethan era because by then, as David Loades puts it, ‘the importance of 
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great private households, so conspicuous in the fifteenth century, [had] steadily 
ebbed away under the pressures of royal policy. In their place appeared a much 
broader ruling class, the ‘political nation’’.19 This erosion of bastard feudalism 
has been identified by Steven Gunn as commencing in the early Tudor period 
when ‘even the greatest ... peers seem to have found that any administrative 
and political talent they found amongst the gentry leached too rapidly for 
comfort out into royal service and an independent role in county politics.’20 Late-
Elizabethan government consequently encompassed a broad range of society; 
from the leading members of the aristocracy who assumed positions at the apex 
of central and local government, all the way down to the lower level ranks of the 
gentry and yeomanry who occupied positions at a neighbourhood and parish 
level. The power and authority of successive early modern regimes therefore 
became increasingly reliant upon the ability of the Crown to secure and 
maintain the allegiance and goodwill of ‘the political nation’, a feat that it 
achieved with varying degrees of success from era to era and county to 
county.21  
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Historical research on early modern Devon 
 
With regards to Devon in the 1530s, Mary Robertson has sought to delineate 
‘the actual mechanics of interaction between centre and locality’. This, she 
argues, revolved around ‘Thomas Cromwell's management of the two western 
counties of Devon and Cornwall’. Accordingly, she has revealed how Cromwell 
painstakingly endeavoured to establish a network of contacts amongst Devon’s 
political elite which could be utilised to assist central government in its efforts to 
control the wider county community. Cromwell’s Devon ‘address book’ included 
Devon MPs with whom he had served in Parliament, legal practitioners with 
whom he had practised law in London but who had subsequently returned to 
their native Devon, courtiers originally from Devon who occupied ceremonial or 
administrative positions at court but nevertheless retained a high degree of 
power and prestige within the county and servants from Cromwell’s own 
household who had family connections in Devon. As a result, these contacts 
‘could with proper management provide the critical link between their local 
community and the central government.’22 However, whereas Cromwell’s 
management of early Tudor Devon was achieved through an informal 
mechanism of personal contacts, this thesis will reveal that, by the late-
Elizabethan era, Cromwell’s successors in central government were able to rely 
on the formal institution of the lieutenancy to achieve a similar result.  
John Cooper has also studied early Tudor Devon in his insightful 
monograph, Propaganda and the Tudor State: Political Culture in the 
Westcountry. The central premise of Cooper’s work is that Tudor propaganda 
promoted a ‘popular culture of loyalism’ to the Crown within both Devon and 
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Cornwall. However, he also argues that ‘the exposure of the region to foreign 
attack, and its dependence on the monarchy for defence, generated feelings of 
patriotism and loyalty towards the centre.’ Indeed, Cooper observes that 
‘anxiety about invasion encouraged the provinces to look to the centre for 
military protection’. He therefore suggests that the south-western rebellions of 
1497 and 1549 ‘reflected short-term political crises rather than a regional or 
cultural predisposition towards insurgency.’ Such loyalty was felt no more 
acutely than amongst Devon’s political elite during the Elizabethan war with 
Spain when the threat of invasion was most severe. This thesis will therefore 
show that the inhabitants of late-Elizabethan Devon were highly ‘integrated 
within the allegiance demanded by the English state’ as a result of their 
perennial fear of foreign invasion.23  
 There has also been detailed research conducted on seventeenth-
century Devon. Mary Wolffe, for example, has illustrated the extent to which the 
county’s political elite provided King Charles I with loyal service in the years that 
immediately preceded the English Civil War whilst at the same time remaining 
candid over the tensions caused within the county by the King’s abrasive 
policies. The primary focus of Wolffe’s study, however, is on the role of Devon’s 
JPs. This she attributes to the fact that there is ‘no core body of material on the 
deputy lieutenants in Devon’ for the twenty-five years with which she is 
concerned (1625-1640). Consequently, she has argued that in the seventeenth-
century it was Devon’s JPs who ‘gradually became the most important means of 
furthering the King's interests in the county.’24 In contrast, this study shows – 
with the aid of a newly discovered body of primary material – that for the late-
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Elizabethan era it was the county’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants who served as 
the most important means of furthering the Queen’s interests in the county.  
Mark Stoyle has similarly looked at Devon before, as well as during, the 
English Civil War in his monograph, Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in 
Devon During the English Civil War. However, his primary concern was not the 
political elite; rather it was to conduct a forensic examination of the patterns of 
popular allegiance within the county. As a result, he acknowledges that his 
findings contain relatively little on high politics or state affairs. Instead ‘it is the 
people of Devon who take centre stage’ in what is an exceptionally lucid 
analysis of why the inhabitants of some areas of Devon were sympathetic to the 
royalist cause, while others were staunchly parliamentarian. In the midst of this, 
Stoyle depicts a county ruptured by civil war: ‘minor skirmishes took place 
everywhere’; ‘full-scale battles occurred at Modbury, Torrington and Sourton’; 
‘Exeter and Dartmouth were each besieged and taken on two separate 
occasions, and Barnstaple on three, while Plymouth endured intermittent siege 
throughout the period 1642-46.’25 This thesis therefore provides an important 
precursor to Stoyle’s work because it outlines a county that was by and large 
unified by the war with Spain. As a result, it highlights the seismic shift that took 
place in relation to Devon’s, and indeed the nation’s, political unity over the 
course of just one generation and underlines the relative success of the Tudors 
and failure of the Stuarts in securing widespread popular allegiance to the 
Crown on the south-western periphery of the realm.  
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Methodologies and sources 
 
It may therefore be argued that this thesis bridges the gap between Robertson 
and Cooper’s work on early Tudor Devon, and Wolffe and Stoyle’s work on 
early Stuart Devon, and offers a new analysis of the county in late-Elizabethan 
time. In doing so, the thesis fundamentally contributes to a re-evaluation of the 
nature of Tudor politics at a local and national level, arguing that by the end of 
the sixteenth-century Devon’s governors – from the Lord Lieutenant and his 
deputies at the apex, to the constables of the parishes at a ‘ground floor’ level – 
were much more embedded in a national political culture than the county’s 
geographical remoteness on the periphery of the Tudor state would suggest. 
This perspective is achieved by viewing events predominantly from the 
periphery rather than the more traditional view of only from the centre. Such a 
new and controversial approach to the understanding of Tudor government and 
the formation of the British state was pioneered by Steven Ellis in the context of 
Tudor Ireland and the English borderlands. In 1985 Ellis noted that ‘a 
perspective which focuses on interaction between English and Irish within 
Ireland is too narrow’ and as a consequence the ‘Westminster-centred history’ 
which had prevailed neglected the fact that ‘Irish history was not shaped by 
events outside Ireland, [rather] it tended to be the sum of regional histories and 
their interaction’.26 In other words Ellis was arguing that  
the traditional approach of historians to the problems of Tudor politics 
and government reflects too much a view of events as seen from ‘the 
centre’ and needs to be balanced by a more sensitive treatment of 
the problems of the ‘periphery’.27 
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Methodological inspiration has been drawn in this study from Ellis’s 
groundbreaking approach and accordingly it provides a fresh perspective on the 
nature of government in the Tudor south-west at the end of the sixteenth-
century. 
  However, it must be stressed that applying Ellis’s ‘centre-periphery’ 
methodology would not have been possible in the context of late-Elizabethan 
Devon without the existence of the Seymour Manuscripts. Presently deposited 
at Devon Record Office, Exeter, the Seymour Manuscripts include the 
lieutenancy papers of Edward Seymour of Berry Pomeroy (deputy lieutenant of 
Devon, 1596-1613). It is these papers that have provided the crucial archival 
springboard from which this thesis has developed; highlighting as they do 
relations between Queen Elizabeth I, her Privy Council, the Earl of Bath (lord 
lieutenant of Devon, 1586-1623), his deputies, Devon’s local landed and civic 
elite and the wider county community during the 1590s.28 As is customary with 
many sixteenth-century manuscript collections, Seymour’s lieutenancy papers 
have had an interesting archival ‘afterlife’.29 Indeed, the relevant papers utilised 
throughout this study were not deposited at Devon Record Office (hereafter, 
DRO) as one single corpus of documents; instead they exist as part of two 
distinct collections deposited separately at DRO over a thirty-eight year period 
(1965-2003).  
The first collection was initially deposited by Sir William Pennington-
Ramsden at Cumberland, Westmorland and Carlisle Record Office. It was then 
transferred to DRO on 18 January 1965 and assigned the reference number 
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1392M.  Additional deposits were received by DRO on 27 October 1975 and 23 
April 1982.30 1392M consists of some title and estate records; however, it’s 
most important feature in the context of this thesis are the 129 items which 
relate primarily to the military activities of Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants 
between 1593 and 1603. Correspondence forms by far the largest proportion of 
the papers. Unsurprisingly, as lord lieutenant of Devon, the Earl of Bath features 
prominently with a substantial number of letters signed by him and addressed to 
his deputies present in either original or copied form. Fortunately, there are also 
large numbers of copied letters written to Bath from the Queen and her Privy 
Council. These letters were enclosed within the Earl’s own correspondence to 
his deputies in order to convey precisely the wishes of central government. 
Edward Seymour’s fellow deputy lieutenants also feature as significant 
correspondents, especially Sir William Courtenay, Sir John Gilbert I, Sir George 
Cary, Sir Thomas Denys, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, Sir Richard Champernowne 
and Sir William Strode. Furthermore, some of Seymour’s correspondence with 
the civic authorities of Plymouth, Dartmouth and Totnes is present providing a 
foundation from which this study has pieced together the dealings of Devon’s 
Lord and Deputy Lieutenants with the wider county community as well as with 
central government and each other. It is also important to note that summer 
1599, when Devon’s governors worked hard to make ready the county’s militia 
in the midst of a prolonged Spanish invasion scare, is the best documented 
period with thirty-four out of the 129 items dated between July and August of 
that year. The remainder of the items are chronologically distributed 
accordingly: 1593, one item; 1595, eight items; 1596, twenty-eight items; 1597, 
four items; 1598, nine items; 1600, four items; 1601, seventeen items; 1602, 
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twelve items; 1603, one item; undated, eleven items. This periodic distribution is 
largely mirrored by the second Seymour collection (discussed below). 
Consequently, the last eight years of this study’s time period (1595-1603) is 
documented significantly better by the Seymour Manuscripts than the first six 
years (1588-1594). Nevertheless, other primary material deposited in both local 
and central archives (outlined in detail below) has been used to supplement 
wherever possible this chronological shortfall.         
 The second Seymour collection, which relates directly with many of the 
items in 1392M and is similarly utilised throughout this thesis, was deposited at 
DRO much more recently. Originally deposited as part of a larger collection by 
John Seymour, nineteenth Duke of Somerset, at Wiltshire Record Office in 
2003, all of the Devon related material was duly transferred to DRO on 3 
September of that year and assigned the reference number 3799M-3.31 There it 
remained largely untouched until October 2009. Since then the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC) has funded a collaborative doctoral 
award – of which this thesis forms the academic research element – to sort, 
catalogue and prepare the documents for public access. It should be noted that 
the Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC) did publish John Scanes’ 
calendar of both collections when they were housed as one archive at the 
Seymour family’s primary residence of Maiden Bradley, Wiltshire, in 1898 as 
part of their fifteenth report.32 However, as with all HMC calendars, the level of 
detail is variable and the degree of accuracy is questionable. It is therefore of 
significant importance that the original manuscripts are now accessible. While 
both collections are chronologically similar, 3799M-3 differs to 1392M in that it is 
made up of a much broader selection of document genres. Thus, as well as a 
                                               
31
 John Draisey, ‘An Exciting Discovery in Wiltshire’, DRO Newsletter, 32 (November, 2003), p. 
5. 
32
 HMC, Somerset. 
18 
 
comparable amount of lieutenancy correspondence, 3799M-3 includes a 
significant number of muster papers, military accounts and manuscripts which 
itemise the minutes of meetings that took place between the Earl of Bath and 
his deputies periodically throughout the 1590s at Plymouth, Okehampton and 
Exeter. The latter of these are crucial as they have enabled this study to gauge 
the extent to which orders from Whitehall were actually implemented within 
Devon as well as illuminating the mechanisms which were put in place to 
achieve this. In particular, the minutes of lieutenancy meetings reveal the 
existence of an extensive, complex and highly organised intra-county postal 
network which was used to convey correspondence, messages, news and 
intelligence between all tiers of county government – from the Earl of Bath at 
the top, all the way down to the ranks of minor officials at parish level. Indeed, 
by combining this information with postal endorsements written on certain 
lieutenancy correspondence and draft precepts written by Edward Seymour to 
the constables living adjacent to his south Devon residence it has been possible 
to reconstruct with a fair degree of accuracy the postal arrangements which 
were employed to transmit orders from Whitehall throughout the parishes of 
late-Elizabethan Devon.      
An interrogation of the evidence contained in the Seymour Manuscripts 
(1392M and 3799M-3) thus reveals the high level of communication and 
interaction that occurred between the Queen, her Privy Council, the Earl of 
Bath, his deputies, local landed and civic elite and the wider county community 
in two key areas: the mustering, training, mobilisation and levying of the 
county’s militia during the Elizabethan war with Spain and the Nine Years’ War 
in Ireland; and the acquisition and broadcasting of news and intelligence 
concerning the whereabouts and intention of the Spanish fleet. Furthermore, the 
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collection provides a rare and invaluable insight into the intra-county postal 
network which underpinned and facilitated this connectivity. It therefore 
illuminates the prominent role that Devon played as a frontline county during the 
Armada years and answers hitherto unanswered questions about how the 
county’s overlapping networks of governors and administrators were able to 
communicate with each other as well as with the centre. Indeed, the emphasis 
of the Seymour Manuscripts on the office of lieutenancy, the county militia, the 
war with Spain and the circulation of news and intelligence enables this study to 
elucidate the operational mechanics of Devon’s government during the late-
Elizabethan era in a manner which is simple not possible for the majority of 
other counties.   
   In addition to the Seymour Manuscripts, a broad range of other locally 
held manuscript sources have been used to examine the inner-workings of 
government in late-Elizabethan Devon including the Exeter City Archives, 
borough records (Barnstaple, Dartmouth, Okehampton, Plymouth and Totnes), 
family papers (Reynell of West Ogwell) and quarter sessions order books. Of 
particular note are the receivers’ accounts of Barnstaple, Dartmouth, Exeter and 
Plymouth.33 These accounts illuminate a great deal of the annual financial 
expenditure of late-Elizabethan Devon’s civic authorities. In relation to this study 
they are an invaluable primary source because they specify money spent on 
gifts and dinners for the county’s political elite, payments made to individuals for 
the conveyance of messages and letters within and beyond the county, and 
wages bestowed upon shipmasters and scouts for proactively seeking out 
information concerning the whereabouts and intention of the Spanish fleet. They 
have therefore greatly assisted chapter two’s aim of recovering the social and 
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personal connections of Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants, chapter five’s 
reconstruction of Devon’s intra-county postal arrangements and chapter six’s 
examination of Devon’s news and intelligence network. However, it should be 
noted that one drawback of using receivers’ accounts is that their content can 
vary dramatically.34 The level of detail in each set of accounts depends largely 
on the town or city where the accounts were made. Thus, while some 
authorities appear to have frequently withdrawn money from their civic coffers, 
others seem to have either had less reason to, been less inclined to, or been 
less able to do so.35 In addition, the level of detail in an individual set of 
accounts can vary greatly from one year to the next because each individual 
elected to a town’s or city’s receivership – an office which customarily spanned 
from Michaelmas to Michaelmas – conducted their duties with varying degrees 
of diligence. Consequently, some years of account are extremely detailed 
because the incumbent receiver endeavoured to itemise individually many of 
the expenses that they disbursed throughout the year, whereas other years are 
frustratingly short on detail because the incumbent receiver decided to group 
expenses together at the year’s end with little description as to what those 
expenses related to.36 Furthermore, some expenses seem to have failed to 
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make the receivers’ account book altogether because the incumbent receiver 
evidently decided that a loose note of receipt would suffice. Nevertheless, 
despite these drawbacks, late-Elizabethan Devon is unusually well endowed 
with a set of highly detailed receivers’ accounts which, when viewed together, 
provide an important and substantial body of evidence for exposing the county’s 
community relationships, intra-county postal arrangements and news-gathering 
activities.    
These local sources are supplemented by material in central archives, 
such as the State Papers (domestic and foreign), which contain countless 
letters and reports from the Earl of Bath, his deputies, JPs, muster 
commissioners, mayors and so on, detailing their work and interaction with the 
Privy Council.37 The Acts of the Privy Council also contain a great deal of 
material relating to Devon, providing many of the orders and directives that the 
Council dispatched to the county’s governors.38 So do the Cecil Papers at 
Hatfield House which have been crucial in further exposing the work of Devon’s 
political elite and their dealings with the country’s leading politicians.39 In 
addition, postal endorsements located on the outside panel of certain letters 
written by Devon’s governors to central government (which are now located 
within the State and Cecil Papers) have been utilised in tandem with the 
Declared Accounts of the Master of the Posts to analyse the structure, speed 
and efficiency of the Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage service.40 Postal 
endorsements were customarily written by royal post-masters on the address 
panel of official correspondence. The Declared Accounts of the Master of the 
Posts make it plain that royal post-masters were periodically funded by the 
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Exchequer when speedy and regular communication between the centre and 
periphery was paramount (for example, during times of Irish rebellion or political 
tension with Spain) to operate a network of post-rooms along the major 
highways of Tudor England. These post-rooms were usually located between 
eight and twenty-five miles apart in towns and cities through which the main 
highway ran. Relays of post-boys were employed to ride post-horses to and 
from these post-stages carrying official correspondence to and from central and 
local government officials. When a royal packet or letter arrived at a post-room 
the time of arrival (to the nearest quarter-of-an-hour), the date and the name of 
the post-stage were customarily scribbled on the outside panel of the dispatch 
by the post-master before he forwarded it on to his counterpart at the next 
stage. Fortunately, a sufficient number of postal endorsements survive to allow 
one to calculate a reasonably accurate mean travel time between Devon and 
London during the late-Elizabethan period. Chapter four therefore utilises a 
sample of 335 postal endorsements from a collection of seventy-three letters 
that were dispatched along the Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage route 
between 1595 and 1603 to determine the speed in which Devon’s governors 
could ‘contact’ their superiors in London. Consequently, the chapter makes a 
substantial contribution to the pioneering work of historical geographers such as 
Professor Mark Brayshay who, in the 1990s, re-defined contemporary views on 
early modern post, communication and connectivity by utilising postal 
endorsements instead of anecdotal evidence to measure the efficiency of the 
early modern royal post-stage service.41  
As well as utilising the key primary material deposited at DRO, Plymouth 
and West Devon Record Office, North Devon Record Office and the National 
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Archives this study has made use of a variety of other manuscript sources. In 
particular, a small selection of state and personal correspondence located at the 
British Library, London, among the Additional, Cotton, Harley, Lansdowne and 
Sloane Manuscripts have helped to broaden understanding with regards to the 
political and government profile of late-Elizabethan Devon. Relevant wills and 
probate inventories of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury have been accessed 
to help gauge the personalities, social connections, local prestige and horse 
ownership of the Earl of Bath, his deputies, their families and associates. And 
the Hengrave Manuscripts at Cambridge University Library have provided vital 
information concerning the Earl’s early life and career away from Devon.42 The 
thesis thus integrates the broad range of local Devon sources with the relevant 
material housed in central archives in order to recover and interpret evidence of 
the political networks that existed amongst those who contributed to the 
governance (in its widest sense) of the county’s affairs, and who provided a 
connection with the centre through their willingness to serve at a national level.   
 
Elizabeth I’s ‘second reign’ 
 
Finally, further clarity should be provided for this study’s choice of period. 
Essentially, this thesis spans the Elizabethan war with Spain, which broke out 
openly in the Netherlands during summer 1585, but did not arrive on England’s 
doorstep until the Armada crisis of 1588. For the remainder of the Elizabethan 
era England was at war. Matters worsened in 1594 with the onset of the Nine 
Years’ War in Ireland and from thenceforward the Crown was forced to split its 
military resources, levying more and more troops for service in Ireland while at 
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the same time maintaining homeland security through the auspices of the 
lieutenancies and county militias. By 1603 the rebellion in Ireland was all but 
over and although hostilities between England and Spain did not officially end 
until August 1604 with the signing of the Treaty of London, the intense military 
activity that defined the last fifteen years of Elizabeth’s reign ended with her 
death in March 1603.  
Unsurprisingly, this period has attracted a great deal of scholarly 
attention. Peter Clark, for example, has described the 1590s as a period of 
‘European Crisis’, while John Guy has defined the years after 1588 as Elizabeth 
I’s ‘second reign’. Both Clark and Guy cite a number of developments which set 
the last fifteen years of the Elizabethan age apart from the first thirty.43 The war 
with Spain and the Nine Years’ War in Ireland were the most obvious of these 
developments; however, the country also endured six years of plague (1592-8) 
and three years of abject famine (1594-7).44 Furthermore, the continuity and 
stability that Elizabeth enjoyed throughout the first thirty years of her reign with 
regards to her chief ministerial advisors came to an abrupt end following the 
deaths of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester (1588), Sir Walter Mildmay (1589), 
Sir Francis Walsingham (1590) and Sir Christopher Hatton (1591).  The only 
heavyweight politician from Elizabeth’s early years to survive into the 1590s 
was William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who, before his own death in 1598, sought to 
secure the position of his son, Sir Robert Cecil, as Elizabeth’s most trusted 
political advisor. This coincided with the meteoric rise of Robert Devereux, 
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second Earl of Essex, whose own political ambitions and ideology placed him 
increasingly at odds with the Cecils. Consequently, the 1590s have also been 
explored by historians in the context of political faction, or, to borrow a phrase 
from Paul Hammer, ‘the polarisation of Elizabethan politics’.45 Thus, for those 
wishing to expose the inner workings of Tudor government, the final fifteen 
years of the reign of Elizabeth I offer very significant advantages and 
opportunities because the participants in local political networks, and the postal 
links between them, and with Whitehall, were particularly active during this time 
of acute political uncertainty, social deprivation and sustained foreign threat. In 
particular, Devon, as a key frontline county during both the war with Spain and 
the rebellion in Ireland, but nevertheless spatially distant from the court, 
provides an ideal case study for testing the degree of interconnectedness of 
local political networks and their linkages within and beyond a sixteenth-century 
English county. 
 
 
 
To summarise, this thesis engages directly with issues of governance and 
connectivity in a late-Elizabethan English county by examining the nature of 
political networks, the inner-workings of Elizabethan government and the 
circulation of news and intelligence. Chapter two undertakes a detailed analysis 
of the personalities and social connections of late-Elizabethan Devon’s Lord 
and Deputy Lieutenants. In doing so, the chapter not only looks at the structure 
of local Elizabethan government through an examination of the office of lord 
lieutenant, but also conducts a detailed analysis of the informal and personal 
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elements of local Elizabethan politics. Consequently, the chapter reveals that, 
when viewed as a group, Devon’s lieutenancy not only possessed a strong 
affinity to the Crown, they also held an array of commercial interests, family ties, 
land, local influence, marital alliances and other public offices within the county. 
This provided both the Privy Council and the county community with a small, 
elite network of power brokers who had a vested interest in ensuring that central 
government policies were articulated and implemented throughout Devon while 
at the same time promoting local concerns and protecting local interests at the 
centre of affairs. Whereas chapter two looks primarily at the character of 
Devon’s lieutenancy, chapter three shines a light directly on how it functioned. 
This is achieved through an analysis of the county militia and the pivotal role 
played by Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants in overseeing the county’s 
defences during the Elizabethan war with Spain and the Nine Years’ War in 
Ireland. Of particular concern is the extent to which they were able to secure the 
consent and cooperation of the wider county community for the Privy Council’s 
relentless military demands. Furthermore, by investigating the intricacies of how 
the militia system worked in late-Elizabethan Devon the chapter depicts a 
county of high strategic value on the frontline of England’s war with Spain. A 
central theme that chapter three makes plain is that the need to co-ordinate and 
make ready Devon’s land-defences in response to the persistent threat that 
Spain posed throughout the 1580s and 1590s engendered an increased level of 
interconnectedness at all levels of government – from the national and regional 
political scene down to a community, neighbourhood and parish level. In light of 
this, the primary objective of chapters four and five is to reconstruct the postal 
networks that maintained this connectivity, allowing one to appreciate the 
operational mechanics that enabled the lieutenancy and other local political 
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networks to function. Thus, chapter four is concerned with the structure, speed 
and efficiency of the Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage service. When, why 
and for how long was it engaged? How quickly were dispatches customarily 
posted between Devon and London? What were the Privy Council’s 
expectations in relation to the efficiency of the service? To what extent were 
these expectations met? The chapter is therefore focused exclusively on the 
form and function of the channel of communication that connected the Crown 
with the political elite at the apex of Devon’s government. Accordingly, chapter 
five is concerned with postal arrangements and letter production on an intra-
county level.  It exposes how orders from the Queen and her Privy Council were 
relayed along the hierarchical chain of command to every parish in Devon and 
how certain political networks within this chain were able to communicate and 
share information with each other. The chapter thus pinpoints the different 
methods of letter delivery available to the members of certain strands of local 
government. Furthermore, the chapter underlines the vital role that personal 
secretaries played in the context of Devon’s post and communication 
arrangements. Finally, chapter six supports the proposition that Devon was a 
key frontline county during England’s war with Spain by conducting an 
examination of the county’s news and intelligence network. Chapters two to five 
make it plain that Devon’s governors, and the postal links between them, and 
with the Privy Council, were particularly active throughout the conflict. Chapter 
six is therefore geared to analysing in detail one of the primary causes for such 
activity – namely, that the ports of south Devon served as vital hubs for 
receiving information concerning the whereabouts and intention of the Spanish 
fleet with daily advertisements from the continent arriving in the county aboard 
merchant shipping. As a result, the county’s governors were in constant contact 
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with each other, as well as with the centre, in an effort to pool information and 
formulate a response to the Spanish threat. Thus, the chapter is designed to 
encourage a reassessment of the current London-centric model of early modern 
news networks which has tended to focus on the dissemination of news that 
emanated outwards from the capital. Instead, a new focus is proposed, one 
which is equally sympathetic to the more complex sets of news networks that 
operated in the first instance at a local level, but which also had connections 
with the centre. 
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2 
The Character of Devon’s Lieutenancy:  
Personality Politics and Social Networks 
 
This chapter not only looks at the structure of local Elizabethan government 
through an examination of the office of lord lieutenant, it also conducts a 
detailed reconstruction of the personalities and social networks of Devon’s Lord 
Lieutenant, William Bourchier, third Earl of Bath, and the fourteen men who 
were appointed as his deputy lieutenants during the late-Elizabethan era. To 
achieve this the chapter utilises what Steven Gunn has defined as the sort of 
primary material that ‘one might call the biographical’ in order to obtain 
‘evidence of the personal affairs and interrelationships of the political actors’ of 
Tudor England who operated within ‘a political system in which the boundaries 
of public and private activity were so blurred.’1 Consequently, the chapter 
reveals that a complex, multi-layered, intertwined network of commercial, 
familial and social connections existed between Devon’s Lord and Deputy 
Lieutenants on the one hand, and the wider county community on the other; a 
network which underpinned and facilitated the functioning of the county’s 
government. Indeed, it is argued that, when viewed as a group, the strong 
affinity to the Crown felt by the members of Devon’s lieutenancy (all of whom 
occupied their prominent position at the apex of county society purely as a 
result of the Queen’s patronage) was mirrored by an equally fervent bond to the 
county in which they lived. This was crucial to the success of the Elizabethan 
regime as it provided those at the centre of affairs with a small, elite network of 
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loyal local agents who could be utilised to communicate and negotiate with the 
wider county community (enabling the Privy Council to articulate and implement 
their policies) while at the same time allowing the inhabitants of Devon to 
respond with any concerns that they might have felt in relation to policies 
(thereby providing an important release valve for any civil unrest that might 
otherwise have ensued).  
This chapter’s principal concern is therefore to uncover the informal 
mechanisms of power in late-Elizabethan Devon. In doing so it depicts the office 
of lord lieutenant (a formal organ of local Tudor government) as dependent on 
the personalities of those who occupied the office and the social networks that 
they managed to cultivate. Such a study is essential as it provides a new way of 
explaining why, in the words of A. G. R. Smith, the Elizabethan lieutenancies 
served as ‘a vital link between the central government and the localities, 
presenting the views of their districts to the [Privy] Council and conveying its 
opinions and orders to their shires.’2 The chapter thus enriches and clarifies 
some of the fundamental propositions put forward by the predominantly 
structural analyses of the institution that have hitherto been written.3 In 
particular, it explains precisely how the Earl of Bath and his deputies collectively 
functioned as one of the principal conduits of interaction between the centre and 
the county. Thus, whereas Sir Geoffrey Elton has demonstrated that 
Parliament, the Privy Council and the Court provided those living on the 
periphery of the Tudor state with three useful ‘points of contact’ at the centre of 
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affairs, this chapter will reveal in detail how Bath and his deputies were able to 
provide those at the centre (politicians and courtiers alike) with a vital ‘point of 
contact’ in Devon; one that could be used to facilitate a dialogue between the 
centre and the overlapping political, personal and social networks of county 
society.4 First, however, it is necessary briefly to outline the development, role 
and remit of the office of lord lieutenant in order to appreciate why the 
personalities and social networks of the men who occupied the office played 
such a pivotal role in the government and politics of late-Elizabethan England. 
 
The evolution of the office of lord lieutenant, 1549-1588 
 
In the words of Mark Fissel, it is ‘something of a misnomer to write of [the] 
lieutenancy’s “inception”, for monarchs traditionally delegated authority, 
particularly during [military] campaigning, to a trusted noble.’5 Nevertheless, the 
first time the institution was utilised in a guise that would have been 
recognisable to late-Elizabethan society can be dated to 1549 when the Crown 
responded to the social and political unrest that ensued after the Prayer Book 
and Kett’s rebellions. Indeed, it is Gladys Scott Thomson’s contention that while 
there were very similar forerunners to and even namesakes of the lieutenancy 
prior to 1549 it is ‘true to say that dating from that year there was a much wider 
conception of the possibilities of the office.’6 Prima facie, the Crown’s use of the 
office of lord lieutenant during the reign of Edward VI was solely to deal with 
specific necessities (in other words, to quell rebellious behaviour in the 
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provinces) and is outlined as such in the following extract from ‘An Acte [of 
Parliament] for the punyshment of Unlawfull Assemblyes and rysinge of the 
Kinges Subjectes’ which was passed in November 1549: 
yf the Kinge shall by his lettres patentes make anye Lyveten’nte in 
anye Countie or Counties of this Realme, for the suppressinge of any 
comocion rebellion or unlawfull assemblye, ... all Inhabitantes and 
subjectes of anye Countye Cittie Boroughe or Towne corporate 
within everie suche Countie, shall ... be bounde to gyve attendaunce 
uppon the same Lyveten’nte.7         
 
Nevertheless, during the last four years of Edward VI’s reign (1549-1553) the 
Crown deemed it appropriate summarily to deploy multiple lord lieutenants into 
the counties each summer.8 In 1551 this was no doubt partly due to the civil 
unrest that had flared up in Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Rutland.9 
That said, due to the timing of the commissions, it is also likely that Edward and 
his advisors began to utilise their lord lieutenants to supervise the mustering of 
the county militia as well as expecting them to protect and promote the Crown’s 
interests in the shires more generally.10 However, when Mary ascended to the 
throne in 1553 she ended the Crown’s policy of annual appointments and chose 
instead to engage lord lieutenants only during times of ‘pressing necessity’: 
Wyatt’s Rebellion in 1554; in response to the threat from Scotland in 1555; the 
war with France in 1558. Furthermore, lord lieutenants were only assigned to 
the counties that were under the most acute threat.11 Thus, when Elizabeth 
became queen in 1558 the lieutenancy was very much an office to which the 
Crown turned in times of national emergency – to maintain order, to levy troops, 
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and to coordinate the realm’s land defences against invasion – but, it was by no 
means a permanent institution.   
   The Crown’s policy of appointing lord lieutenants only during times of 
crisis seems to have continued throughout the first twenty-five years of the 
Elizabethan era. This is despite the rather deceptive portrait that Thomson 
paints of the lieutenancy during this period: 
Examining ... the first thirty years of the [Elizabethan] reign, it will be 
found that except only for the year 1561, during which no Lieutenants 
were apparently appointed at all, there were always some 
Lieutenants in some counties.12  
 
Unfortunately, Thomson’s misconception has been repeated by some historians 
when writing their own analysis of Tudor local government.13 However, Neil 
Younger rightly points out that ‘no evidence has been found to suggest that 
lieutenancies had a continuous existence during the 1560s, 1570s and early 
1580s.’ Furthermore, he stresses that, prior to the 1580s, lord lieutenants seem 
to have been commissioned only three times: for two years following Elizabeth’s 
accession in 1558; in response to the rebellion of the Northern Earls between 
November 1569 and September 1570; and during a Spanish invasion scare in 
1574.14 Indeed, even the Elizabethan chorographer, William Harrison, 
acknowledged the office of lord lieutenant to be a sporadic expedient used only 
during periods of political strife: 
Over each of these shires in time of necessity is a several lieutenant 
chosen under the prince, who, being a nobleman of calling, hath 
almost regal authority over the same for the time being in many 
cases which do concern his office.15    
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The turning point in the evolution of the office of lord lieutenant came in 
July 1585 when eighteen counties were assigned lord lieutenants. From then 
on, as J. C. Sainty has pointed out, ‘lieutenants, once appointed, continued to 
act until their death or replacement.’16 Twelve out of the eighteen counties that 
were assigned a lord lieutenant in 1585 can be regarded as ‘maritime’. This 
zone included all of England’s southern counties – from Cornwall in the west to 
Kent in the east. The main catalyst for such an extensive engagement was the 
long-running hostility between England and Spain which finally erupted as open 
war in summer 1585.17 Following the deaths of both the Duke of Anjou and the 
Prince of Orange in 1584, the Dutch offered their sovereignty to Henry III of 
France. However, Henry rejected the offer and by March 1585 it was 
considered inevitable that Elizabeth would have to agree to become the 
protector of the Dutch in order to prevent the Spanish from acquiring a greater 
foothold in the region. Events then spiralled out of control: in April Elizabeth 
suspended English trade with the Spanish Netherlands; in May Philip II placed 
an embargo on all foreign ships in Spanish ports – an act considered by the 
English to be targeted directly at them; on 1 July Sir Francis Drake was 
authorised to attack Spanish vessels in the North Atlantic; on 18 July Elizabeth 
agreed to dispatch a military taskforce to the Netherlands; and during August 
and September the articles for the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Nonsuch were drafted 
and agreed upon.18 Thus, in the midst of this escalating situation the Crown 
deemed it prudent to appoint lord lieutenants, especially for the ‘frontline’ 
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counties running along England’s south coast, in order to prepare for a likely 
Spanish invasion attempt.  
Ultimately, all lord lieutenants owed their position to the Queen, a fact 
that is illuminated by the trouble that Lord Burghley (one of Elizabeth’s most 
senior ministers) had in securing a lieutenancy commission prior to 1587.19 
Therefore, an important question that needs answering is what criteria did the 
Queen and her advisors use when selecting candidates to serve as her lord 
lieutenants? On the one hand the Queen could choose a leading magnate from 
within the county or region in question. The positives of this approach were that 
the Crown could exploit not only the local magnate’s influence to facilitate the 
implementation of central government policies, but also his local knowledge in 
order to appreciate the particular characteristics of that locality which would help 
the Crown to avoid confrontation with both the county’s administrators and the 
general population. Moreover, the antipathy felt towards ‘outsiders’ in Tudor 
local government was potentially extremely destructive to the social and political 
harmony of a county or region. That said, the obvious disadvantage of 
appointing a magnate with a tangible local standing was that if the interests of 
the Crown and the county diverged then he might experience a divided sense of 
loyalty and could well have been inclined to favour the interests of the county 
over those of the Crown. Therefore, surely it was equally preferable to appoint 
an ‘outsider’: an individual who would, above all else, protect and promote the 
Crown’s interests, being ruthless if necessary in order to bring the Crown’s 
policies to fruition. However, the problem with the ‘outsider’ option was that he 
would inevitably face opposition, being viewed as an intruder in the county’s 
affairs. Such circumstances in fact arose following the appointment of Lord 
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Hunsdon as lord lieutenant of Norfolk in 1585. In theory, Hunsdon, a privy 
councillor with military experience and a cousin of the Queen, was the perfect 
candidate. However, he enjoyed little influence in Norfolk and soon fell foul to 
the problems outlined above.20 In the end the Queen decided to set aside the 
‘outsider’ option and adopt the practice of appointing individuals – the vast 
majority of whom were privy councillors – who held a local interest in the county 
or counties to which they were appointed. Whether or not this was directly 
influenced by the Hunsdon experience in Norfolk is uncertain. However, what is 
certain with the benefit of hindsight is that it created an institution that promoted 
consent and cooperation – the two cornerstones of Elizabeth’s system of 
government in her realm – and, in doing so, created an effective channel of 
communication between the Crown and the localities. Indeed, the fact that each 
lord lieutenant was recognised as having a manifest vested interest in the 
success of the county or counties where they were appointed was arguably the 
key to the well attested success of the lieutenancy system.21  
The expansion of the lieutenancies into all but one of the counties in 
England and Wales by summer 1588 is indicative of the extensive defence 
preparations that were being rolled out across the realm in anticipation of the 
Spanish Armada.22 It is therefore pertinent not only to outline the remit of the 
office of lord lieutenant in light of the threat posed by Spain, but also to flag up 
the varying geographical jurisdictions that different lord lieutenants were granted 
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by the Crown. In terms of remit, the lord lieutenants were given six core duties: 
to muster and train the county militia; to lead forces to suppress rebellious 
behaviour; to lead forces to defend the Queen and enforce peace; to oppose all 
traitors and rebels; to coordinate defence against foreign invasion; and to 
appoint muster-masters and a provost-marshal to assist in these tasks.23 
However, it must be stressed that these substantial powers were confined to the 
specific geographical unit outlined in a lord lieutenant’s commission. In the mid-
Tudor period it was customary to appoint one candidate to the lord lieutenancy 
of multiple counties – that is, more than three.24 However, by the late 1580s it 
had become much more usual to appoint an individual to the lord lieutenancy of 
just one and occasionally two counties.25 This shift in policy is indicative of the 
fact that the purpose of lord lieutenants had significantly changed during the 
second half of the sixteenth-century. Indeed, what had been a fleeting 
emergency measure, where the appointment of one individual to the lord 
lieutenancy of multiple counties would suffice, shifted to being a long-term 
central government expedient that required each lord lieutenant to forge a 
durable relationship with the county or counties under his control in order to 
implement the Crown’s wishes. It is this shift which no doubt prompted the 
Crown also to appoint lord lieutenants to jurisdictions other than the county.26 
Nevertheless, in the words of Younger, ‘the county remained the basic 
[jurisdictional] unit’.27  
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Devon’s Lord Lieutenant, 1586-1623 
 
Having briefly placed the office of lord lieutenant in a national context it is now 
possible to shift focus to the individual who became Devon’s Lord Lieutenant in 
autumn 1586 – William Bourchier, third Earl of Bath. John Roberts has been 
hyper-critical of Bath in his two-part biography of the ‘Armada Lord Lieutenant’. 
Bath is described in the introduction of part one as a man who had a ‘lack of 
force’ in character and is chastised for ‘the ineffective nature of his rule over the 
county’, Roberts continues in the same vain throughout; finishing his account by 
declaring that ‘the story of William Bourchier, 3rd Earl of Bath, is not typical of 
Elizabethan leaders, local or national, and is in some ways pathetic’.28 In 
contrast, Mark Stoyle has sought to restore Bath’s historical reputation arguing 
that ‘Bath took his military duties seriously’ and was ‘prompt and efficient in 
carrying them out’. Stoyle also points out that after an inauspicious start the Earl 
‘worked hard to maintain peace and good order’ in Devon and that on his death 
in July 1623 ‘the Crown lost a valued servant’.29 How might these two conflicting 
assessments be reconciled? This section will argue that Bath was indeed 
somewhat weak in character, particularly when compared with his mother, 
Frances Bourchier, and his father-in-law, Francis Russell, second Earl of 
Bedford. Furthermore, it will be shown that he lacked personal power and 
prestige both at the Elizabethan court and on a regional basis in the south-west. 
In fact, Bath was peculiarly dependent on his position as Devon’s lord lieutenant 
as the overriding source of his political and social standing. Thus, 
notwithstanding the flaws and weaknesses in his character and ability, the Earl 
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of Bath inevitably took his duties as lord lieutenant very seriously and as a result 
became a ‘valued servant’ of the Crown on the periphery of the realm.    
William Bourchier was the son of John Bourchier, Lord Fitzwarren (1529-
1557), and Frances (d.1586), daughter of Sir Thomas Kitson (1485-1540). In all 
likelihood William was born at Hengrave Hall near Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk, on 
an unknown date in 1557. By that time, Hengrave Hall had become the centre 
piece of the Kitson family estate that included land in the West Country as well 
as Suffolk. The land had been amassed by Sir Thomas Kitson (William 
Bourchier’s maternal grandfather) following a lucrative career as a merchant 
adventurer that included a stint as sheriff of London and a knighthood in 1533.30 
At his death in 1540 Kitson made plain that it was his desire for all of his fortune 
to be granted to his wife, Margaret Kitson (William Bourchier’s maternal 
grandmother). The only condition was that, should the unborn child that 
Margaret was carrying at the time of her husband’s death be a boy, then he 
would inherit his father’s wealth on reaching his majority. Margaret gave birth to 
a boy, Thomas, on 9 October 1540; he was William Bourchier’s uncle and later 
played a pivotal role in securing his nephew’s controversial first marriage. 
Nevertheless, at the time of her first husband’s death in 1540, Margaret Kitson 
became a very wealthy widow. Her wealth became even greater in 1544 
following the death of her father, John Donnington of Stoke Newington, 
Middlesex.31 As the beneficiary of two substantial estates, Margaret was well-
placed both to expand the influence of her family in West Suffolk and to obtain 
advantageous marriages for herself and her four Kitson daughters. For 
Margaret this initially involved a brief marriage to the influential courtier Sir 
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Richard Long of Shingay, Cambridgeshire (c.1494-1546).32 Long was a senior 
member of King Henry VIII’s Privy Chamber and was thus able to assist 
Margaret in furthering her family’s interests at court, an initiative which bore fruit 
in March 1543 when King Henry stood as godfather to Henry Long, the only son 
to be born from Margaret’s second marriage.33 In September 1546 Margaret 
again benefited financially following the death of her second husband, receiving 
a jointure from his estate. Soon after, she began her courtship with John 
Bourchier, second Earl of Bath (William Bourchier’s paternal grandfather). By 
1548 the couple were engaged in marriage that hinged on Margaret securing 
the marriage of Frances Kitson – her last remaining unmarried daughter from 
her first marriage – to the second Earl of Bath’s heir, John Bourchier, Lord 
Fitzwarren.34  Negotiations between the two couples proved successful and 
culminated in a joint marriage ceremony on 11 December 1548, thus unifying 
the Bourchier and Kitson dynasties.  
 Tawstock Court, situated just a few miles south of the north Devon port 
of Barnstaple, had been the Bourchier family’s primary residence since the 
fifteenth-century.35 It was therefore the likely birthplace of John Bourchier, 
second Earl of Bath (c.1500-1562).36 Bourchier began his public career in 1519 
with his appointment as sheriff of Somerset and Dorset. A knighthood followed 
in c.1523; however, it was not until 1539 that Bourchier, then aged forty, 
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succeeded to the earldom of Bath.37 The second Earl of Bath, described by 
Diarmaid MacCulloch as a ‘sound Catholic and conscientious Marian official’, 
owed his greatest political success to his decision to be one of the first to 
support Mary Tudor’s claim to the throne in 1553.38 Thus, for periods during the 
1550s, he was a JP in Suffolk and Norfolk, a privy councillor, and the governor 
of Beaumaris Castle in Anglesey.39 The second Earl of Bath’s marriage to 
Margaret Long was his third following the premature deaths of his first two 
wives. The Earl’s heir, John Bourchier, Lord Fitzwarren, resulted from his 
second marriage to Eleanor, sister of Thomas Manners, first Earl of Rutland, 
and daughter of George Manners, Lord Ros. Fitzwarren was knighted on 17 
November 1549 and was one of the hostages demanded by France at the 
conclusion of peace in 1550. However, his death at the age of only twenty-
seven on 28 February 1557 meant that he made little further impact. It is 
uncertain whether Lady Fitzwarren had already given birth to William at the time 
of her husband’s death. What is certain is that as a newborn baby William had 
become his grandfather’s heir.  
 According to the Devon biographer, John Prince, William was born at 
Tawstock Court on an unknown date in 1558.40 However, given the date of his 
father’s death, 1557 must be the true year of his birth. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that William was born at Hengrave Hall – a notion that is supported by the 
fact that his father, grandfather and grandmother were all buried there.41 The 
second Earl of Bath outlived his son by four years, dying on 10 February 1562. 
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Thus, at the age of just four, William Bourchier became the third Earl of Bath. Of 
course, the young Earl could not obtain his grandfather’s estate until he reached 
his majority and, as a minor, he was subject to the laws of wardship. Evidence 
that the dowager Countess of Bath petitioned the Queen for the wardship of her 
grandson exists in a draft letter that she wrote to an unknown courtier 
beseeching them to be ‘a meane to the Quenys Majestie that we maye have the 
only bringinge vppe of him duringe theise his tender yeres’.42 Evidently the 
dowager Countess was successful in her petition because her will granted 
custody of Tawstock Court together with all ‘suche stuffe and ymplementes of 
houshoulde’ to Lady Fitzwarren until her son reached the age of twenty-one.43          
 Lady Fitzwarren’s inclination was to raise and educate her son in Suffolk 
and Cambridgeshire, a decision which must have been influenced by her 
controversial second marriage to a Suffolk man, William Barnaby of Great 
Saxham, in September 1557.44 Thus, Bath attended school at Bury St Edmunds 
and then Ely before spending four years at Cambridge University (1573-7).45 In 
December 1577 he was still attending university when the first well-documented 
controversy of his life occurred. According to an account written by his uncle, Sir 
Thomas Kitson, Bath was invited to Hengrave Hall on Tuesday 9 December 
with the intention of finding him a suitable bride. Kitson had inherited his father’s 
estate on reaching his majority in 1561 and had married Elizabeth, daughter of 
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Sir Thomas Cornwallis of Brome, the year before. The Cornwallis family were 
renowned Catholics who inevitably benefited under Mary and suffered under 
Elizabeth. Indeed, Sir Thomas Cornwallis had also declared the right of Mary to 
succeed in 1553 and thus joined the second Earl of Bath as a privy councillor 
during the Marian regime.46 Kitson sympathised with his step-father’s and 
father-in-law’s Catholic beliefs and enjoyed tutelage from the latter in navigating 
the intricacies of county politics in Elizabethan Suffolk.47 Thus, it may well have 
been in gratitude to his father-in-law that Kitson had arranged for his unmarried 
sister-in-law, Mary Cornwallis, to be present at Hengrave Hall when the Earl of 
Bath arrived in order to obtain an advantageous marriage alliance for the 
beleaguered Cornwallis family.48  
Initially, Bath was supposedly troubled by the suggested match because 
of the identity of Mary’s father, ‘of whose deuotion and religion he much 
misliked’. However, on Thursday 11 December 1577 ‘not longe after dynner’ the 
Earl signified to his uncle that ‘his good will towardes the gentlewoman was 
verie much increased’ and by Saturday 13 December Mary was similarly ‘better 
inclyned then before’ to marry the Earl. Thus, according to Kitson, the only 
stumbling block to the marriage was Lady Fitzwarren who he claimed ‘thought 
soe evill of Sir Thomas Cornwaleys, me selfe, and my wife’. Accordingly, 
because ‘it was verie vnlikelie to atteyne his mothers good will’ and not wanting 
his nephew to ‘fall into strangers handes which would abuse his simplicitie to 
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ther owne gayne’ Kitson encouraged Bath to marry Mary covertly. Bath 
responded positively to his uncle’s chivvying and on the night of Sunday 14 
December 1577, ‘in the presence of diuerse gentlemen and others’, the young 
couple married. Unsurprisingly, on her discovery of this clandestine ceremony, 
Lady Fitzwarren was none too pleased and promptly dispatched her son 
‘secretlie into the west partes’ before proceeding vigorously to contest the 
validity of the marriage – a dispute which continued well into the seventeenth-
century. According to Sir Thomas Cornwallis in a letter that he wrote to Sir 
Robert Cecil on 10 June 1601 it had been upon ‘the earnest desire & affection 
of the Earle’ to marry his daughter.49 Indeed it was Cornwallis’ contention that 
Bath had ‘diuerse dayes both before and after the marriage’ gone to bed with 
Mary and had even bragged ‘with great Ioy’ on his return to Cambridge that he 
had married her. These accusations were completely denied by Bath in the 
immediate aftermath of the marriage with the Earl claiming, evidently under the 
direction of an infuriated Lady Fitzwarren, that he had been ‘made insensible 
with drink and at once put to bed with Mistress Mary’.50  Lady Fitzwarren 
appears to have viewed her son’s marriage into an infamous Catholic family as 
political suicide and sought vigorously to have the union annulled during the 
subsequent court case, apparently offering £500 as a bribe to one of the judges. 
When that failed Lady Fitzwarren escalated the matter, obtaining the help of the 
Queen’s favourite, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, to have the case retried 
using a handpicked commission of judges. Unsurprisingly the new commission 
ruled the marriage to be invalid leaving Mary Cornwallis destitute, a fact that 
encouraged Sir Thomas Kitson to bequeath his sister-in-law £300 when he 
wrote his will in June 1601 in guilty recognition of the role that he had played in 
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procuring the marriage.51 Nevertheless, Mary was viewed by her family as the 
rightful Countess of Bath until her death in 1627.52 
Bath therefore relocated to north Devon in 1578 not because he chose to 
but because, in the midst of controversy, his mother ordered him to. Lady 
Fitzwarren, having become a widow once again, joined her son at Tawstock 
soon after.53 Having played such a prominent role in securing the annulment of 
her son’s first marriage it is highly likely that Lady Fitzwarren was equally 
prominent during the negotiations for the Earl’s second marriage in 1582 to 
Elizabeth, daughter of Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford (1527-1585).54 
Bedford was the powerhouse of West Country politics during the first half of the 
Elizabethan era owing mainly to the fact that he had inherited large swathes of 
land in the region from his father and had acted as lord lieutenant of Dorset, 
Devon and Cornwall on an intermittent basis from 1557.55 However, it was not 
until 1577 that Bedford chose to reside on a more permanent basis in Devon, 
dividing his time between his mansion house in Tavistock, his town house in 
Exeter and Bedford House in London.56 Bedford, described by Wallace 
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MacCaffrey as ‘a stalwart and outspoken supporter of a vigorous evangelical 
Protestantism’, also sought to align himself and his family with those who 
shared similar religious sentiments, marrying off his eldest daughter, Anne, in 
November 1565 to Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick (elder brother of Robert 
Dudley, Earl of Leicester).57 Furthermore, the numerous bequests that Bedford 
made in his will to powerful politicians and senior members of the nobility 
confirms that he enjoyed an extensive network of influential friends and 
associates at the Elizabethan court who could be called upon to defend his 
interests and those of his family.58 Thus, the marriage that took place at St 
Stephens, Exeter, on 7 August 1582 between the Earl of Bath and Bedford’s 
daughter, Lady Elizabeth Russell, must have been agreed by the young Earl 
and his mother at least partly in the belief that they too would benefit from 
Bedford’s personal power and prestige.59  
In 1585 the alliance between the two families was further cemented by 
the marriage of Bath’s cousin Elizabeth, daughter of Henry Long, to Bath’s 
brother-in-law, Sir William Russell (c.1553-1613). In that same year Russell 
took part in the Earl of Leicester’s military expedition to the Netherlands, serving 
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as the lieutenant-general of the horse. It seems that Bath also joined the 
expedition, no doubt to ingratiate himself with his formidable father-in-law – 
whose religious views made him an ardent supporter of the expedition – while 
at the same time using it as an opportunity to forge friendships and alliances 
with the up-and-coming members of the late-Elizabethan aristocracy.60 Having 
demonstrated ‘outstanding valour in the battlefield’, Russell assumed the 
governorship of Flushing on 1 February 1587 – a position that he held for over 
two years.61 In contrast, Bath gained no military acclaim during the campaign 
and by summer 1586 he had returned to Devon to assume his commissions as 
a JP and vice-admiral – his first two notable positions in local government.62 
Much had changed during Bath’s absence in relation to the government 
of the county owing to the death of the second Earl of Bedford on 28 July 
1585.63 Bedford’s death left a significant power vacuum in the West Country 
with no one individual able to replicate his regional eminence.64 Coupled with 
the escalating conflict with Spain it appears that Elizabeth no longer deemed it 
prudent to place the western counties of Dorset, Devon and Cornwall under the 
command of just one lord lieutenant. By the end of December 1585 it was Lord 
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Burghley’s desire to assign the lord lieutenancy of Devon and Cornwall to the 
Lord Admiral, Charles Howard of Effingham, and the lord lieutenancy of Dorset 
to William Paulet, third Marquess of Winchester.65  However, the Queen was 
not to be rushed in her appointments and decided to allow the Deputy 
Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall – who had always shown great ‘zeale’ in the 
execution of the Crown’s orders – to oversee the mustering and training of the 
militia in their respective counties on an interim basis without a lord lieutenant.66  
This situation lasted less than a year: by autumn 1586 the lord 
lieutenancy of Dorset had been granted to the Marquess of Winchester; 
Cornwall’s to Sir Walter Ralegh; and Devon’s to the Earl of Bath. However, on 
account of Bath’s ‘young years’ and inexperience, Devon’s Deputy Lieutenant’s 
maintained some of their privileged status with Bath being ordered by the Privy 
Council to ‘use the counsel of the gentlemen named in your commission to be 
by you appointed to be your deputies’.67 John Roberts has placed much stock 
on this seemingly unique order, arguing in his biography of Bath that it 
demonstrated ‘the critical attitude of the government towards the county’s sole 
earl.’68  However, before one views Bath with similar derision it is important to 
point out that to have governed a large frontline county such as Devon during 
wartime without following the advice and obtaining the cooperation of the 
Deputy Lieutenants – the majority of whom exercised substantial influence in 
their local regions of the county – would have been foolish. Furthermore, in 
spring 1586 Lady Fitzwarren, who had played such a pivotal role in Bath’s 
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49 
 
upbringing, died.69 Thus, the Privy Council’s order for Bath to follow the advice 
of his deputies may well reflect their sympathy and their prudence rather than 
any specific lack of confidence or personal criticism of his supposed abilities or 
personal qualities. However, the prestige that Bath enjoyed following his 
appointment as lord lieutenant was soon overshadowed by the ordeal of having 
to bury his first two sons, John and Robert, on 12 March 1587 and 27 May 1588 
respectively. Both had been baptised just fifteen months prior to their deaths 
with the baptism of Robert and the burial of John tragically separated by just 
nine days.70 Fortunately, the Earl and Countess had a third son, Edward, who 
was baptised on 1 March 1590. He survived to succeed to the earldom on his 
father’s death in 1623.71  
The late 1580s and early 1590s were thus turbulent years for the Earl 
and Countess of Bath. Indeed, the infant deaths of their first two sons may well 
have provided the root cause for the hostility that existed between the couple.72 
On 16 April 1594 Anne Dudley, Countess of Warwick, wrote a scathingly critical 
letter to her brother-in-law from the court in complaint of the maltreatment that 
he had offered her younger sister.73 The Countess also threatened that should 
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Peerage, ii, p. 17). 
70
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her brother-in-law not amend his behaviour she would inform the Queen in a bid 
to obtain the couple’s separation: 
you are become soe voyd of judgment and discretion to offer such 
abuses still unto her ... yow shall well knowe that she hath frends 
who will not suffer her anie longer to be thus abused without cause, 
and therefore if that which I heare be true, I purpose to acquainte her 
Majestie therwith ... and indeed unless yow had more governement 
of your selfe I will seeke that my sister may have her portion and go 
lyve from yow ... I pray for your amendement.74     
 
Evidently Bath’s marital problems were a hot topic of conversation at court 
because just a day after the Countess of Warwick had written her letter Robert 
Devereux, second Earl of Essex, wrote to Bath with his own views on the 
matter.75 Essex reminded his friend that having ‘rashly allmost intangled 
yourself in bonds thatt ware nott worthy to hold you’ (a reference to Bath’s first 
marriage to Mary Cornwallis) he had been lucky enough to obtain a match ‘in a 
very noble house with a Lady both of greatt honor and frends’.  However, he 
went on to warn the Earl that the Countess of Bath’s friends were ‘far greater’ 
than his and that ‘her cause will make her more frends’ if she continued to 
suffer.76 Both letters are invaluable in shedding light on Bath’s troubled 
domestic life. However, they also underline the importance of personal 
relationships and social connections in the Elizabethan political system. 
Specifically, they reveal that Bath – a nobleman residing at the distant periphery 
of the realm – struggled in the 1590s to cultivate the necessary social network 
of powerful friends and associates at the court to defend his reputation and 
uphold his personal interests. Indeed, even Bath himself acknowledged the 
disadvantage of living so far away from the centre of affairs in a letter that he 
                                                                                                                                         
Jan 2008) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/69744> [accessed 27 Feb 2012] (para. 3 of 
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wrote to one of his deputy lieutenants, Edward Seymour, on 12 September 
1596. Within the letter Bath demonstrated an interest in becoming lord warden 
of the stannaries – a position thought to be vacant owing to a rumour that Sir 
Walter Ralegh was dead. However, Bath also revealed that he had little 
confidence in being chosen by the Queen to succeed Ralegh because he 
believed that ‘her Majestie will laye it vppon some person nearer to the Courte 
and of more sufficiencye then my self.’77       
Having established that Bath lacked both political and social standing at 
the Elizabethan court during the 1590s – a fact that partly reflected his perennial 
absence from the centre of affairs – one would be forgiven for thinking that he 
possessed substantial regional eminence instead. However, when comparing 
the parliamentary borough influence enjoyed by his father-in-law, the second 
Earl of Bedford, during the elections for the first four Elizabethan parliaments 
with that of the Earl of Bath’s in the last five it becomes clear that this was not 
the case.78 P. W. Hasler estimates that for the first four Elizabethan parliaments 
138 (40%) of members out of the 346 returned by Cornwall, Devon and Dorset 
(the highest regional concentration of parliamentary seats in the country) owed 
their seats either to Bedford’s direct nomination or his indirect influence.79 In 
contrast, Bath’s influence during the final five Elizabethan parliaments (save for 
a sole nomination for Dartmouth in 1589) was restricted to Barnstaple where he 
held the nomination for just one of the two members that the borough was 
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enfranchised to elect.80 Thus, Bath’s nominations for the last five Elizabethan 
parliaments came to just seven. For Barnstaple these were Thomas Hinson 
(1586, 1588 and 1597), George Chittinge (1593), George Peard (1597) and 
Edward Hancock (1601); and for Dartmouth Roger Papworth (1589).81 Put 
another way, Bath’s parliamentary borough influence within Devon stood at just 
under 9% compared with Bedford’s 40% in all three western counties.82 What 
personal power and prestige Bath enjoyed in Devon was therefore localised in 
the north of the county and centred in particular on Barnstaple. Indeed, John 
Roberts has described the young Earl as having ‘almost undisputed sway’ in the 
town from 1586 onwards. By the 1590s Bath was the town’s recorder and as 
such he sporadically commanded a certain degree of respect from Barnstaple’s 
townsmen, particularly when they were in need of his legal aid and assistance.83 
Indeed, Bath would undoubtedly have resided for considerable amounts of time 
at his Barnstaple town house during periods when the townsmen were seeking 
his favour.84 Furthermore, there are frequent entries in Barnstaple’s receivers’ 
accounts of payments relating to gifts and dinners that were bestowed upon 
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Bath and his followers by the town’s mayor and chief inhabitants no doubt in 
order to lubricate relationships and obtain Bath’s support for the town’s 
causes.85   
Thus, in assessing certain aspects of the Earl of Bath’s early life and 
career this section has endeavoured to underline that William Bourchier was not 
what one might regard as a typical lord lieutenant. During the first section of this 
chapter two types of lord lieutenant were outlined. First, the local magnate who 
held a vested interest in the success of the county or counties where he was 
appointed, an interest though that might make him inclined to neglect the 
interests of the Crown should those interests diverge from the interests of the 
county or counties under his lieutenancy. And second, the ‘outsider’ who had no 
vested interest in the county or counties assigned to him and, as a result, could 
be ruthless in protecting and promoting the Crown’s interests but who probably 
suffered from a lack of consent and cooperation from those who inhabited the 
area under his control. Bath, uniquely, was neither of these; rather he was a 
hybrid of the two. He was a local magnate living in Devon and as such held a 
vested interest in the success of the county, but at the same time he was an 
‘outsider’ having spent his formative years in Suffolk and Cambridgeshire and 
he thus enjoyed only a moderate level of local influence and esteem in Devon 
especially when compared to his father-in-law, the second Earl of Bedford. 
Consequently, the Queen’s choice of Bath no doubt largely respected the fact 
that following Bedford’s death there was no other viable alternative: Bedford’s 
heir was a minor; Sir Walter Ralegh had been appointed lord lieutenant of 
Cornwall; and Lord Admiral Howard was an ‘outsider’. Nevertheless, in Bath the 
Crown benefited from an individual who depended on his lord lieutenancy for 
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the vast majority of his power and prestige and therefore endeavoured to fulfil 
his duties to the best of his ability. Furthermore, he was able to rely heavily on 
the advice and assistance of his Deputy Lieutenants, the majority of whom were 
influential power brokers in their specific regions of the county. 
 
Deputy lieutenants  
 
According to Neil Younger ‘deputies were seldom appointed in counties where 
the lord lieutenant was very clearly a “country” peer, without major office at 
court and therefore available to be in his county when necessary.’86 It has been 
demonstrated in the previous section that the Earl of Bath was one of these 
‘country’ peers who lacked major office at court; however, the fact that he also 
lacked an appropriate level of prestige within Devon may well have been a key 
factor in the Crown’s decision to appoint five deputy lieutenants to advise and 
assist him when he assumed the lord lieutenancy of Devon in autumn 1586. 
That said, Bath’s lack of regional status was not the only or probably even the 
primary reason for the existence of a deputy lieutenancy within Devon. Indeed, 
it has been revealed that the second Earl of Bedford – a man who commanded 
substantial regional esteem – had five deputy lieutenants of his own at the time 
of his death in 1585. Thus, the Crown’s decision to appoint deputy lieutenants in 
Devon regardless of the fact that the county had a resident lord lieutenant from 
1577 onwards was doubtless made chiefly for operational and strategic reasons 
rather than being a personal criticism of Bath. After all, Devon is one of 
England’s largest counties and its location on the frontline of England’s war with 
Spain and the rebellion in Ireland made it strategically vital.  
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 Customarily the social standing of a deputy lieutenant was that of senior 
gentry. Furthermore, unlike some lord lieutenants, deputies were ordinarily 
appointed to serve within just one county, city, or regional jurisdiction.87 In terms 
of its size and membership the deputy lieutenancy differed greatly from the 
commission of the peace, with the latter, in the words of Alfred Hassell-Smith, 
being ‘in a constant state of flux’.88 Indeed, as early as the mid-sixteenth century 
the commission of the peace had started to attract criticism in some quarters 
due to its ever expanding membership.89 In particular, the Secretary of State, 
Sir Thomas Smith, explained to William Cecil in July 1549 that it would be much 
better to have ‘one or two responsible gentlemen in each shire to inforce the 
King's proclamations’.90 According to Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, Cecil held 
much the same view, and was a firm believer that the ‘multiplication of 
magistrates ... only enhanced the inefficiency of local administration ... by 
muddying the lines of communication between the centre and localities, and by 
diluting the authority of the individual justice and eroding ... [their] personal 
responsibility.’91 Thus, whereas it was the general trend for the identity of JPs 
within each county constantly to change, and their numbers consistently to 
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increase year on year throughout the second half of the sixteenth-century, the 
Crown was at pains to ensure that the lieutenancy remained a much more 
stable and exclusive office with deputies more often than not retaining their 
position until death. That said there was a definite growth in the number of 
deputy lieutenants appointed within each county from 1585 onwards. Indeed, in 
that year it had been usual for most counties, especially small inland counties 
that were not susceptible to foreign invasion, to have just two or even one 
deputy lieutenant. However, by the end of the Elizabethan era this had changed 
with most counties possessing more: Shropshire and Dorset had five; Kent six; 
Cornwall either seven or eight; and Devon was unsurpassed with nine.92 
However, despite the growth in membership, the lieutenancy remained an elite 
and prestigious office that was eagerly sought because, in the words of Henry 
Herbert, second Earl of Pembroke, ‘all men cannot be deputy lieutenants ... 
some must govern, some must obey.’93 
Ultimately, the final decision whether or not to appoint a deputy 
lieutenant was made by the monarch on the advice of the Privy Council. In 
some circumstances this decision-making process included specifically 
choosing the individuals who would be appointed, however, for peripheral 
regions of the realm that were less well known to the Crown the selection of 
individuals to serve as deputy lieutenants was often deferred to the relevant lord 
lieutenant. For example, having been newly commissioned as lord lieutenant of 
Wales at the beginning of 1587, the Earl of Pembroke was given permission, 
subject to the Crown’s approval, to 
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take some course for the choice of certain principal gentlemen in 
every of the said counties (such as are well known to be of sound 
disposition towards her Majesty and the State) to have chief charge 
under your Lordship to serve as your Deputy Lieutenants.94   
 
In Devon, as a result of his ‘young years’ and inexperience, the Earl of Bath 
played no part in this decision-making process when he became the county’s 
lord lieutenant in autumn 1586. However, as he gained experience, Bath 
acquired greater influence in selecting his deputies, a fact that is confirmed by a 
copy of a letter sent from the Privy Council to the Lord Keeper, Sir Thomas 
Egerton (one of only two officials who could issue a new lieutenancy 
commission), on 31 October 1596 approving Bath’s decision to appoint Edward 
Seymour a deputy lieutenant: 
the said Earle of Bath beinge her Majesties Leuetenant can well iudge 
who are fittest to be aydinge and assestinge vnto him in those 
affaires Wee doe therefore praie your Lordship: to Cause the 
Comission of Leiuetenauncye for the Countie of Devon to be renewed 
... and in the same to nominate and appointe Edward Seymour 
esquire for a Deputie Leuetenant.95 
 
Thus, Bath went from playing no part in the appointment of his deputies in 1586, 
to possessing just ten years later a similar degree of influence to that of the Earl 
of Pembroke. Evidently, Mark Stoyle’s contention that Bath died a ‘valued 
servant’ of the Crown in July 1623 was well on its way to fruition by the end of 
the 1590s.  
 
Devon’s Deputy Lieutenants, 1586-1603 
 
As already noted, for a brief period after the death of the second Earl of Bedford 
in summer 1585 and before Bath’s appointment to the office in autumn 1586, 
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Devon’s lieutenancy was jointly commanded by Bedford’s five deputies: Sir 
William Courtenay, Sir Arthur Bassett, Sir Robert Denys, Sir John Gilbert I and 
Sir John Chichester. The only change to this arrangement came in spring 1586 
when Chichester and Bassett died of gaol fever following their attendance at 
Exeter’s infamous ‘Black Assizes’.96 Thus, by the time that Bath assumed his 
position as lord lieutenant, Hugh Fortescue and George Cary had been 
appointed in place of their deceased predecessors.97 This section seeks to 
place in context the five men who occupied the position of deputy lieutenant 
following the appointment of the Earl of Bath as lord lieutenant in autumn 1586, 
as well as the nine others who were appointed to this elevated and prominent 
local office throughout the late-Elizabethan era. The intention is to document a 
further tier in a political system that depended on personal relationships. It 
therefore underlines the importance of the personalities and social networks 
that operated at the apex of power and influence in late-Elizabethan Devon. In 
particular, the study reveals certain key attributes necessary to securing a place 
on late-Elizabethan Devon’s lieutenancy commission: family connections; 
strategic marriage; wealth and status; geographical location of residence; 
having a patron of high status at court; timely personal lobbying; political 
ambition; local reputation, respect and influence. Thus, the underlying message 
that this analysis seeks to project is that securing political office in Elizabethan 
local government was as  much  to  do  with  one’s  personal  relationships  and  
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1586 1593 1596 1599 1601 1603 
Sir William Courtenay 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sir Robert Denys 2      
Sir John Gilbert I 3 2     
Hugh Fortescue Esq. 4 3 2 2   
Sir George Cary 5 4 3 3 2 2 
Sir Thomas Denys  5 4 4 3 3 
Sir Francis Drake  6     
Sir Richard Champernowne   5 5 4 4 
Sir Ferdinando Gorges   6 6   
Sir Edward Seymour   7 7 5 5 
Sir William Strode    8 6 6 
Sir John Gilbert II     7 7 
Sir Robert Bassett     8 8 
Hugh Pollard Esq.     9 9 
Anthony Monck Esq.*      10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The names and number of Devon deputy lieutenants, 1586-1603.98  
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1. Tawstock – William Bourchier, Earl of Bath 
2. Powderham – Sir William Courtenay 
3. Bicton – Sir Robert Denys 
4. Greenway – Sir John Gilbert I  
5. Weare Giffard – Hugh Fortescue Esq. 
6. Cockington – Sir George Cary 
7. Bicton – Sir Thomas Dennys 
8. Buckland Abbey – Sir Francis Drake 
9. Modbury – Sir Richard Champernowne 
10. St Nicholas Island – Sir Ferdinando Gorges  
11. Berry Pomeroy – Sir Edward Seymour  
12. Newnham – Sir William Strode 
13. St Nicholas Island – Sir John Gilbert II 
14. Umberleigh – Sir Robert Bassett 
15. Kings Nympton – Hugh Pollard Esq. 
 
Figure 2.2: Principal residences of Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants, 1586-
1603.    
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social connections as it was to do with the particular requirements of the 
moment and an individual’s ability to do the job. A summary table (figure 2.1) 
presents the chronology of the appointments and/or removals of individuals 
serving on Devon’s lieutenancy commission and highlights the increase in the 
number of deputy lieutenants from five in 1586 to ten in 1603. Furthermore, a 
map of the principal residences of Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants (figure 
2.2) provides a visual appreciation of the geographical concentration of the 
officeholders in the south of the county – a trend which owed largely to the 
importance that the Crown attached to defending Devon’s south coast 
throughout the Elizabethan war with Spain. 
 
Sir William Courtenay of Powderham (1553-1630) 
 
By far the most senior of Bath’s deputies, signing his name just under the Earl’s 
in all lieutenancy correspondence, was Sir William Courtenay of Powderham.99 
In fact, Courtenay was the de jure Earl of Devon, a position that was only 
granted to him 201 years after his death following a curious ruling that the 
House of Lords made in 1831. Intriguingly, had Courtenay been granted his 
position among the nobility while alive he would have been a plausible 
alternative to Bath as Devon’s lord lieutenant. While there is no concrete 
evidence to suggest that Courtenay ever sought to obtain his rightful title during 
his lifetime it was certainly the belief of the Spanish Ambassador, Bernardino 
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De Mendoza, immediately before the discovery of the Babington Plot that he 
would do so if given the opportunity:  
Sir William Courtney, a Catholic, who expects to be able in the 
turmoil [of an invasion] to recover the earldom of Devonshire, which 
is his by right. He is a person of great weight and credit in the west, 
and promises to ensure the possession of the port of Plymouth.100  
 
De Mendoza’s assertion that Courtenay would assist the Spanish in their 
planned invasion was, in the words of John Roberts, ‘almost certainly a bait to 
lead the Spaniards on’; in fact Sir Walter Ralegh was also involved in a similar 
deception at the time.101 In contrast, the allegation that Courtenay was a 
Catholic was based on firmer ground and will be discussed further in due 
course.  
 Courtenay succeeded his father, also named William Courtenay, at the 
age of just four after the latter had been supposedly slain at the siege of St 
Quintin, France, on 18 August 1557. William Courtenay the elder had married 
Elizabeth, daughter of John Paulet, second Marquess of Winchester, in 
November 1545 and she gave birth to William Courtenay the younger in 1553. 
On his father’s death Courtenay became the ward of his maternal great-
grandfather, William Paulet, first Marquess of Winchester, who, as Lord 
Treasurer, ensured that William’s formative years were spent at court.102 By the 
time Courtenay married his first wife, Elizabeth, daughter of Henry Manners, 
second Earl of Rutland, in January 1573 he was known personally to the Queen 
and was a member of a circle of courtiers that included his wife’s uncle, Roger 
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Manners – a court favourite who protected Courtenay’s interests at the centre of 
affairs following the latter’s relocation to Devon.103  
Courtenay’s relocation to Devon no doubt occurred after finishing his 
legal education at Middle Temple in 1578.104 From thenceforward he was based 
on a more permanent basis at Powderham Castle. Overlooking the estuary of 
the River Exe from its western shore and just over seven miles downstream 
from Exeter (see figure 2.2), Powderham had been the Courtenay family’s 
primary residence since the fourteenth-century. However, Powderham was just 
a small part of much more extensive lands that still included eighteen other 
notable Devon manors at the time of Courtenay’s death in 1630.105 Courtenay’s 
first commission in local government was as a Devon JP which he occupied 
throughout the late-Elizabethan era. He also stood as sheriff of Devon between 
1579 and 1580 and was the county’s senior knight of the shire for the 
parliaments of 1584, 1589 and 1601.106 These positions, in combination with his 
de jure noble status, landed wealth and deputy lieutenancy, provided Courtenay 
with the credentials to claim his place at the pinnacle of Devon’s gentry. His 
ability to secure and retain that position during the 1590s no doubt owed much 
to his seemingly unscrupulous personality and to the grudging respect that he 
commanded amongst his contemporaries. Certainly the Earl of Bath was weary 
of his deputy’s Machiavellian nature, so much so that on 2 November 1592 he 
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wrote to Lord Burghley describing Courtenay as ‘a man who though he geue 
himself ouer to all vyce, as drinking, and hooring ... he neyther want witt to 
deuyse, nor might to practyse, how to strengthen him self, and weaken 
others’.107  
However, the power and respect within Devon that Courtenay enjoyed 
during the reign of Elizabeth I gradually eroded following the accession of 
James I. This was chiefly as a result of his move towards Catholicism; a shift 
engendered by his third marriage to the openly Catholic Jane, daughter of 
Robert Hill of Yard, Somerset.108 The earlier influence of the recusant Paulet 
family during Courtenay’s infancy may well have planted the seed from which 
his conversion grew and which became publicly known in 1610 when Sir 
William and Lady Courtenay were ‘compelled’ to take the oath of allegiance on 
account of their recusancy.109 Worse though was to come in 1614 when 
Courtenay was made to surrender his deputy lieutenancy – as a recusant he 
could no longer occupy public office.110 Nevertheless, there is certainly no 
evidence, save for the rather biased accusations of men like Bernardino De 
Mendoza, to suggest that he openly practised Catholicism during his early 
career and, even if he did, it did not necessarily follow that he was disloyal to 
the Crown. Indeed, the fact that Courtenay was entrusted with such prominent 
positions in the administration and defence of Devon during the Armada years 
strongly indicates that any uncertainty in relation to his loyalty was not felt by 
Elizabeth and her Privy Council during the 1580s and 1590s.  
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Sir Robert Denys of Bicton and Holcombe Burnell (c.1530-1592)     
 
Whereas Sir William Courtenay was at the peak of his career during the 1580s 
and 1590s, Sir Robert Denys’ influence was drawing to a close. Denys was the 
eldest son and heir of Sir Thomas Denys (c.1477-1561) – the assiduous Devon 
lawyer and administrator whose rise to prominence had come about chiefly 
because of the time he had spent at court during his youth where he married 
wisely and cultivated important alliances with both Cardinal Wolsey and 
Thomas Cromwell.111 This rise also included a string of important positions in 
local government. Denys was an MP for Devon in the parliaments of 1529, 1539 
and 1553, he was twice chosen as recorder of Exeter, and was appointed a 
deputy lieutenant of both Devon and Cornwall in 1558.112 Indeed, John Cooper 
has pointed out that the marriage of his eldest son to Mary, daughter of William 
Blount, fourth Baron Mountjoy, on 4 April 1552 ‘indicates how the standing of 
the Denys family had risen in Thomas’s lifetime’.113  
 Sir Robert Denys, who succeeded Sir Thomas on 18 February 1561, 
never replicated his father’s success at court, choosing instead to reside on a 
near permanent basis in Devon. His two primary residences within the county 
were at Bicton and Holcombe Burnell. Both were just a short ride from Exeter 
with the former approximately twelve miles south-east of the city and the latter 
approximately four miles west (see figure 2.2). However, even on a local level, 
Denys was only able partially to emulate his father’s success, standing as an 
MP for Devon just once in 1555, acting as the recorder of Exeter from 1572 and 
occupying the office of deputy lieutenant of Devon but not Cornwall during the 
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1580s.114 Nevertheless, he does seem to have had a good working relationship 
with the chief inhabitants of Exeter; regularly receiving visitors, letters and gifts 
from the city at his Bicton residence, the majority of which related to his 
positions in local government.115 
 By 1592 Denys’ health had deteriorated to such an extent that he 
struggled to honour his lieutenancy commitments, a fact that is revealed by a 
schedule of Devon’s militia that the Earl of Bath sent to the Privy Council in that 
year: 
For Sir: Robert Denys his Regiment in the Easte devision. I haue not 
receyued any certificate at all. the cause whereof I finde to be his 
longe sicknes and present extremitie as I am aduertised by his sonne 
Sir: Thomas Denys: whome I haue alwayes founde to be verie dutifull 
& forwarde in all occasions of her Majesties seruice, and he hath 
promised to repaire vnto me with his fathers certificate verie 
shortlye.116        
 
Evidently Denys’ son was positioning himself to replace his father once he had 
died. He did not have long to wait for Denys’ will was written on 15 July 1592 
and was proved following his death just a few months later. The content of that 
will reveals much about Denys’ personality. As a champion of the poor, Denys 
started building an almshouse in 1591 and he urged his son to finish it ‘withe as 
muche speede as convenientlye may be’. He also made monetary bequests to 
the poor people living in the hundreds near to where he lived as well as granting 
£6 13s. 4d. to the prisoners of Exeter gaol. In addition, Denys, clearly a man 
with a conscience, added a codicil to his will in recognition of how little he had 
initially bequeathed to his ‘lovinge wife’.117      
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Sir John Gilbert I of Greenway (c.1536-1596) 
 
The only other survivor from the second Earl of Bedford’s lieutenancy was Sir 
John Gilbert I. Gilbert was the eldest of three sons from the first marriage of 
Katherine, daughter of Sir Phillip Champernowne of Modbury, to Otho Gilbert of 
Greenway.118 Following Otho Gilbert’s death on 18 February 1547 Katherine 
married Walter Ralegh of Fardel. This union produced two more sons, the 
youngest being the widely celebrated Sir Walter Ralegh (1554-1618).119 Thus, 
Sir John Gilbert I was the older half-brother of one of the Elizabethan era’s most 
prominent personalities. Gilbert’s own career was by comparison rather modest. 
Nevertheless, he served as a much-valued local agent for his courtier half-
brother and occupied a prominent position in the government of Elizabethan 
Devon for over forty years. 
 Gilbert was very much a Devon man who seems to have resided within 
the county on a permanent basis throughout his entire life. His two key places of 
residence – inherited on the death of his father in 1547 – were Compton Castle 
and Greenway. The former is located approximately four miles north-west of Tor 
Bay in the south of the county, whereas the latter lies approximately five miles 
north of Dartmouth overlooking the River Dart estuary on its eastern bank (see 
figure 2.2). Gilbert’s proximity to one of Elizabethan Devon’s premier ports 
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coupled with his close relationship with Ralegh made him the ideal person to 
organise supplies for the latter’s numerous marine expeditions.120 It was thus 
customary for Ralegh to write to Gilbert from the court prior to his fleet sailing 
down to Devon from its moorings at Deptford or Chatham to ensure that his 
half-brother had items such as bread, cider and dried Newfoundland fish ready 
and waiting in Dartmouth or Plymouth.121 Ralegh’s fleet was then able to anchor 
briefly at either port, pick up the victuals, and be on their way to the New World 
with the minimum amount of fuss. Furthermore, Gilbert levied soldiers from 
Devon and Cornwall to form the companies within Ralegh’s fleet and purchased 
weapons so that they were appropriately armed to board foreign vessels, fend 
off other privateers and pillage unsuspecting coastline communities.122 In return 
Ralegh acted as an important connection for Gilbert with the Elizabethan court, 
supplying the most up-to-date news and gossip whilst at the same time utilising 
his position as one of the Queen’s favourites to protect and promote his half-
brother’s interests.123  
Gilbert’s ability to assist Ralegh was a result of the prominent position 
that he had been able to acquire for himself within the government of Devon. 
The catalyst for this may well have been in November 1556 when he married 
Elizabeth, daughter of Sir Richard Chudleigh of Ashton.124  Chudleigh was an 
associate of the second Earl of Bedford and therefore the marriage was no 
doubt regarded by Gilbert as an opportunity to forge his own association with 
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Devon’s principal magnate.125 This association certainly seems to have been 
cemented by the 1570s because in June 1574 Bedford had deemed it 
appropriate to nominate Gilbert as one of his deputy lieutenants and, just one 
year later, he commended his deputy for the great ‘care and diligence’ that he 
had demonstrated in serving the Crown.126  
An important element of Gilbert’s service to the Crown was coordinating 
the handling of captured Spanish vessels and it is in this aspect of his public 
service that much of the evidence concerning his personality can be found.127 
Sir John Gilbert, described by Roberts as ‘a hot-tempered man, capable of 
strong feelings’, may well have been industrious and efficient in promoting both 
the Crown’s and his family’s interests but he also seems to have been a man 
who was ‘eager for personal gain’ and financial profit.128 Indeed, his fellow 
deputy lieutenant, George Cary, believed him to be a man who was ‘not 
disposed to tak payne where no gayne cometh’.129 Furthermore, he was 
accused of prohibiting others from dealing with Spanish vessels so that he 
could embezzle some of the captured goods for himself and his associates and 
then sell the remainder without a Privy Council warrant.130 Gilbert received 
warnings from the Privy Council in response to accusations of this nature.131 
Nevertheless, he ‘hotly’ defended his reputation against any suggestion that he 
acted dishonourably and no doubt believed that he was owed a portion of any 
captured Spanish goods in recompense for his loyal service to the Crown.132       
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Hugh Fortescue Esq. of Filleigh and Weare Giffard (1544-1600) 
 
Between his appointment in 1586 and his death on 1 August 1600 Hugh 
Fortescue was the Earl of Bath’s only deputy to reside in north Devon. One of 
his direct antecedents, Martin Fortescue (d.1472), had originally lived at 
Holbeton in the south of the county.133  However, on 10 September 1454 he 
married Elizabeth, daughter and heir of Richard Deynsell of Filleigh and Weare 
Giffard, and relocated to north Devon.134 John Fortescue (1460-1503) – Martin 
and Elizabeth’s eldest son – took control of both manors following the death of 
his mother and, from then on, this particular branch of the Fortescue family 
chose to reside permanently at Filleigh and Weare Giffard – the former being 
situated about eight miles south-east of Barnstaple and the latter approximately 
four miles south of Bideford (see figure 2.2).135 Hugh Fortescue assumed 
control of both manors at the age of twenty-six following the death of his father, 
Richard, on 30 June 1570.136  
Little documentary evidence survives for Fortescue’s life and career.137 
Nevertheless, he was one of three captains assigned to inspect the Armada 
levies in north Devon in 1588, was one of Devon’s fifty-five JPs to be named on 
the commission of the peace in 1592 and appears to have had substantial 
commercial interests in milling and husbandry.138 Furthermore, Fortescue 
seems to have been closely associated with the Chichesters of Raleigh – an 
association that was formalised by his marriage to Elizabeth, daughter of Sir 
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John Chichester.139 Chichester had a total of nine daughters and eight sons and 
he was able to secure advantageous marriages for many of them with spouses 
belonging to other leading Devon families.140 Thus, Fortescue enjoyed an 
extensive network of familial contacts that spanned the entire county. Indeed, it 
seems highly likely that Fortescue’s association with the Chichester’s coupled 
with his widespread social connections influenced the Privy Council when they 
nominated him to succeed his brother-in-law, Sir John Chichester, as a deputy 
lieutenant following the latter’s untimely death of gaol fever on 31 March 1586.   
      
Sir George Cary of Cockington (1541-1617) 
 
It has already been revealed that Sir Arthur Bassett lost his life in 1586 following 
his attendance at Exeter’s ‘Black Assizes’. Bassett’s chief residence was at 
Umberleigh in north Devon, approximately eight miles south of Barnstaple, and 
he, like Fortescue, had married one of Sir John Chichester’s daughters. Thus, 
one might be forgiven for thinking that the Queen would have chosen another 
gentleman from north Devon to replace Bassett. However, in George Cary she 
chose an individual whose chief residence was in the south of the county. 
Cockington Court, situated just inland from Tor Bay and about ten miles north of 
Dartmouth, had been the chief residence of one branch of the Cary family from 
as early as 1375 (see figure 2.2). In that year the Cary family had divided: Sir 
William Cary chose to reside in Clovelly, about eleven miles west of Bideford in 
north Devon, whereas his brother, Sir John Cary, Chief Baron of the Exchequer, 
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moved his family south to Cockington.141 George Cary was a direct descendent 
of the latter brother. The decision to appoint another deputy lieutenant on the 
south coast of the county as opposed to the north may well have been 
influenced by the growing threat from Spain. Nevertheless, the Crown had 
appointed an individual who also commanded, partly through his cousin and 
namesake George Cary of Clovelly, a significant degree of influence in north 
Devon.142  
 Having been legally educated at the Inner Temple from 1558, Cary 
assumed control of his Devon estate at the age of twenty-six following the death 
of his father, Thomas Cary, in 1567. Cary’s early career was very much centred 
in Devon and by the 1570s he was fast becoming a leading member of the 
county’s government: from 1572 he was a captain of the county militia; from 
c.1579 he was a JP; in 1586 he was elected an MP for Dartmouth; and three 
years later he stood as Devon’s junior knight of the shire.143 However, Cary’s 
close association with the second Earl of Essex resulted in him joining his 
patron, who had been appointed lord deputy of Ireland, on his secondment to 
the province in 1598.144 Cary was appointed as Essex’s under-treasurer from 1 
March 1599 as a result of the ‘discrecion and fidelitye’ he had shown in previous 
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service to the Crown and was intended to be a ‘pryncipall member’ of the Irish 
Council which no doubt partly explained his knighthood in that same year.145  
During his time away, Cary endeavoured to maintain his standing in 
Devon, particularly with the chief inhabitants of Totnes to whom he had given 
much legal advice during the 1590s in connection with their ongoing dispute 
with the town’s more humble residents. This advice ensured that he displaced 
Richard Sparry as the town’s recorder in 1596.146 On 28 September 1601 Cary 
wrote to the Mayor of Totnes from Dublin asking that he be granted the 
nomination for one of the town’s MPs for the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections.147 Cary desired his agent, Thomas Watson, to have the nomination 
and Watson himself wrote a follow-up letter to the Mayor of Totnes on 13 
October personally to request it.148  However, despite Cary’s best efforts, 
Watson failed to get the nomination. This failure may well have reflected the fact 
that Watson had annoyed the Mayor by asking for a speedy response because 
of the other possible nominations which were on offer to him. Nevertheless, one 
would be justified in speculating that had Cary been in Devon and not Ireland in 
1601 then he would surely have secured the nomination for his agent. 
Evidently, his time away from Devon eroded his standing within the county and 
so it must have been bittersweet when in May 1603 Cary became Ireland’s lord 
deputy, a position that he occupied until 16 July 1604 before relinquishing it to 
Sir Arthur Chichester in order to return to Cockington.   
Nevertheless, while he was away in Ireland, Cary still retained his 
position as one of Devon’s deputy lieutenants. Not only is this an indication of 
the high regard that was felt for him by the Privy Council but it also 
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demonstrates the reluctance of the Crown to replace a deputy lieutenant for 
reasons other than death or gross negligence which, as noted earlier, was very 
different from the ever-changing commission of the peace. Thus, Cary’s 
lieutenancy duties were temporarily devolved to Amias Bampfield of Poltimore 
and Thomas Reynell of West Ogwell for the duration of his absence in 
Ireland.149 Cary returned to Devon on a permanent basis soon after he 
relinquished his position as lord deputy of Ireland and accordingly resumed his 
role as a deputy lieutenant. He died on 15 February 1617 having retired from 
public service some time before.150      
 
Sir Thomas Denys of Bicton and Holcombe Burnell (1559-1613) 
 
It was earlier observed that Sir Thomas Denys was operating as a de facto 
deputy lieutenant in place of his ailing father from at least the beginning of 1592. 
Thus, following Sir Robert Denys’ death, the Privy Council wrote to the Earl of 
Bath declaring that they could ‘thinke of no meeter person then ... Sir Thomas 
Dennis for all respectes to supplie his father’s roome and to be a Deputie 
Lieutenaunte’.151 The Privy Council’s high opinion of Denys no doubt stemmed 
from the years that he had spent at court as a ‘young blood’. During those 
years, Denys enjoyed the favour of the Queen who personally intervened on his 
behalf in order to obtain the Marquess of Winchester’s blessing for Denys’ 
marriage to his daughter, Lady Anne Paulet, who was the cousin of Sir William 
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Courtenay.152 Denys also gained military experience and a knighthood in 1586 
having joined the Earl of Leicester as one of his captains in the Netherlands.153  
Furthermore, as a JP in Devon from c.1583 and in Dorset by 1591, a knight of 
the shire for Devon in 1593 and sheriff of Devon in 1594/5, Denys had a sound 
knowledge of south-western politics.154 It is therefore of little surprise that his 
name appears on Devon’s lieutenancy commission on 29 April 1593 (see figure 
2.1).155 
 Unlike Sir George Cary, Denys seems to have been reluctant to become 
too close to the second Earl of Essex once the latter’s hostility towards Sir 
Robert Cecil intensified during the second half of the 1590s.156  Nevertheless, 
he was pragmatic enough not to alienate himself from Essex either, supplying 
the Earl with the news and gossip that was circulating in Exeter’s taverns during 
summer 1595 concerning the whereabouts and intention of the Spanish fleet.157 
Denys’ decision not to align himself wholeheartedly with Essex may well have 
been influenced by his seemingly affable character. Just like his father, Denys 
made provisions for the poor in his will, bequeathing £40 to the poor of Bicton 
and Holcombe Burnell and ensuring that the almshouse he had erected in his 
father’s honour was maintained.158 He therefore seems to have been a man 
much more keen on building relationships as opposed to destroying them; an 
appealing trait for a deputy lieutenant to have, especially when one considers 
the increasing burdens that were being placed upon the inhabitants of 
Elizabethan Devon by central government during the 1590s.   
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Sir Francis Drake of Buckland Abbey (1540-1596) 
 
The ever increasing burdens on Devon’s lieutenancy following the 
commencement of hostilities with Spain in 1585 no doubt played a part in the 
Crown increasing the number of deputies to six at the start of the 1590s. Thus, 
the lieutenancy commission drafted on 29 April 1593 also named Sir Francis 
Drake as a deputy lieutenant (see figure 2.1). Drake’s exploits as an explorer 
and naval commander are too well known to warrant further analysis here. In 
contrast, his role in Devon as a deputy lieutenant and an important mediator 
between local and central government has received little attention. Drake’s early 
years are obscure owing to the fact that prior to his knighthood – an honour that 
was awarded by the Queen on 4 April 1581 in recognition of his famous 
circumnavigation of the globe – he was a man of low social status and as such 
enjoyed little standing at court.159 Indeed, Drake’s first marriage on 4 July 1569 
to Mary Newman, a woman whose family were from the ranks of the yeomanry 
rather than gentry, indicates the extent to which Drake was very much a self-
made man.160  The wealth that Drake managed to amass as a result of his 
naval success was ‘moderate’.161 Nevertheless, it was sufficient to purchase 
Buckland Abbey from Sir Richard Grenville on 3 October 1582 for £3,400 (see 
figure 2.2). Furthermore, Drake acquired forty separate freehold properties in 
Plymouth, a leasehold interest in the Plymouth Town Mills, property at Sidbury 
and some other unspecified pieces of land from his kinsman, William Hawkins, 
on 20 October 1582 for £1,500. Thus, in a short period Drake became 
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Plymouth’s third largest landowner behind Hawkins and the town’s 
corporation.162   
 As well as providing the financial means to purchase a substantial 
amount of property, Drake’s maritime success seems to have acted as the 
catalyst for his elevation in local government. Thus, in 1581 the newly knighted 
Drake was elected as Plymouth’s mayor, from c.1583 he was commissioned a 
Devon JP, in 1584 he was elected an MP for the Cornish borough of Bossiney, 
from c.1591 he was commissioned a Cornish JP and in 1593 he was elected as 
one of Plymouth’s MPs.163 Appointing a man of Drake’s renown to these 
positions was advantageous for both the Crown and the townsmen of Plymouth. 
For the Crown Drake provided a charismatic local figurehead whose popularity 
could be harnessed in order to obtain local cooperation in implementing 
potentially controversial policies.164 Paradoxically, the townsmen of Plymouth 
enjoyed Drake’s assistance in furthering their suits at the centre of affairs, using 
his newly acquired national eminence as a bargaining chip to protect and 
promote the town’s interests.165  
One notable example of the mutual benefit that the Crown and the 
townsmen of Plymouth enjoyed as a result of Drake’s support and assistance 
concerned Plymouth’s water supply. Lady Eliott-Drake has described the town’s 
water supply prior to 1591 thus:  
for the greater part of the year [there was] but a small supply, and in 
dry weather there was none at all, “a matter very incommodious,” not 
only to the inhabitants, who in summer had to fetch water daily from 
more than a mile’s distance, but also to mariners coming within the 
harbour to water their ships.166 
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In order to rectify this problem Drake, at great personal expense, ordered a 
twenty-seven mile leat to be constructed between Dartmoor and Plymouth so 
that a regular water supply for the latter could be obtained from the River Meavy 
and its tributaries. Historians have been keen to describe Drake’s efforts in 
bringing fresh water to Plymouth as his ‘princely gift’ to the town.167 
Furthermore, it has been customary to portray Drake’s construction of the leat 
as an example of him selflessly furthering the town’s interests.168 However, this 
apparent act of generosity must have also been influenced by Drake’s 
proprietary interests in the town. Put simply, if Plymouth had an inadequate 
water supply then the town’s economy would suffer and property prices would 
decline.  In addition, as a deputy lieutenant and naval commander, Drake was 
also concerned with national defence. Thus, without a regular water supply ‘her 
Majesty's ... ships [could not] ... be supplied with water, nor her army ... with 
bread and beer’.169 Drake’s effort in bringing fresh water to Plymouth is 
therefore an excellent example of how his local, commercial and national 
interests frequently coalesced, thereby reinforcing his desire to mediate 
between local and central government.    
 
Sir Richard Champernowne of Modbury (1558-1622) 
 
Drake died of dysentery aboard the Defiance at Portobello Bay on 28 January 
1596.170 Thus, on 30 May of that year ‘uppon the commendacion of our verie 
good Lord the Earle of Bathe’ the Privy Council deemed it appropriate to 
appoint Richard Champernowne of Modbury as a deputy lieutenant in place of 
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his deceased predecessor (see figure 2.1).171 The Champernowne family 
originally came from Normandy and settled in Devon following the Norman 
Conquest. The family’s ownership of the manor at Modbury – located in the 
South Hams region of Devon approximately twelve miles east of Plymouth (see 
figure 2.2) – began during the reign of Edward II following the marriage of Sir 
Richard Champernowne’s ancestor and namesake to Joan, daughter and 
heiress of Sir Alexander Okeston.172 In 1559 Sir Richard’s great-uncle, Sir 
Arthur Champernowne (c.1525-78), acquired Dartington Hall – a property 
located about two miles north of Totnes – in order to establish a secondary 
branch of the family.173 Sir Richard Champernowne of Modbury – who 
succeeded his father, Henry Champernowne (c.1538-70), at the age of twelve – 
was born into a family which had already proven highly useful to the Crown: his 
father had been a valued informant during his time overseas, supplying the Earl 
of Leicester and Lord Burghley with political information from the continent, 
while his great-aunt, Katherine Astley (née Champernowne, d.1565), had been 
a tutor of the young Princess Elizabeth and later became a chief gentlewoman 
of the Privy Chamber following Elizabeth’s accession in 1558.174  It is therefore 
of little wonder that the Privy Council believed there to be ‘noe person more fitt 
to take ... [Sir Francis Drake’s] roome then Mr. Richard Champernown’.175  
 Unfortunately, maintaining the good reputation that his father and great-
aunt had established for the family does not seem to have been a high priority 
for Champernowne. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that he was ‘a 
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quarrelsome young man’ and possessed a rather divisive personality.176 Indeed, 
as early as 1584 he was ruffling the feathers of Devon’s most senior gentleman, 
Sir William Courtenay, when both men were at court.177 This abrasive nature 
seems to have remained with Champernowne throughout his life owing to the 
fact that he was ‘often oppressyd with melancholy’.178 Thus, it is of no surprise 
that on 28 January 1598 the Devon lawyer, John Hele, complained to Lord 
Burghley that ‘Mr Champernowne ... tryvmphes over me ... in assessing and 
taxing me and my sonne’.179 Champernowne’s provocative behaviour inevitably 
attracted enemies. Little wonder therefore that on 15 August 1595 he found 
himself writing to Sir Robert Cecil to deny a ‘most dysgracefull’ court rumour 
that he gelded his choir boys in order to prolong their voices.180 However, 
perhaps the best documented controversy of Champernowne’s life occurred 
during the second half of the 1590s when he argued with his fellow deputy 
lieutenant, Edward Seymour, over the command of certain sections of the 
county militia – an argument that will be outlined in detail in chapter three.   
 Nevertheless, even though controversy was always close at hand, 
Champernowne remained heavily involved in the government of Devon 
throughout his career. Indeed, as well as his deputy lieutenancy he was also a 
Devon JP from c.1583, an MP for West Looe in 1586, a central figure in the 
county militia from 1588 and the sheriff of Devon in 1592/3. Furthermore, his 
public service was rewarded with a knighthood in 1599.181 One would be 
justified in questioning how it was possible for such an antagonistic man to 
acquire and retain these important positions in local government. Part of the 
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answer must surely have been his familial connections. As the grandson of Sir 
Richard Edgcumbe, the cousin of Sir John Gilbert I and Sir Walter Ralegh, and 
the son-in-law of the Lord Chief Justice, Sir John Popham (c.1531-1607), 
Champernowne benefited from having an extensive family network which he no 
doubt called upon to assist him in furthering his career.182 Indeed, as Julie 
Sampson has pointed out, Elizabethan families would have been very ‘familiar 
with their extended networks of kinship and affinity’ and would have readily 
utilised these networks to protect and promote their interests.183 However, a 
more forceful reason was, in all likelihood, the cordial relationship that the 
Champernowne family had with the townsmen of Plymouth. The family was well 
known in the town and as a result both Sir Arthur Champernowne and Henry 
Champernowne were elected as MPs for the borough in 1558 and 1562 
respectively. Sir Arthur was also a trading associate of John Hawkins – the 
influential head of Elizabethan Plymouth’s leading merchant dynasty.184 It is 
therefore unsurprising that during the 1590s the townsmen of Plymouth tried to 
obtain the command of Plymouth Fort for Sir Richard’s younger brother, Arthur, 
because he was ‘himself with his dearest Fryndes & kinsfolke ... our nerest 
neighbours, whose sufficiencie in marsiall affaires is well knowen’.185 Appointing 
and retaining Champernowne in local government in spite of his antagonistic 
behaviour and insubordination can therefore be viewed as a pragmatic move by 
the Privy Council who were probably conscious that they needed a Crown agent 
living near to Plymouth who, like Drake, could use his popularity within the town 
to secure its ongoing cooperation.  
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Sir Ferdinando Gorges of Wraxall (1568-1647) 
 
In contrast, cultivating the cooperation of the townsmen of Plymouth was not 
something that came easily to Sir Ferdinando Gorges when he was appointed a 
deputy lieutenant in autumn 1596. Gorges’ appointment increased the number 
of deputy lieutenants in Devon to seven (see figure 2.1). The Privy Council 
justified this increase because ‘the shire is large and populous and by meanes 
that it bordereth on the sea coast hath frequent and often occasions of her 
Majesty’s services, and therefore the other Deputie Leiutenantes hath neede of 
greater assistance.’186 This is of course an accurate assessment of late-
Elizabethan Devon’s special administrative requirements; however, it seems 
likely that Gorges’ appointment was also influenced to an extent by his continual 
request for additional discretionary powers in light of the hostile treatment that 
he had encountered from the townsmen of Plymouth following his arrival in 
Devon in autumn 1595.187  
Gorges came to Devon from the Dutch seaport of Brille in order to take 
command of Plymouth’s newly built fort. The commission had been obtained for 
him by his patron, Robert Deveraux, second Earl of Essex, because of the 
former’s desire to return to England.188 It has already been revealed that the 
townsmen of Plymouth had wanted Arthur Champernowne to take command of 
the fort. Not only was this a demonstration of the townsmen’s affinity towards 
the Champernowne family it was also their belief that having a local in charge 
was paramount for their safety 
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because ... Arthur Champernowne is both vearie neigh [near] allyed 
vnto the best of Devon and Cornewall, and likewise is welbeloved of 
theym and the rest of our Countrie, which sayd Causes maie be the 
better meanes to drawe the gentlemen and Countrie Forces more 
speedelie vnto our releiffe in tyme of daunger.189    
 
By contrast, Gorges was not a native of Plymouth, or even of Devon for that 
matter, rather his family were of Wraxall, Somerset. In addition, the townsmen 
of Plymouth believed they had earned the right to choose their own commander 
having spent a considerable sum of the town’s money establishing the fort.190 
To compound matters, Gorges was authorised to pay himself and his garrison 
of sixty-five men with the revenue obtained from the taxation of the local 
pilchard trade.191  
Thus, the reason for the townsmen’s antipathy towards Gorges was 
threefold: the Privy Council had ignored their request to appoint Arthur 
Champernowne, they had then compounded matters by choosing an ‘outsider’ 
and had seemingly ignored the fact that the fort was to be funded by the 
inhabitants of Plymouth and the surrounding area.192 However, in Gorges the 
Crown had appointed an experienced military and naval commander whose 
earlier career had included captaining a force of soldiers during the Earl of 
Leicester’s expedition to the Netherlands in 1587, commanding a squadron of 
eight ships during the Spanish Armada in 1588, being knighted by the Earl of 
Essex on a military campaign to Normandy in 1591 and commanding a garrison 
of men at the Dutch seaport of Brille between 1594 and 1595.193 In addition, the 
appointment of Gorges can be rationalised on the basis that the Crown no 
doubt considered him, as an ‘outsider’, to be more aware of how vital 
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Plymouth’s local defences were in the wider context of national security. Indeed, 
in the words of Charles Clark, he ‘represented a transfer of control [of Plymouth 
Fort] from the town to the royal government and the subordination of local to 
national interests’.194  
However, Gorges, who was also commissioned a Devon JP in 1595, 
soon became fed up with his life in Plymouth. It is therefore unsurprising that on 
4 December 1598 – just three years after his arrival in Devon – he wrote to 
Essex, who had been appointed lord deputy of Ireland, to ask his patron 
whether he could join him in quelling the Irish rebellion, stating that ‘I have to 
loath the manner of my lyvinge heere’.195 The response was positive and 
Gorges was chosen to be a sergeant-major-general of the land forces in 
Ireland. However, at the eleventh hour the Queen decided that a number of 
officers, including Gorges, were to remain in England.196 Gorges remained in 
command of Plymouth Fort for a further two years before becoming implicated 
in the Earl of Essex’s infamous rebellion on 8 February 1601.197 Imprisonment 
inevitably followed and he remained out of favour with the Queen even after he 
had been released. Throughout the whole affair Gorges solicited Sir Robert 
Cecil, his new patron, to help obtain a full royal pardon.198 However, it was not 
until James I ascended to the throne that, with Cecil’s help, he returned to his 
post at Plymouth – a position that he retained for a further twenty-six years 
before relinquishing it in order to focus on establishing the American colony of 
Maine.199 
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Sir Edward Seymour of Berry Pomeroy (c.1563-1613) 
 
Autumn 1596 also saw the appointment of Edward Seymour to Devon’s 
lieutenancy in place of Sir John Gilbert I who had died on 8 September 1596 
(see figure 2.1).200 Seymour was the son and heir of Lord Edward Seymour 
(d.1593) who was himself the only child to result from the first marriage of the 
renowned Protector Somerset (the elder brother of King Henry VIII’s third wife, 
Jane Seymour).201 However, by an Act of Parliament passed in 1540 it was the 
eldest son from Somerset’s second marriage to Ann, daughter of Edward 
Stanhope, who inherited the majority of the Protector’s estate following the 
latter’s execution in 1552.202 Nevertheless, Lord Edward Seymour managed to 
assume ownership of Berry Pomeroy Castle and from thenceforward two 
distinct branches of the Seymour family co-existed.203 Situated approximately 
two miles east of Totnes and around twelve miles north of Dartmouth, Berry 
Pomeroy Castle was the ideal base for Edward Seymour to assume control of 
Gilbert’s lieutenancy responsibilities (see figure 2.2). Like most deputy 
lieutenants, Seymour – who succeeded his father on 18 May 1593 aged thirty – 
had already acquired a solid grounding in other areas of county administration. 
He served as a Devon JP from c.1583, as the county’s deputy vice-admiral in 
1586, as a knight of the shire for the parliaments of 1593, 1601 and 1604, and 
as the county’s sheriff in 1595/6.204  
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Throughout the course of his political career Seymour seems to have 
been well liked by the majority of Devon’s political elite. Indeed, in August 1596 
Sir Ferdinando Gorges wrote that he had been ‘easelye assured’ of Seymour’s 
integrity and virtue by the ‘report of diuerse ... speciall frendes’.205 This high 
regard was clearly shared by the Earl of Bath who had by ‘sondrye lettres ... 
greatlie comended’ Seymour to the Privy Council as the best person to replace 
Gilbert as a deputy lieutenant.206 Seymour’s appointment to the lieutenancy was 
no doubt also aided by the fact that the three most influential late-Elizabethan 
privy councillors – Lord Burghley, Sir Robert Cecil and the second Earl of Essex 
– all seem to have been on good terms with him during the 1590s.207 However, 
this popularity did not extend to all quarters of Elizabethan society. Indeed, it 
has been highlighted already that a rivalry over the command of certain militia 
units broke out between Seymour and Sir Richard Champernowne during the 
latter half of the 1590s. The particulars of this dispute will be discussed in detail 
during the next chapter but it is possible, although this is pure speculation, that 
part of the antipathy between the two men stemmed from Champernowne’s 
jealousy. After all Seymour fathered five sons and four daughters following his 
marriage on 19 September 1576 to Champernowne’s cousin, Elizabeth, 
daughter of Sir Arthur Champernowne of Dartington.208 In contrast, the 
melancholic Sir Richard died childless.209  
Community relations between Seymour and the townsmen of Totnes 
also seem, on occasions, to have become strained. One notable example of 
this tension centred on the question of how much gunpowder the town was 
required to have in readiness in order to supply the county militia. The following 
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extract from a petition written to the Privy Council by the Mayor and Burgesses 
of Totnes in 1602 provides an explicit reference to this: 
Mr Edward Seymor, being one of the Deputie Leiftenaunts of the 
Shire (and for some private grudge, ill affected to the said Towne) To 
put the Peticioners to needlesse charge, doth nowe require them to 
provide and have in readynes Three Last of Powder, which is more 
then doble the proportion of most of the Townes there.210    
 
This dispute clearly had a personal element; however, it is also indicative of the 
tension that sometimes existed between the lieutenancy (which was essentially 
an extension of central government in the localities) and the country’s town 
corporations, who were always hostile to any perceived infringement of their 
independence.  
  
Sir William Strode of Newnham (1562-1637) 
 
By July 1599 Sir William Strode had become Devon’s eighth deputy lieutenant 
(see figure 2.1).211 The exact reason for the increase is unclear; however, it 
seems likely that the Spanish invasion scare of that year prompted the Privy 
Council to add him to the commission in the same way that they had been 
prompted to add Gorges three years earlier. The Strode family’s primary 
residence was located approximately five-and-a-half miles east of Plymouth at 
Newnham (see figure 2.2). Sir William Strode assumed control of Newnham 
House, along with the rest of his inheritance, following his father’s death on 5 
August 1581.212 Just one month prior to this, Strode, aged nineteen, married 
Mary, daughter of Thomas Southcote, landowner and tinner, of Bovey 
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Tracey.213 The marriage was no doubt initially desired by Strode and his father 
to avoid the penalties of wardship.214 However, by the early 1590s the union 
also provided William – who had assumed control of his family’s tin mining 
interests in 1593 – with a useful commercial associate.215  
Throughout 1594 and 1595 Strode was keen to enlarge his industrial 
facilities and sought to erect a number of buildings upon some land that he 
owned in Lambhay, Plymouth.216 This inevitably led to a conflict between 
himself and the chief townsmen who arranged for one of their legal 
practitioners, John Sparke, to lobby the Privy Council against the proposed 
buildings.217 In January 1595 a five man commission consisting of Sir Francis 
Drake, Sir John Gilbert I, Edward Seymour, George Cary and Richard 
Champernowne was appointed by the Privy Council to investigate the dispute 
and by April it was ruled that Strode could go ahead with his building plans.218 
However, upon the advice of Drake, he decided against antagonising the 
townsmen, choosing instead to use the land in question as gardens.219 This 
decision helped to ensure that relations between Strode and the inhabitants of 
Plymouth remained cordial throughout his life. Indeed, Strode’s affinity with the 
town was strong enough for him to become it’s recorder at the start of the 
seventeenth-century, secure his election as a Plymouth MP in 1614 and receive 
a number of gifts from the town for his assistance in furthering their suits.220 As 
well as his election for Plymouth, Strode was MP for Plympton Erle (his local 
stannary town) in 1601, 1604, 1621 and 1625, and was one of Devon’s knights 
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of the shire in 1597 and 1624. He was also publically active as a Devon JP from 
c.1592 and as the county’s sheriff in 1593/4. He received a knighthood in 
1598.221  
However, what set Strode apart from the rest of Devon’s gentry when he 
was chosen as a deputy lieutenant in 1599 was, in all probability, his close 
relationship with Devon’s tin workers. Described by John Cooper as possessing 
‘a sophisticated cultural identity that cut across parish or even county divisions’ 
the tin workers of Devon and Cornwall operated within eight geographical 
divisions (four in Devon and four in Cornwall) under the autonomous jurisdiction 
of stannary law.222 The enforcement of stannary law during the 1590s was 
ultimately the responsibility of Sir Walter Ralegh who, between 1585 and 1604, 
operated as lord warden of the stannaries. As well as enforcing stannary law, 
Ralegh also fiercely protected the tin workers’ autonomy from any ‘foreign 
authority’ including the lieutenancy.223 Strode’s association with Devon’s tin 
workers stemmed from his family’s commercial interests in tin mining. Indeed, 
his importance within the industry is highlighted by the fact that in 1610 he 
produced 64% of all the coined tin produced in Plympton, rising to 81% in 1629. 
Moreover, between those years he consistently produced between one-sixth 
and one-twelfth of Devon’s entire coined tin output.224 It is therefore little wonder 
that he was returned as an MP for Plympton Erle four times, appointed as 
colonel of the one hundred tin workers that were drawn from the Plympton area 
during the Armada years to supplement the county militia and received the 
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backing of Sir Walter Ralegh during his building dispute with the townsmen of 
Plymouth.225 Thus, by appointing Strode as a deputy lieutenant the Crown could 
benefit from an individual who bridged the gap between two distinct 
jurisdictions, acting as a mediator for both in order to facilitate the 
implementation of central government policies.    
 
Sir John Gilbert II of Greenway (1575-1608)  
 
When Sir Ferdinando Gorges was imprisoned as a result of his involvement in 
the Essex Rebellion in January 1601 he was unsurprisingly stripped of his 
command of Plymouth Fort and his commission as one of Devon’s deputy 
lieutenants. Thus, in April 1601 the Crown chose Sir John Gilbert II as the new 
commander of Plymouth Fort and by 3 June had commissioned him a deputy 
lieutenant in place of the disgraced Gorges.226 Gilbert was the eldest son of Sir 
Humphrey Gilbert who was the younger brother of Sir John Gilbert I.227 Sir John 
Gilbert II was therefore the nephew of Sir Walter Ralegh who used his influence 
at the court to acquire the command of Plymouth Fort for his young relation.228  
It seems that Gilbert was not himself a native of Devon and, in all likelihood, 
was born in London where between 1573 and 1578 his father was choosing to 
reside on a more frequent basis at his house in Little St Helens, Bishopsgate.229 
Indeed, throughout the 1580s and early 1590s Gilbert based himself 
predominantly at the centre of affairs, being referred to as Sir John Perrot’s 
servant on 9 October 1591 and duelling with Sir John Burgh in March 1594 – a 
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fracas which ended in Gilbert mortally wounding his opponent and being 
convicted of murder only to be pardoned of any wrongdoing by the Queen.230 
However, in summer 1596 Gilbert’s fortunes improved when he was knighted by 
Lord Admiral Howard following his decision to take part in the Cadiz 
Expedition.231  Furthermore, on 8 September 1596 he became the owner of 
both Compton Castle and Greenway following the death of his childless uncle 
and namesake, Sir John Gilbert I.232  
 From then on it seems that Gilbert spent more and more time in Devon 
overseeing his newly acquired estate and operating as a privateer.233 Indeed, 
during his absence from the court he was able to rely on the help and support of 
his uncle, Sir Walter Ralegh, in return for his services as Ralegh’s Devon-based 
agent in much the same manner as his other uncle had done during his later 
years.234 However, unlike the relationship between Ralegh and the elder Gilbert, 
relations between Ralegh and the younger Gilbert appear to have become 
strained by April 1602 as a result of the latter’s perceived ingratitude for the help 
and assistance he had received from his uncle.235 Relations between Gilbert 
and the townsmen of Plymouth were also tense during his brief tenure as 
commander of Plymouth Fort. Once again the townsmen had been denied the 
right to choose their own commander and, even though Gilbert had strong links 
with Devon, they no doubt regarded him as an ‘outsider’ whose priority was to 
protect and promote the interests of himself and the Crown as opposed to the 
interests of the town.236 Moreover, the apparently impetuous nature of Gilbert 
would not have helped matters. Indeed, the fact that William Parker (Mayor of 
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Plymouth in 1601/2) described Gilbert as ‘a furious and young governor, having 
in his fury his rapier out on the sudden’ provides a strong indication that he had 
learnt little from the controversy that followed his killing of Sir John Burgh ten 
years earlier.237 It is therefore little wonder that upon his pardon in 1603, Gorges 
resumed command of Plymouth Fort leaving Gilbert to concentrate on his 
lieutenancy duties for the remainder of his short life.238 
  
Sir Robert Bassett of Umberleigh (1574-1641) 
 
The last amendment to Devon’s lieutenancy commission during the late-
Elizabethan era was caused by the death of Hugh Fortescue on 1 August 1600. 
Thus, on 15 November 1600 the Earl of Bath wrote to Sir Robert Cecil in order 
to obtain his support for the appointment of Sir Robert Bassett and Hugh Pollard 
as deputy lieutenants: 
I haue in my said lettre, by reason of the death of my Coosen Hugh 
Fortescue Esquier byne an humble Suitor ... that my lovinge Frendes 
and Kinsmen Sir Robert Bassett & Hughe Pollarde Esquier ... mighte 
be admitted into the Comission of Lieuetenauncie, as my Deputies & 
Assistentes in that Countie of Deuon: dwellinge verie convenientlie 
for that purpose. And beinge Gentlemen of suche respecte (as I am 
thoroughlie perswaded) will vse all their best endevors to doe hir 
Majestie true and loyall Service in that behalf.239 
 
The Queen subsequently assented to Bath’s request thereby increasing the 
number of Devon deputy lieutenants to nine (see figure 2.1).240 This increase 
may well have been influenced by the fact that during the last years of 
Elizabeth’s reign the county officials in north Devon became increasingly 
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burdened by the need to coordinate the levies of men who were to be sent to 
serve in Ireland. Indeed, it will be shown in the next chapter that the port of 
Barnstaple played a central role in the transportation of soldiers to Ireland and 
therefore the need for an additional deputy lieutenant in the north of the county 
was no doubt intended to facilitate this logistical challenge.  
Situated approximately eight miles south of Barnstaple and five-and-a-
half miles from Tawstock Court, Sir Robert Bassett’s residence at Umberleigh 
was ideally located for him to serve as one of Bath’s north Devon deputies (see 
figure 2.2). Bassett was the son of the deceased Sir Arthur Bassett who, as 
noted above, was one of the second Earl of Bedford’s deputies prior to his 
death following his attendance at Exeter’s ‘Black Assizes’ in 1586. At the time of 
his father’s death Sir Robert Bassett was twelve years old and so could not 
replace him as a deputy lieutenant in the same way that Sir Thomas Denys had 
replaced his father in 1592.241 Nevertheless, the fact that both Bassett’s father 
and maternal grandfather, Sir John Chichester (c.1520-1568), were deputy 
lieutenants in Devon and Hugh Fortescue was his uncle through marriage 
undoubtedly provided him with the familial credentials to become a deputy 
lieutenant himself in 1600.242   
 Initially Bassett proved a reliable county administrator, being elected as 
an MP for Plymouth in 1593 at the age of just nineteen, taking on some of the 
lieutenancy duties of the infirm Fortescue in 1597 and becoming a Devon JP in 
that same year.243 Further success came in 1599 when he was knighted by the 
Earl of Essex during a period of military service in Ireland.244 However, just 
three years after his appointment to the lieutenancy Bassett – who was not only 
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rumoured to be a Catholic but also deeply in debt – fled the realm. 
Nevertheless, in 1611 he was granted a conditional pardon by James I and 
allowed to return home where he quietly lived the remainder of his days in 
relative obscurity having been stripped of his lieutenancy commission by 
November 1616.245 
 
Sir Hugh Pollard of King’s Nympton (d. after 1604) 
 
In hindsight, given the swift demise of Bassett’s career, it was rather a good 
thing that Hugh Pollard had joined him as Fortescue’s replacement in north 
Devon in 1600. At approximately thirteen miles south-east of Tawstock Court 
and a further mile from Barnstaple, Pollard’s residence at King’s Nympton was, 
like Umberleigh, well situated for him to assist Bath in north Devon (see figure 
2.2). Furthermore, Pollard, like Bassett, also possessed the family connections 
that were so important in furthering a political career during the Tudor period: he 
was the uncle of Sir Robert Bassett, the brother-in-law of Hugh Fortescue and 
the son-in-law of Sir John Chichester having married Chichester’s fourth 
daughter, Dorothy.246 Indeed, it is likely that he was chosen to provide guidance 
to his fatherless nephew who was only twenty-six at the time of their 
appointment to the lieutenancy. Pollard’s ambition to become a deputy 
lieutenant dated from at least 1599. In that year he was reprimanded by the 
Privy Council for having ‘entermeddled’ with the work of Sir George Cary’s 
proxies, Amias Bampfield and Thomas Reynell.247 Indeed, Pollard’s interference 
reaffirms the power and prestige that Elizabethan England’s political elite 
attached to the lieutenancy; power and prestige that, by the 1590s, could no 
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longer be acquired by either the commission of the peace, of which Pollard was 
a member from at least 1592, or the shrievalty, a position that Pollard occupied 
during the Armada crisis of 1588.248 
 
 
 
In surveying late-Elizabethan Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants this chapter 
has depicted a political system dependent on personal relationships, social 
connections and the particular requirements of the moment. Securing a position 
on Devon’s lieutenancy commission was thus not achieved solely on merit. 
Indeed, it has been argued here that family connections, strategic marriage 
alliances, personal wealth and status, geographical location of residence, 
cultivation and availability of a patron or friend of high status at court, timely 
personal lobbying, ambition, local reputation, respect and influence all operated 
in concert with the changing requirements caused by the war with Spain and 
rebellion in Ireland to influence the Crown when it selected the men who served 
as Devon’s lord and deputy lieutenants during the turbulent years of 1586 to 
1603. It therefore did not matter that what personal power and prestige the Earl 
of Bath commanded in Devon was localised in the north of the county and 
centred in particular on Barnstaple because he was supported by an impressive 
group of deputies who, with the exception of Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Sir 
John Gilbert II, all held substantial influence in their regional pockets of the 
county. Consequently, the Crown could exploit the collective influence, personal 
connections and commercial interests that Bath and his deputies possessed 
within Devon in order to communicate their orders to the county’s general 
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population and implement their policies from the confines of Whitehall. That 
said, the chapter has also confirmed that Bath and the majority of his deputies 
held a vested interest within Devon, most notably as landowners and 
businessmen. This was crucial because it motivated them to convey to central 
government any concerns felt by the county’s inhabitants about certain policies, 
thereby providing an important mechanism for releasing any civil tension that 
might otherwise have resulted. Indeed, chapter three will elaborate further on 
this point in the context of the county’s militia, revealing precisely how Bath and 
his deputies modified certain Privy Council directives to accommodate Devon’s 
general population throughout the critical years of 1588 to 1603. Nevertheless, 
the fact that two ‘outsiders’ (Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Sir John Gilbert II) were 
chosen by the Crown to command Plymouth Fort and serve as deputy 
lieutenants during the last years of Elizabeth’s reign highlights that a 
harmonious relationship between the Crown and the county’s general 
population was of secondary importance to national defence and the threat from 
Spain.   
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3 
War and the Militia:  
Musters, Levies and the Defence of the County 
 
By illuminating the activities of late-Elizabethan Devon’s militia this chapter 
emphasises the tactical importance that central government attached to the 
county, exposes the character of the Crown’s relationship with the county’s 
population and assesses the martial role of the county during the conflict with 
Spain and the insurrection in Ireland. The chapter thus develops the analysis 
already presented in chapter two of the Earl of Bath and his deputies and 
explores their role as commanders and co-ordinators of the county’s militia 
during a period when Devon’s geographical location and maritime significance 
placed it on the frontline of England’s military endeavours. Of particular concern 
is the extent to which Devon’s lieutenancy was able to secure the consent and 
cooperation of the wider county community for the Crown’s relentless military 
demands. Thus, the chapter reveals that when there was an acute fear of 
Spanish invasion in summer 1588 and summer 1599 Bath and his deputies had 
a relatively easy time in meeting, even exceeding, Privy Council expectations 
because the inhabitants of late-Elizabethan Devon could recognise the tangible 
benefit of defending their homes and families from possible Spanish invasion. 
However, when that tangible benefit was less immediate or less obvious, as it 
was whenever the Privy Council ordered a general muster or chose to levy 
troops for service in Ireland, the lieutenancy’s task became less straightforward. 
Indeed, the chapter argues that during periods when the interests of the Crown 
and the interests of the county diverged the Earl of Bath and his deputies 
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worked hard to implement successfully Privy Council directives whilst at the 
same time ensuring that the burden of those directives remained palatable for 
the increasingly war wearied county community – an endeavour which was 
greatly assisted by their collective regional influence and local knowledge. The 
chapter will therefore demonstrate, as Neil Younger has done elsewhere, that 
Privy Council ‘orders were almost a bargaining position, the extent to which they 
were adhered to being the product of a variety of factors.’1 The chapter also 
provides further insight into the personal and informal nature of politics in a late-
Elizabethan English county by examining the composition and command 
structure of Devon’s militia. However, whereas chapter two identified how 
personal relationships and social connections facilitated the smooth-running of 
the county’s affairs, this chapter reveals how they could equally undermine it. 
Moreover, the chapter confirms that the need to co-ordinate and make ready 
Devon’s land defences in response to the persistent threat that the war with 
Spain and the rebellion in Ireland posed throughout the 1580s and 1590s 
engendered a heightened degree of interaction at every tier of government – 
from the Privy Council and lieutenancy, down to the constables of the hundreds 
and petty-constables of the parishes. 
The standard work on the sixteenth-century militia is Lindsay Boynton’s 
The Elizabethan Militia.2 Indeed, even though it is now over forty years old it 
remains the most detailed and comprehensive national overview.3 However, 
one particular area where Boynton’s research falls short is her lack of emphasis 
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on the role of the lieutenancies. This has prompted John McGurk and, more 
recently, Neil Younger to examine how Elizabeth and her Privy Council 
increasingly utilised the office of lord lieutenant to command and co-ordinate the 
county militias following the outbreak of war with Spain in 1585 and Irish 
rebellion in 1594.4 In addition to these national overviews, McGurk and Michael 
Braddick have sought to establish the extent to which individual lieutenancies 
succeeded in implementing central government’s military demands before, 
during and after the Armada crisis through the prism of two county-based case 
studies.5 McGurk’s focus was on Lord Cobham’s activities in Kent which, like 
Devon, was a key frontline county throughout the Elizabethan war with Spain; 
however, its proximity to London meant that, unlike Devon, it cannot be 
regarded as a peripheral county. In contrast, Braddick chose to examine the 
work of the Earl of Huntingdon in Yorkshire, a peripheral county, yet not 
considered on the frontline because of its northern location. The following in-
depth study of Devon’s lieutenancy and its control of the county’s militia 
therefore provides a new insight into matters of defence and security during the 
late-Elizabethan period because it assesses the extent to which Bath and his 
deputies succeeded in implementing central government’s military policies in a  
frontline county on the periphery of the realm.6 In particular, as a result of 
scrutinising the role of Devon’s militia throughout the Armada years, the failure 
of Garrett Mattingly, Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker to acknowledge the vital 
role played by the militia forces on the south coast during summer 1588 is 
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exposed as inherently short-sighted.7 Indeed, even when the role of the 
southern maritime counties has been acknowledged by historians, they have 
repeatedly suggested that the militias’ primary role during the Armada crisis was 
to march in-step with the Spanish and English navies, shadowing them as they 
progressed eastward along the Channel.8 Fortunately, Neil Younger’s recent 
reappraisal of what might have happened ‘if the Armada had landed’ has greatly 
assisted in vanquishing this misinterpretation.9 Instead he has convincingly 
argued that during an initial Spanish attack the militias in each of the southern 
maritime counties would have been responsible only for the defence of their 
own coastline, as well as that of their immediate neighbours, under what is 
referred to in this chapter as the mutual aid initiative. Thus, what follows not 
only reinforces Younger’s revisionist work, it further enriches it by deploying 
hitherto unused documentary evidence from among the Seymour Manuscripts 
to assess specifically the unique military function of Devon before, during and 
after the Armada crisis of 1588.   
 
The trained bands initiative 
 
Before looking specifically at Devon’s militia during the late-Elizabethan period, 
it is necessary to provide some brief background information on the 
development of the Elizabethan militia system prior to 1588. The ancient 
principle that all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and sixty were to 
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be available to serve the monarch during military crises was formalised in 1558 
by the Marian Militia Acts.10 However, early in Elizabeth’s reign it was realised 
that the newly codified militia system needed reform. The development and 
proliferation of firearms, as well as the improvement of the pike, were obvious 
contributory factors. Moreover, the Crown acknowledged that by supplying 
fewer men with better equipment the county militias could be moulded into a 
much more effective fighting force.11 Thus, the Crown decided to introduce the 
trained bands initiative which essentially involved the provision of military 
training for a select number of able-bodied men from within each county. In a 
military crisis these men would group together to form trained bands of 
militiamen and serve as the realm’s principal land-based force whilst the 
county’s remaining able-bodied men were expected to assemble in untrained 
bands as a reservist force. Central government’s desire to train parts of the 
county militia dated from at least August 1568.12 However, it was not until March 
1573 that the Privy Council decided to roll out their trained bands initiative on a 
wholesale basis for the first time.13 Neil Younger has suggested that tension 
between England and Spain was ‘the most likely trigger’.14 Indeed, Geoffrey 
Parker has noted that, following the Ridolfi Plot in 1571, Elizabeth ‘never trusted 
Spain and her monarch again ... [and] she began to spend heavily to improve 
the defence of her realm’.15 However, what is unclear from Parker’s statement is 
that the cost of training the county militias was to be paid for by a county-wide 
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tax.16 Thus, whilst the trained bands initiative was a fundamental part of the 
Crown’s national defence policy, the costs involved meant that it was viewed 
with ambivalence and trepidation by the majority of those living in the counties.  
The successful implementation of the trained bands initiative therefore 
required central government to take a firm grip on proceedings. However, the 
Crown did not initially recognise this fact and as a consequence the 1573 
trained bands initiative became something of a false dawn.17 Indeed, it was not 
until March 1577 that the Council renewed its efforts, adopting a much more 
authoritative and realistic approach to achieve a more successful outcome.18 
Yet, despite moderate success in 1577, the Privy Council let its trained bands 
initiative fall by the way-side between 1578 and 1583 only to renew it in the 
maritime counties on a much grander scale in spring 1584 as a result of the 
rising tension with Spain.19 Such an increased demand for training stemmed 
from the realisation that the numbers of men trained in 1573 and 1577 were 
woefully inadequate to withstand a sustained Spanish invasion attempt. It is 
therefore unsurprising that between 1584 and 1587 this beefed up trained 
bands initiative was extended beyond the maritime counties to encompass the 
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entire realm.20 However, the obvious problem with such a grand and 
unprecedented training programme was the increased costs that each county 
was liable to pay. How then did the Privy Council ensure an appropriate level of 
compliance? Its principal tactic was to reintroduce the office of lord lieutenant in 
1585 on a much more permanent and widespread basis. Thus, whereas in 1573 
and 1577 it had been the Council which dealt with the counties’ ambivalence 
towards the trained bands initiative, from 1585 central government was able to 
rely increasingly on the lieutenancies to cajole the inhabitants of the counties in 
a more rigorous manner than had hitherto been possible.21 By utilising Devon 
as a case study, the remainder of this chapter will examine the lieutenancies’ 
leading role in matters of defence and security and assess some of the ways in 
which central government utilised the office to try and further develop the county 
militias during the late-Elizabethan period.  
    
The social command structure of Devon’s militia   
 
Appointing Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants as commanding officers in the 
county’s militia was the most fundamental way in which central government 
sought to utilise the office to maintain the county’s land defences. As a result, 
the county’s militia was an institution built around the personal relationships and 
social connections of Bath and his deputies: they selected their junior officers 
from their immediate entourage and enlisted their rank and file militiamen from 
amongst their nearest servants and tenant farmers. However, whereas chapter 
two stressed the role of personal relationships and social connections in 
facilitating the smooth-running of Devon’s government, this section looks at how 
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 Lambeth Palace MS., 247, part ii, f. i (printed in Thomson, Lord Lieutenants, pp. 159-60); SP 
12/198 f.177: 14/2/1587.  
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they could also undermine it. This perspective is achieved by examining the 
disagreement which broke out during the late-1590s between Edward Seymour 
and Richard Champernowne over the command of certain sections of the 
county militia. Indeed, by looking at the Seymour-Champernowne dispute in 
detail an important caveat to the arguments made in chapter two is highlighted 
– namely that, in a political-military system that did not prioritise personal talent, 
and in a society that placed great stock in matters of honour and reputation, 
factious behaviour amongst neighbouring political elite was inevitably to be 
expected.  
First, however, it is crucial to outline the composition of Devon’s militia in 
order to appreciate fully the effect that the personal relationships and social 
connections of its commanding officers had on the county’s defence 
preparations. Unfortunately there is little, if any, reliable archival evidence that 
specifies the exact composition of late-Elizabethan Devon’s militia. This, 
according to Mark Brayshay, can partly be attributed to the fact that ‘men falsely 
secured exemption from musters, concealed lost or broken equipment, or 
recorded false evidence in muster certificates’ in response to the rising 
demands of central government.22 However, whilst Lindsay Boynton has 
stressed that muster certificates ‘fail as statistical evidence’ she has insisted 
that ‘it does not follow that they are of no value at all’.23 Indeed, even though 
figures stated in muster certificates cannot be regarded as entirely accurate 
they at least provide historians with a rough guide to a militia’s composition, as 
well as the lieutenancies’ high level of involvement in matters of defence and 
security during the late-Elizabethan period. Devon’s only known surviving 
muster certificate for the late-Elizabethan period was drafted by the Earl of Bath 
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 Mark Brayshay, ‘Defending the Hampshire Coast and the Isle of Wight in the Reign of Queen 
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and four of his deputy lieutenants – Sir William Courtenay, Sir Robert Denys, Sir 
John Gilbert I and George Cary – when they convened at Exeter in December 
1587.24 The document was dispatched to the Privy Council on 7 December as 
part of Bath’s response to the letters that the Council had sent to the lord 
lieutenants of twenty-six counties on 9 October. These letters ordered that the 
trained bands were to be mustered, viewed and ‘put in strengthe to be in 
rediness to repaire to suche places’ in anticipation of the Spanish Armada.25 In 
addition, they instructed Bath, along with the lord lieutenants of eighteen other 
counties, to send a muster certificate itemising the number of men, horses and 
weapons within their particular county. 
 As well as stating a total of 6,200 soldiers and 200 horsemen, Devon’s 
muster certificate also reveals how the county’s militia was organised into three 
geographical sub-divisions – east, north and south. The East Division was 
composed of the ten hundreds that made up the most easterly portion of the 
county between Exeter, Somerset and Dorset; the North Division consisted of 
the ten hundreds surrounding the northern port of Barnstaple; and the South 
Division spanned the thirteen hundreds between Plymouth, Okehampton and 
Exeter (see figure 3.1).26 It is uncertain exactly when these divisions were 
established; however, from as early as 1558 the Earl of Bedford – who had 
taken inspiration from how the county’s JPs had divided their administrative 
duties – deemed it prudent to divide the county into four military sub-divisions.27  
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1. Exeter         East Division 
2. Barnstaple        North Division 
3. Plymouth         South Division 
4. Okehampton 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Approximate geographical area of Devon’s three sub-divisions.28  
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By 1574 this had been reduced to three and the division had become the key 
geographical unit from which the defence and government of the county was 
organised.29  Indeed, similar military and administrative sub-divisions existed 
throughout the realm: Hampshire’s governors seem to have operated within as 
many as seven distinct sub-divisions; Lancashire four; Yorkshire, Suffolk and 
Norfolk three; and Somerset two.30 
Within each division Devon’s muster certificate specifies the number of 
trained soldiers, musketeers and horsemen: the East Division had 1,667 
soldiers, sixty-six musketeers and sixty horsemen; the North Division had 1,667 
soldiers, sixty-seven musketeers and sixty-seven horsemen; and the South 
Division had 1,666 soldiers, sixty-seven musketeers and seventy-three 
horsemen. Thus, in total the county was apparently equipped with 5,000 trained 
soldiers, 200 musketeers and 200 horsemen. In addition, the certificate states 
that the number of untrained men within the county stood at 1,000 (332 in the 
East, 334 in the North and 334 in the South) and that the number of Pioneers – 
the militia’s auxiliary forces – amounted to 1,200 (400 in each division).31 As 
lord lieutenant of Devon, the Earl of Bath was granted the overall command of 
these men – an honour which was replicated in every other jurisdiction where a 
lord lieutenant was appointed. Within each division the soldiers and horsemen 
were divided into regiments and placed under the command of captains. Thus, 
in the East Division the militia was divided into two regiments with one being 
commanded by Sir William Courtenay and the other by Sir Robert Denys; the 
North Division was divided into three regiments with Hugh Fortescue, Hugh 
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 Wolffe, Gentry Governors of Devon, pp. 29-46.   
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 SP 12/200 f.68: 23/4/1587; Clark, English Provincial Society, p. 430, fn. 14; SP 12/200 f.121: 
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pp. 88-9; APC, xvii, p. 108.  
31 The uniformity of these figures is a strong indication that Bath and his deputies drafted this 
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Pollard and Anthony Monck commanding a regiment apiece; and the South 
Division was also divided into three regiments with Sir John Gilbert I, Richard 
Champernowne and Thomas Fulford taking control of one regiment each. By 
the beginning of the 1590s the number of regiments within the North and South 
Divisions had been reduced to two in like manner to the East Division and the 
rank of colonel was introduced to describe the commander of each of the 
county’s six regiments which, by that time, each numbered 866 men.32 In 
addition, Bath gained even greater control of the militia and by autumn 1596 all 
of the key positions within the organisation were occupied by his deputy 
lieutenants: Sir William Courtenay and Sir Thomas Denys were the colonels of 
the East Division; Sir George Cary and Edward Seymour were the colonels of 
the South Division; Hugh Fortescue and Hugh Pollard were the colonels of the 
North Division; Sir Ferdinando Gorges was the marshal; and Richard 
Champernowne was the colonel of the horse.33  
  Why then did Bath and his deputies assume such a prominent role in 
matters of defence and security? It was revealed above that from 1585 onwards 
the Privy Council looked increasingly to the office of lord lieutenant as a 
mechanism for achieving greater control over the county militias, but how was 
this achieved in practice? The identity of Devon’s colonels provides part of the 
answer. It is no coincidence that the colonels of Devon’s six regiments lived 
within or, in Courtenay’s case, adjacent to the division where they recruited their 
trained bands of militiamen. This was crucial because it enabled each of them 
to exploit their local influence and knowledge where it was strongest and utilise 
their personal relationships and social connections where they were most 
concentrated. It therefore became customary for the colonels of each regiment 
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to opt for their most loyal friends and associates as junior officers, and enlist 
their closest employees and leaseholders as rank and file militiamen.34  
Moreover, the size of the trained bands within each regiment was determined 
by the social status of its commanding officer rather than military aptitude: 
deputy lieutenants were authorised to command 250 men; knights 200; 
esquires 150; and gentlemen 100.35 The logic behind these principles was 
simple: personal loyalty towards the commanding officer was promoted; social 
cohesion amongst rank and file militiamen was maximised; and Elizabethan 
views on honour and reputation were respected.36 Consequently, the 
commanders of Devon’s six regiments wielded a significant amount of power 
and authority over their neighbours. This was highly desirable in a society 
where ‘social climbing was endemic’, ‘competitiveness came easily’ and 
‘reputation was best advanced by activity and involvement’.37  It is therefore 
easy to understand why each of Devon’s deputy lieutenants regarded a 
colonelcy in the county militia as a position that could be used to buttress their 
political and social ascendancy within their particular region of the county. 
Fortunately, there were never more than two deputy lieutenants in either the 
East or North Division during the 1590s and thus competition for a colonelcy in 
those areas was not an issue.  In contrast, by autumn 1596 there were four 
deputy lieutenants living in the South Division – Sir George Cary, Sir 
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Ferdinando Gorges, Edward Seymour and Richard Champernowne. As the 
South Division’s senior deputy lieutenant, Sir George Cary was assured one of 
the South’s two colonelcies while Sir Ferdinando Gorges had his hands full with 
the command of the garrison at Plymouth Fort. The South Division’s other 
colonelcy had been granted to Edward Seymour in autumn 1595 on the 
recommendation of the incumbent colonel, Sir John Gilbert I, whose health had 
declined to such an extent that he was forced to cede control of his regiment.38  
However, this meant that Champernowne was left without either a colonelcy or 
an adequate substitute position within Devon’s militia – a fact that formed the 
basis for his subsequent quarrel with Seymour.  
Champernowne’s chagrin was no doubt compounded by the fact that he 
had lost his regimental captaincy when the South Division was reduced from 
three to two regiments soon after the Armada crisis. Indeed, given his previous 
experience, he must surely have expected to be granted Gilbert’s colonelcy 
instead of Seymour who was a man five years his junior and not yet a deputy 
lieutenant. In addition, Seymour’s colonelcy not only gave him power and 
authority over Champernowne, it gave him overall control of Champernowne’s 
trained band of militiamen who Champernowne had enlisted from his south 
Devon power-base of Ermington and Plympton hundreds. Thus, in order to 
preserve his perceived military and social standing within the South Division, 
Champernowne proceeded to launch a three year campaign to acquire his own 
regimental colonelcy calling for the South Division’s militiamen to be 
redistributed amongst himself, Seymour and Cary so that a third regiment could 
be created for himself to command.39 Unsurprisingly, both Seymour and Cary 
vehemently opposed the creation of a third regiment in the South Division 
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because it directly threatened their own political and social standing within the 
county.40 The Earl of Bath was similarly opposed to such a scheme and 
attempted to mollify Champernowne by granting him the colonelcy of the horse 
in November 1596, while the Privy Council refused point-blank to authorise the 
creation of a third regiment in the South Division no doubt because, as Seymour 
highlighted, it was too burdensome to the rank and file militiamen who had only 
just got accustomed to mustering and training as two regiments.41 However, this 
opposition did little to dampen Champernowne’s resolve and he proceeded to 
disrupt Seymour’s regiment by treating his personal band of militiamen from 
Ermington and Plympton as an autonomous entity under his sole command.42 
Indeed, it was not until summer 1599 that Champernowne appears to have 
eased back on his insubordination. The Spanish invasion scare of that year may 
well have been the catalyst for this with Champernowne realising that the 
defence of the county, and indeed the realm, was much too important to 
jeopardise. However, the fact that he was also knighted in that year, thereby 
achieving social ascendancy over Seymour through a different channel, may 
well have made his decision to quit his pursuit of a colonelcy all the more 
easy.43 
To summarise, the command structure of late-Elizabethan Devon’s militia 
was based on the power and influence of the Earl of Bath and his deputies. The 
county was divided into three sub-divisions and within each sub-division there 
were two regiments. Each of the county’s six regiments was appointed a colonel 
and by the mid-1590s all six of Devon’s colonels were either incumbent deputy 
lieutenants or would soon be appointed to the office. The allocation of a specific 
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regiment was based purely on whether a colonel resided in the East, North or 
South Division and corresponded directly to the power and influence that he 
enjoyed within his native part of that division. Consequently, the junior officers 
of each regiment were chosen from a colonel’s closest followers and the 
militiamen were drafted from amongst the occupants of his nearest 
landholdings. Such a structure encouraged allegiance and solidarity, as well as 
taking into account contemporary opinions on social status, and seems to have 
worked well in both the East and North Divisions where there was always a 
sufficient number of obtainable colonelcies to placate each deputy lieutenant. In 
contrast, the number of deputy lieutenants in the South Division surpassed the 
number of regimental colonelcies and it was this that served as the underlying 
issue in the Seymour-Champernowne dispute. Indeed, their jealousies highlight 
an inherent problem in an Elizabethan political-military system that based itself 
on personal relationships, social connections, honour and reputation. Namely 
that when there were not enough positions to satisfy a particular social group – 
in this case, not enough regimental colonelcies to satisfy all of Devon’s deputy 
lieutenants – rivalry and, in extreme cases, damaging fractiousness ensued.44         
   
Mustering and training Devon’s militia 
 
In spite of the ongoing controversy between Seymour and Champernowne the 
primary role of the Earl of Bath and his deputies during the late-Elizabethan 
period was to co-ordinate general musters and oversee the training of the 
soldiers and horsemen under their command. Only then was it possible for a 
muster certificate to be drafted in like manner to the one that was produced at 
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Exeter in December 1587. How then did Devon’s lieutenancy plan and execute 
a general muster of the county’s forces? Lindsay Boynton has stressed that ‘the 
decisive factor in fixing the place of the muster was, of course, distance. 
Primitive transport and communications were powerful reasons for taking the 
musters in several places during several days, or even weeks.’45 This enabled 
each band of militiamen to muster at a location near to their homes which 
meant that the time they spent away from their families and livelihoods was 
minimised. Such a policy was crucial for maximising attendance, especially 
during periods when the perceived threat from Spain was low, and highlights 
just one of the ways in which the lieutenancies tried to accommodate the often 
conflicting interests of central government and the wider county community.  
However, the problem with such elongated musters was that it greatly 
encouraged weapons-sharing whereby the local authorities redistributed arms 
within the county to fulfil their training requirements as well as to ensure that the 
muster certificate mirrored, albeit falsely, Privy Council expectations.46 From a 
central government perspective this was clearly problematic and so an effort 
was made to ensure that the authorities in counties such as Norfolk ‘enjoyned 
once every quarter [year] to veiw the armour and furnyture of the trayned bands 
in every devicion, and where there is any want, default or insufficiency to give 
order the same may speedily be amended and repayred’.47 Unfortunately the 
Council could do little else: enforcing shorter, single location musters was 
desirable but impracticable for the reasons outlined above, especially for a 
county like Yorkshire whose northern location meant that its inhabitants did not 
                                               
45
 Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, p. 25. The Deputy Lieutenants of Essex, for example, conducted 
a muster of the county’s forces in three different locations over the course of six days during 
May 1597 (HMC, Salisbury, vii, p. 215; CP 51/33). 
46
 Such a practice seems to have been particularly prevalent in Lancashire and Cheshire (SP 
12/208 f.142: 29/2/1588).  
47
 APC, xxix, p. 665. 
114 
 
recognise the threat from Spain as readily as their counterparts in the southern 
maritime counties. Central government were therefore forced to accept the fact 
that county musters had to take place in multiple locations over the course of 
several days or even weeks. In Devon, England’s fourth largest county, it was 
weeks rather than days.  
With these issues in mind, the remainder of this section will outline how 
Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants planned and executed a general muster 
of the county’s forces during the 1590s. This will be achieved by deploying 
hitherto unused documentary evidence from the Seymour Manuscripts to 
reconstruct precisely the route that the Earl of Bath and Sir Ferdinando Gorges 
planned to travel during their eighteen day tour of the county in spring 1598 to 
oversee the mustering and training of Devon’s militia. The aim of such an 
exercise is to underline the extent to which Devon’s lieutenancy sought to 
implement Privy Council directives while at the same time minimising the impact 
that those directives had on the county community. Moreover, by outlining the 
specific locations, days and, in some instances, times that individual regiments 
and bands were expected to muster and train the section confirms that there 
must have been a significant level of communication and interconnectedness at 
all tiers of the county’s government to even contemplate such an intricate plan.         
On 12 February 1598 the Privy Council wrote to the Earl of Bath to order 
the mustering and training of Devon’s militia. Similar orders were dispatched to 
seventeen other counties as part of the Council’s renewed attempt to prepare 
England’s land defences for Spanish invasion. To assist in this process the 
Council appointed general colonels – that is to say, ‘speciall persons of 
knowledge in marshall seruice’ – to be present at each muster. In Devon’s case, 
the Council chose Sir Ferdinando Gorges and he was instructed to help Bath 
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survey Devon’s forces and ‘instructe them in the discipline of warre’.48 
Consequently, on 10 March 1598 Bath and Gorges – along with Sir William 
Courtenay, George Cary, Edward Seymour and Hugh Fortescue – convened at 
Exeter so that Bath could communicate to his deputies the Privy Council’s 
orders.49 During the meeting many matters relating to the mustering and training 
of Devon’s militia were discussed, including the letter written to Bath by the 
Privy Council on 12 February. In addition, certain documents were drafted and 
then annexed to the minutes of the meeting which, although not explicitly 
stated, most probably included a single folio manuscript entitled: 
The daies tymes & places appointed for the veiweing & the 
musteringe of all the trained forces of this Countie of Devon before 
the Lord: Leiuetenante & Sir Ferdinando Gorges knighte Generall 
Colonell of the same as followeth.50 
 
This document is crucial because it outlines the exact itinerary that Bath and 
Gorges planned to travel in fulfilment of the Council’s order to muster and train 
Devon’s militia in spring 1598. It therefore provides a unique snapshot of how 
Devon’s lieutenancy conducted a general muster during the late-Elizabethan 
period (see figure 3.2).  
The document reveals that, with a noticeable and probably well-
established understanding of the county’s geography and travel times, Bath and 
Gorges planned to commence their tour of the county in the South Division at 
Roborough Down near Tavistock on Monday 27 March 1598 where they 
ordered Edward Seymour to appear with 200 men from the hundreds of 
Ermington and Plympton. The pair then intended to proceed south to Plymouth 
Hoe  where  the  forces  of  Plymouth  were  expected to present themselves on  
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1. Monday 27 March – Roborough Down   East Division 
2. Tuesday 28 March – Plymouth Hoe 
3. Wednesday 29 March – Modbury     North Division 
4. Thursday 30 and Friday 31 March – Totnes  
5. Saturday 1 April – Haldon     South Division 
6. Sunday 2 April – Exeter    
7. Tuesday 4 and Wednesday 5 April – Ottery St Mary 
8. Thursday 6 and Friday 7 April – Cullompton  
9. Saturday 8 April – Molland  
10. Sunday 9 and Monday 10 April – South Molton 
11. Tuesday 11, Wednesday 12 and Thursday 13 April – Torrington  
 
 
Figure 3.2: The days and places appointed for the mustering and training of 
Devon’s militia, Monday 27 March 1598 to Thursday 13 April 1598.51 
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Tuesday 28 March. From Plymouth they decided that they would proceed 
eastward along the south coast of Devon to view Richard Champernowne’s 
trained band at Modbury (29 March), the remainder of Edward Seymour’s 
regiment  at  Totnes  (30 March)  and  George  Cary’s  regiment  at  Haldon  (31 
March). On Sunday 2 April the pair planned to be at Exeter to view certain 
horses from the South Division before moving into the East Division to view Sir 
Thomas Denys’ regiment at Ottery St Mary on Tuesday 4 and Wednesday 5 
April. From there they intended to move north to Cullompton to view Sir William 
Courtenay’s regiment together with the horses of the East Division on Thursday 
6 and Friday 7 April before proceeding to the North Division to view Hugh 
Pollard’s regiment at South Molton (9 and 10 April) and Robert Bassett’s 
regiment, together with the horses of the North, at Torrington (11, 12 and 13 
April). Thus, the mustering and training of Devon’s militia in spring 1598 was 
planned to take place in eleven separate locations over an eighteen day period 
(27 March-13 April). Moreover, the document illuminates the fact that Bath and 
his deputies agreed specific times for mustering and training certain sections of 
the militia: Edward Seymour was expected to muster part of his regiment in 
Totnes at 10am on Thursday 30 March; George Cary was instructed to be at 
Haldon with his regiment at 1pm on Saturday 1 April; and Hugh Pollard was 
required to have his regiment ready and waiting in South Molton at 10am on 
Sunday 9 April. Indeed, Bath and Gorges even had the foresight to arrange 
overnight accommodation during their eighteen day tour of the county, a fact 
that is revealed by a five word note written in the margin of the document: 
‘Fridaie at night Mr Bluyttes’.   
What then can one learn from such an intricate and well-considered 
itinerary? Five things instantly become apparent when looking at the document 
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alongside figure 3.2. First, it reinforces the arguments of Paul Glennie and Nigel 
Thrift that there was a prevalent Tudor ‘time consciousness’ where precise 
hours of the day were marked and mattered in the organisation of events and 
the administration of public and private proceedings.52 Second, although it is 
impossible to say for certain whether the muster was executed precisely in 
accordance with the plan, the fact that Devon’s lieutenancy went to the trouble 
of appointing specific days, places and, in some instances, times for mustering 
and training different sections of the county’s militia is a strong indication that it 
did. Otherwise, why should Bath and his assistants have gone to so much 
trouble? Third, the level of planning reveals just how seriously Bath and his 
deputies took their position as facilitators of central government’s trained bands 
initiative. Fourth, the itinerary equally demonstrates the extent to which Devon’s 
lieutenancy tried to accommodate the county’s ordinary inhabitants. It would 
have been quite reasonable for Bath and his deputies to order sections of 
Devon’s militia to muster at three mutually accessible regional locations instead 
of the eleven localised locations that were chosen. For example, the forces 
directed to locations one to four in figure 3.2 could have all convened at 
Modbury; locations five to eight at Exeter; and nine to eleven at South Molton. 
This would have shortened the muster’s duration dramatically, minimised the 
possibility of weapons-sharing and sped up the production of a muster 
certificate. The fact that Bath and his deputy lieutenants did not do this implies 
that a conscious effort was made to ‘take the muster to the people’. Not only did 
this lessen the possibility of evasion, but also it reduced the distance that each 
band of militiamen had to travel and therefore minimised the time that they 
spent away from their families and livelihoods. And fifth, to even contemplate an 
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itinerary with such a high level of detail infers that there was an extremely high 
level of interconnectedness at all tiers of Devon’s government. Indeed, there 
would have been little point in Bath and his deputies devising such a complex 
muster if they were not entirely confident that the relevant information could be 
passed on to each and every rank and file militiaman (an issue that will be 
discussed further in chapter five). 
One final thing to consider is the extent to which the evidence of just one 
general muster applies to the rest of the time period covered by this thesis. It 
seems highly likely that each of the locations outlined above were time-
honoured mustering stations specifically chosen to accommodate large scale 
military training.53 Certainly, Torrington had been used as a muster station from 
at least 1583, while Roborough Down, Plymouth Hoe and Haldon offered 
extensive open plains for the simultaneous training of hundreds, even 
thousands, of men.54 Indeed, recognised muster locations existed throughout 
the realm: St Gile’s Hill in Hampshire; Bridgewater in Somerset; Buntingford and 
St Alban’s in Hertfordshire; Braintree, Brentwood, Chelmsford and Colchester in 
Essex.55 Thus, one can reasonably assume that the itinerary chosen for the 
muster of Devon’s militia in spring 1598 was not designed solely for that year. 
Rather it was a well recognised route that was routinely travelled by Bath and 
his aides whenever central government requested a muster certificate of the 
county’s militia. It is therefore possible to appreciate the intricate process that 
the members of Devon’s lieutenancy went through to enable them to produce 
their muster certificate in December 1587 – a document that the Privy Council 
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would have heavily relied upon to help them devise the role of Devon’s militia 
during the Armada crisis of 1588.     
 
The role of Devon’s militia during the Armada crisis of 1588  
 
The precise role of Devon’s militia during summer 1588 has, until recently, been 
shrouded by the recurrent tendency of historians to misinterpret the primary 
function of the militias in the southern maritime counties. The basic idea put 
forward has been that their main role during the Armada crisis was to march in-
step with the Spanish and English navies, shadowing them as they progressed 
eastward along the Channel. Lindsay Boynton seems to have been the earliest 
proponent of this idea, writing in 1967 that 
there were mobile forces, of indeterminate number, which remained 
in the maritime counties to shadow the Armada ... as the Armada 
made its way up the Channel, they moved with it to cover as far as 
possible the landing-places along the coast.56      
  
This premise has been largely supported by subsequent scholars with James 
McDermott writing as recently as 2005 that  
as the composite host shadowed the armada passed eastward along 
the English coast, “old” formations – those that had come furthest 
from the west – dropped out and returned home as the bands of the 
counties into which they advanced joined it.57  
 
Indeed, with specific reference to Devon’s militia, John Roberts has suggested 
that ‘it seems probable that these men moved along inland more or less in step 
with the Armada’s progress up the Channel.’58 Yet in spite of this firmly 
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entrenched view, Neil Younger has recently refuted the idea, arguing that in 
reality  
aside from the intrinsic improbability, in the context of Elizabethan 
military capability, of a massed force moving along the south coast 
with no overall commander or staff, there is no solid evidence that 
such a movement took place, or even that it was planned in any 
detail.59  
 
However, if the militias in the southern maritime counties did not coalesce into a 
shadow army, what was their true function during the Spanish Armada crisis? 
This section answers that question by utilising Devon as a case study.    
As late as March 1588 the Privy Council were gearing up to repel what 
they believed would be two separate Spanish attacks: an amphibious assault 
somewhere along the south coast of England or Wales and a primary Spanish 
attack spearheaded by the Duke of Parma, who had gathered his forces across 
the English Channel in Flanders, in either Kent or Essex.60 However, Simon 
Adams has crucially revealed that by mid-July 1588 the Council had received 
new intelligence that suggested Spain’s forces intended to launch just one co-
ordinated attack on London.61 Essex therefore became the centre of the Privy 
Council’s defence preparations because, as Sir William Monson observed,  
if an enemy land on [the] Essex side, he may march directly to 
London without let, impeachment, or other impediment, but by the 
encounter of an army ... [whereas] if an enemy land in Kent he is 
kept by the river of Thames.62  
 
Consequently, the Earl of Leicester was commissioned a lieutenant-general and 
instructed to begin mustering an army, composed of approximately 1,500 
horsemen and 11,000 militiamen from the Home Counties, at a strategically 
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advantageous location on the north bank of the River Thames.63 Leicester 
thought Tilbury to be the ‘most apt place’ to concentrate the bulk of his forces 
and throughout August 1588 he utilised the port as his headquarters.64 
However, while the Privy Council were seemingly confident that the Spanish 
intended just one coordinated attack on the capital they could not neglect the 
possibility of an attack elsewhere along the south coast. Nor could they be 
certain that Leicester’s army would successfully repel a Spanish onslaught in 
Essex. With this in mind it was deemed essential that the militias of the 
southern maritime counties should adopt a mutual aid initiative and that a 
reserve army of militiamen should be instructed to muster near London to 
defend the Queen in the event that Leicester’s army failed. Devon’s militia 
played a crucial role in both of these contingency measures.  
The mutual aid initiative in the southern maritime counties – or, the 
forces to ‘impeach the landing ... of th’enemy upon his first descent’ – has been 
described by Younger as ‘by far the least understood’ element of the Privy 
Council’s defensive strategy owing largely to the reluctance of historians to 
dismiss the idea of a shadow army.65  The true role of the trained bands in each 
southern maritime county was to act as a skirmish force, resisting any Spanish 
landing attempt in the first instance and, once that became futile, delaying the 
enemy’s advance inland as much as possible in order to buy time for 
reinforcements to arrive from neighbouring counties. As Sir Thomas Scott put it 
in reference to the role of east Kent’s militia:  
by keeping thenemy from Landing by disordering or deminishing 
some parte of his forces or at the leaste by staying of him for a tyme: 
Wherby thenland partes of this Countie and other Counties adioyning 
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may be in the more forwardnes to staye the enemy from speedy 
passage to London or the harte of the realme.66          
 
Thus, the mutual aid part of the Council’s defence strategy would only be 
initiated in the specific location that the Spanish chose to attack. For example, 
in the south-west, if the Spanish attacked Falmouth, Cornwall’s 4,000 trained 
militiamen would be reinforced by 4,000 from Devon and 3,000 from Somerset. 
If Plymouth or Tor Bay was targeted, Devon’s 4,000 trained militiamen would be 
supported by 2,000 from Cornwall, 3,000 from Dorset, 2,000 from Wiltshire and 
4,000 from Somerset. And if Poole was assaulted, Dorset’s 4,000 trained 
militiamen would be aided by 4,000 from Devon, 4,000 from Somerset and 
2,000 from Wiltshire.67 Similar arrangements were put in place further eastward 
thereby ensuring that all of the key ports along the south coast of England – 
from Falmouth in Cornwall to Yarmouth in Norfolk – were defended by a fighting 
force that ranged between 11,000 and 20,000 men.68 Of course during the 
actual event the English naval forces were able to prevent the enemy from 
landing on the south coast, successfully harrying the Spanish fleet towards 
Calais so that, in the words of Lord Admiral Howard, they had ‘no leisure to 
land’.69 Consequently, this ensured that the mutual aid initiative was never 
actually initiated despite Henry Whitfield’s unsubstantiated claim that ‘amid 
beating drums and waving flags, seventeen thousand soldiers marched into 
Plymouth and encamped on the Hoe; and eleven thousand more continued the 
journey to Falmouth to resist the attack if it fell there.’70 In reality, the navy’s 
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success freed Devon’s militia, along with the militias in the other southern 
maritime counties, to begin preparing for their secondary function: joining the 
inland counties to form the army that would defend the Queen in the event that 
Leicester’s army in Essex failed to thwart the anticipated Spanish attack on the 
capital.  
 The London army, which was to be placed under the command of Lord 
Hunsdon, was by far the largest force that the Privy Council planned to muster 
during the Armada crisis and, if it had been required, would have represented 
England’s last line of defence. The Council’s orders to muster the main bulk of 
this force – which numbered over 40,000 footmen and 4,000 horsemen – were 
issued between 23 and 28 July 1588.71 Devon was ordered to send 2,000 
footmen who were ‘to be at London’ on 10 August. To put this into context, 
2,000 men was only the seventh highest contribution: Somerset was ordered to 
provide 4,000 men; Norfolk and Suffolk 3,000; Gloucestershire and Sussex 
2,500; and Wiltshire 2,300. In addition, an arrival date of 10 August gave 
Devon’s militia more time than any other contributing county to make ready. 
Clearly, this did not reflect Devon’s inability to levy more than 2,000 men; after 
all it has already been revealed that the county was expected to provide 
Cornwall and Dorset with 4,000 men under the mutual aid initiative. However, 
one possible reason why Devon’s contribution was relatively modest was the 
fact that the two western-most counties had been in a state of military readiness 
longer than any other region during the run up to the Armada.72 It is therefore 
feasible that the Privy Council was reluctant to impose too great a burden on 
either Devon or Cornwall over and above the mutual aid initiative – a possibility 
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that is supported by the fact that Cornwall’s militia was not required to contribute 
at all to the London army. Another possibility was that the Council wished to 
maintain its hitherto impressive defensive flexibility. After all there was no way 
of predicting the eventual success of the English fleet once it had harried the 
Spanish into Calais and, as Simon Adams has pointed out, there were nagging 
‘fears in August that the departure of the Armada northwards [to Scotland] was 
a feint ... as part of a plan to double back’.73 Thus, if the naval skirmishes had 
played out more evenly the Spanish might well have felt strong enough to 
retreat westward and gain a foothold in the West Country to await 
reinforcements. Completely draining the militia from the south-west for service 
in the London army would have left England’s back door wide open to that 
threat.  
Of course in reality the Armada crisis of 1588 was all but over by 3 
August with the Privy Council ordering those troops who had commenced their 
journey to the capital to return home to their respective counties so that they did 
not enter into the Queen’s pay.74  Indeed, with the scrapping of the London 
army on 3 August it seems highly probable that Devon’s levy of 2,000 
militiamen, who still had a week to go before their allotted arrival date in 
London, never left the county. The Devon militia’s practical role during the 
Armada crisis was therefore restricted to mustering within the county to repel a 
possible amphibious Spanish assault on the Devon coast and to make ready 
4,000 militiamen to serve as reinforcements in the event of a Spanish attack in 
either Cornwall or Dorset. Unfortunately there are no known records that specify 
the intra-county movements of Devon’s militia during summer 1588. It is 
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therefore impossible to be certain what the level of military preparedness was 
within the county ‘if the Armada had landed’ in the south-west.  
 
Devon’s defence against the ‘Invisible Armada’ of 1599 
 
In his study of Plymouth’s defences in the year of the Armada Mark Brayshay 
acknowledged that ‘evidence which indicates precisely the number of militia 
billeted in Plymouth during the Armada emergency has not survived.’ He was 
therefore forced to concentrate solely on Plymouth’s fortifications, ordnance 
supplies and battle tactics, writing of the militia that ‘clearly there were soldiers 
in Plymouth but in what numbers and from where they came remains hard to 
determine’.75 However, while there is insufficient evidence to measure precisely 
the preparedness of Devon’s militia during the Armada crisis of 1588, there is a 
substantial amount of material present in the Seymour Manuscripts to illuminate 
the intra-county deployment of the county’s trained bands during August 1599 
when it was feared that Spain planned another invasion similar in nature to 
1588. England’s defence preparations in 1588 and 1599 were largely 
comparable and so the evidence relating to August 1599 can be deployed to 
gauge the likely level of preparedness within Devon during both crises. Geoffrey 
Parker has been hyper-critical of the county militia’s potential to fend off a 
Spanish onslaught in 1588, describing England’s land defences during the crisis 
as ‘desperately behind-hand all over’, ‘ludicrously inadequate’, ‘untrained troops 
without clear orders, backed up by only a handful of inadequately fortified 
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towns’.76 In contrast, Neil Younger has painted a rather different picture, arguing 
that 
The privy council was called upon to deploy limited forces to defend 
a long coastline against an unpredictable attacker, and the evidence 
shows that they contrived to maximize the effectiveness of the 
available resources whilst balancing the calls of military practicality, 
financial necessity and political constraints.77  
 
This section supports Younger’s more positive assessment. Moreover, by 
examining the intra-county deployment of Devon’s militia in August 1599, the 
section reveals that this was by no means unusual.  Indeed, the county militias 
were also ‘better organized, more efficient and more willing than has [hitherto] 
been recognized’ eleven years later.78  
While the defeat of the Spanish Armada represented a severe body-blow 
to King Philip II’s military ambitions it did little to dampen his resolve in pursuing 
an anti-English policy for the remainder of his reign and this was carried forward 
with equal gusto by Philip III when he succeeded his father on 13 September 
1598.79 Indeed, Paul Hammer has cited the months immediately following the 
accession of the Protestant French King, Henri IV, on 2 August 1589 as 
marking the start of the ‘deep war’ between England and Spain ‘when no end to 
the fighting seemed in sight and Elizabeth’s regime could only seek to endure, 
as new threats and commitments mounted up on all sides.’80 The threat of 
another Spanish Armada therefore persisted throughout the 1590s with an 
amphibious Spanish assault twice attempted in autumn 1596 and autumn 1597. 
The former was an ill-conceived knee-jerk reaction on the part of Phillip II who 
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wanted to seize the Breton port of Brest and use it as a base to launch a 
counterattack in response to the English sacking of Cadiz, while the latter 
constituted a more ambitious plan to occupy the Cornish port of Falmouth and 
use it as a base to ambush the English fleet on its return from the Azores. Both 
armadas were forced to turn back before reaching their targets due to bad 
weather in the English Channel. Nevertheless, in summer 1599 they 
represented two recent precedents to support the growing paranoia within 
England that the Spanish were once again preparing for an amphibious assault 
on the country’s southern coastline using Brest as a forward operating 
position.81       
 The first reports of this apparently imminent Spanish attack arrived in 
England in early-July 1599. They included a dispatch that Captain Matthew 
Bredgate sent to Simon Willis (one of Sir Robert Cecil’s secretaries) on his 
arrival in Plymouth on 14 July having recently conducted a reconnaissance 
mission to the northern cape of Spain. Bredgate reported that there were 
rumoured to be 15,000 Spanish soldiers already at Brest and a further five to 
ten thousand expected to join them shortly. Furthermore, he stated that King 
Philip III himself was planning to lead this force across the Channel in an 
attempt to invade and occupy the Isle of Wight.82 However, other reports 
arriving in England and Wales in mid-late July claimed that the Spanish were 
not yet at Brest but were nevertheless planning to use the port as a staging post 
to launch an attack. Milford Haven, Bristol, Falmouth and Plymouth were all 
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mentioned as possible targets.83 Moreover, the possibility of the Spanish 
launching a simultaneous attack from the Low Countries also appeared likely 
when the Privy Council received reports on 31 July claiming the Spanish army 
was gathering in Dunkirk with a view to landing somewhere in Kent.84 Thus, just 
as in 1588, the Privy Council were required to adopt a flexible defence strategy: 
Lord Cobham was given command of approximately 10,000 men to prevent a 
Spanish landing in Kent; the Earl of Cumberland was instructed to assemble a 
naval blockade on the River Thames to hinder a Spanish advance on London; 
Lord Admiral Howard was appointed the commander of a London army to 
defend the Queen and capital; and the lord lieutenants of the southern maritime 
counties were required to renew their mutual aid initiative.85   
Defence preparations also occurred concurrently within Devon as a 
result of the growing anxiety that had spread amongst those who inhabited the 
county’s southern coast.86 This anxiety reached a new level of intensity on the 
afternoon of 25 July when a fleet, initially thought to be the vanguard of a 
Spanish invasion force, was sighted off the coast of Plymouth. As it turned out 
the suspicious fleet was composed of Dutch merchant vessels returning home 
to the Low Countries.87 Nevertheless, by 29 July this false alarm, coupled with 
reports arriving in Dartmouth which stated that Spain’s forces were apparently 
far greater in number and nearer to Devon than previously thought, jolted the 
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Earl of Bath into ordering his deputies and the rest of his militia officers ‘to putt 
themselues and theire companies in readynes to martche’.88 After a short period 
of consultation with his deputies, Bath pin-pointed Plymouth, Dartmouth and Tor 
Bay as likely Spanish landing sites and proceeded to initiate Devon’s military 
mobilisation, riding south to Roborough Down, near Tavistock (see figure 3.2), 
where he had ordered the colonels of the North Division (Sir Robert Bassett and 
Hugh Pollard) to rendezvous with 2,000 militiamen.89 On 5 August this 
contingent marched into Plymouth where they were joined by an additional 
force of 1,000 footmen from the South Division.  Meanwhile, Sir William 
Courtenay and Edward Seymour’s regiments were ordered to muster at 
Dartmouth, Sir Thomas Denys’ regiment at Totnes and Sir George Cary’s 
regiment at Tor Bay in the light of fresh intelligence received in Plymouth from a 
Scottish mariner that reiterated the vulnerability of those ports.90 Thus, when 
Bath wrote to the Privy Council on 6 August he was able to state that there was 
a total of 6,000 militiamen billeted at Plymouth, Dartmouth, Totnes and Tor Bay 
ready and waiting to repel a Spanish landing.91 
 Bath maintained Devon’s militia at these locations for nearly two weeks.92 
During this period it was the inhabitants of the county who were liable to pay the 
mounting costs of the mobilisation because, as the Privy Council explained to 
Sir Ferdinando Gorges on 6 August, ‘until there shall be an army assembled 
under a General and officers in orderly manner, her Majesty is wont never to be 
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put to any charges.’93  Thus, Bath had no choice but to tax the county’s 
inhabitants for a further ten days’ conduct money on 12 August.94 However, just 
a day later Devon’s financial situation was judged to be so dire that he was 
forced to remind the Council that 
the whole charge of the army amounts to £300 per day, besides the 
expenses of the colonels and other gentlemen. I find all men 
earnestly bent and desirous to encounter with the enemy, but truly 
they are very unable to continue here any longer without some 
direction from you to satisfy the charges.95 
 
In addition, he cited the fact that the 1599 invasion scare was being played out 
in the midst of the summer harvest and, if Devon’s militiamen were not 
dismissed by the Crown, their crops would be ‘almost utterly lost’.96 Such an 
appeal underlines the dual function of Devon’s lieutenancy as facilitator of 
central government’s defence policy and guardian of the county’s interests. 
Moreover, it reveals a crucial aspect of the Crown’s relationship with the 
ordinary inhabitants of late-Elizabethan Devon in that when the inhabitants of 
Devon perceived the threat from Spain to be high they were more than willing to 
meet, even exceed, central government’s defensive strategy in order to protect 
their families and livelihoods. However, as soon as that threat was believed to 
have diminished, even slightly, the desire of Devon’s militiamen to return home 
and work their land intensified and their willingness to continue cooperating with 
central government receded.   
Yet, despite Bath’s best efforts, the Council were unmoved by Devon’s 
financial predicament; after all it had been a long-established principle that the 
county militias were to be funded by a county-wide tax. Nevertheless, they did 
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recognise the necessity for Devon’s militiamen to return home and tend to their 
harvest. Thus, on 12 August they instructed Bath to send a vessel to survey the 
Breton coast and, provided there was no sign of the Spanish fleet, on its return 
to order the majority of the county’s militia to demobilise.97 As it turned out Bath 
did not have to arrange his own reconnaissance mission because on 17 August 
John Lymberry, a mariner who had sailed to Brittany from Lyme Regis on 12 
August with similar instructions from the Council, arrived in Plymouth and 
reported that there was no sight of the Spanish fleet in either Brest or 
Conquet.98 Consequently, with the total cost of Devon’s August 1599 
mobilisation having apparently reached in excess of £10,000, Bath duly 
dismissed the majority of his forces; retaining just 300 militiamen in Plymouth 
who were to enter the Queen’s pay for a further fourteen days.99 However, 
despite their dismissal, Devon’s lieutenancy reminded the county’s militiamen 
that they were still required ‘vppon paine of death to be readye at an howers 
warning to marche to the place of Roundeuous with theire weapons & armes’. 
These places were exactly the same as those that had been used earlier in the 
month: the forces of the North Division were to gather at Tavistock; Sir William 
Courtenay’s regiment at Totnes; Sir George Cary and a section of Edward 
Seymour’s regiment at Dartmouth; and the remainder of Seymour’s regiment at 
Plymouth. Furthermore, in the event of a Spanish attack in north Devon, the 
militiamen of the South and East Divisions were to rendezvous at Torrington 
before joining forces with the North Division.100 Interestingly, all of these 
locations have been identified as locations where Devon’s militia mustered for 
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training during the 1580s and 1590s. The fact that they were also used for 
military mobilisation purposes therefore reinforces the notion that they were 
time-honoured muster stations and as such used to similar effect during 
summer 1588.  
A partial remobilisation of the county militias occurred in late-August as a 
result of fresh reports that claimed the Spanish were at Brest preparing to attack 
either Falmouth or Tor Bay.101 However, this once again proved to be a false 
alarm and by 1 September all the county militias, as well as the English fleet, 
were able to stand down for the winter. Thus ended what R. B. Wernham has 
called the ‘Invisible Armada’ of 1599 when, in reality,  
not one of [Spain’s] ... ships, other than a few small scouting craft, 
had come nearer than Coruna to the English or Irish coasts. Yet it 
had called forth defence preparations by sea and even more by land 
on a scale comparable to those of 1588.102 
 
Unfortunately, Wernham does not elaborate on his comparison between 1599 
and 1588. Nevertheless, it has been the intention of this section to use the 
extensive documentary evidence of the internal mobilisation within Devon 
during August 1599 to reveal that the likely mobilisation of Devon’s militia during 
the Armada crisis of 1588 was, contrary to Geoffrey Parker’s belief, ahead of 
schedule, extensive and highly organised. Indeed, whilst it is impossible to say 
for sure whether the military mobilisation that took place in Devon during August 
1599 was an exact replica of what happened in July 1588, it seems highly 
probable that it was. Certainly, the Council’s national defence strategy in 1599 
shared a very clear resemblance with their strategy in 1588: an army situated in 
Kent to hinder a Spanish attack from the Low Countries; a larger force in and 
                                               
101
 SP 12/272 f.114: 24/8/1599; SP 12/272 f.116: John Peryam, Mayor of Exeter to Sir Robert 
Cecil; DRO, 3799M-3/O/1/21; SP 12/272 f.135: 28/8/1599; Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 
204-5. 
102
 Wernham, Return of the Armadas, pp. 271-2. 
134 
 
around London to defend the Queen and capital; and a mutual aid initiative in 
the southern maritime counties. It is therefore logical to assume that the Earl of 
Bath and his deputies would have similarly replicated the intra-county 
deployment of Devon’s militia that must surely have taken place during the 
Armada crisis of 1588 when they faced the ‘Invisible Armada’ of 1599.  
    
Troop levies to Ireland, 1594-1602 
 
In retrospect the ‘Invisible Armada’ of 1599 was one of the watershed moments 
of the Armada years, marking the end of the Spanish invasion scares that had 
become part and parcel of life for the inhabitants of England’s southern 
maritime counties for well over a decade. Indeed, Lindsay Boynton has noted 
that the 1599 crisis stretched England’s military resources to such an extent that 
‘when the Council ordered resumed training in 1600 it was clear that there was 
no intention of keeping it up as frequently as before’.103 However, the role of the 
Elizabethan militia was not restricted to the defence of mainland England and 
Wales. The county militias were also required to provide troop levies for military 
service in Brittany and in the Low Countries. Moreover, between 1594 and 
1603, the county militias were similarly utilised in Ireland as part of the 
Elizabethan government’s strategy to quell the rebellion that had broken out 
there, later dubbed the Nine Years’ War, in response to the Tudor regime’s 
aggressive Anglicisation policies.104 The Devon ports of Barnstaple and 
Plymouth both served as critical centres for the embarkation and transportation 
of these troops across the Irish Sea. By briefly outlining the role played by the 
Earl of Bath and his deputies in levying and conducting Devon’s quota of troops 
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to these ports, this section underlines the strategic value that central 
government continued to attach to Devon even after the threat of a Spanish 
invasion of England had dissipated. Furthermore, it reveals the pragmatic steps 
that Devon’s lieutenancy took in spreading the burden of troop levies evenly 
throughout Devon in a bid to appease the county’s increasingly war-weary 
inhabitants. However, whereas the previous section outlined the relative 
willingness of Devon’s ordinary inhabitants to meet, even exceed, central 
government’s military demands during periods of acute Spanish threat, this 
section explains why such willingness was never replicated in relation to the 
Nine Years’ War in Ireland.    
Between 1594 and 1602, 6,688 footmen, 500 mariners and 132 horses 
were conducted to either Barnstaple or Plymouth for transportation to Ireland 
(see figure 3.3). The only ports to receive more during the same period were 
Chester (19,105 footmen and 1,046 horses) and Bristol (10,275 footmen and 
602 horses). On paper this is clearly considerably more than the combined 
totals of Barnstaple and Plymouth: Chester handled 65% more footmen and 
87% more horses; and Bristol handled 35% more footmen and 78% more 
horses.105 However, the figures for Barnstaple and Plymouth are still substantial 
when one takes into account the acute burden that Devon had been under 
since 1585 as a frontline maritime county in England’s war with Spain. Indeed, 
even the much smaller figures for the six other ports that were used to launch 
military levies across the Irish Sea can be regarded as notable when one takes 
into account that they too were all located within frontline maritime counties.106   
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Date Total 
levy 
Levy origin / 
ratio 
Port of 
embarkation 
Destination Note 
Mar '95 1,553 f. Brittany Plymouth Waterford 1 
Oct '96 400 f. Devon (300) Barnstaple Dublin 2 
    Cornwall (100)       
Apr '97 400 f. Devon (300) Barnstaple Dublin 3 
    Cornwall (100)       
Aug '98 1,350 f. Low Countries Plymouth Lough Foyle/Carlingford 4 
 50 h.     
Nov '98 400 f. Devon  Plymouth Cork 5 
Feb '99 16 h. Devon Barnstaple Carrickfergus 6 
Jan/Feb '00 200 f. Devon (100) Barnstaple Carrickfergus 7 
    Dorset (50)       
    Cornwall (50)       
Dec '00 150 f. Devon (40) Barnstaple Lough Foyle  8 
    Somerset (40)       
    Wiltshire (30)       
    Dorset (20)       
    Cornwall (20)       
Apr '01 170 f. Somerset (50) Barnstaple Lough Foyle 9 
    Devon (40)       
    Wiltshire (40)       
    Cornwall (20)       
    Dorset (20)       
Aug '01 275 f. Devon (100) Barnstaple Waterford/Kinsale 10 
  Hampshire (100)    
  Dorset (50)    
  Cornwall (25)    
Oct '01 500 m. Devon  Plymouth Kinsale 11 
    Cornwall       
Oct/Nov '01 975 f. Devon (300) Barnstaple Waterford/Kinsale 12 
  Somerset (250)    
  Wiltshire (125)    
  Cornwall (100)    
  Dorset (100)    
  Hampshire (100)    
  66 h.  Not specified        
Jan/Feb '02 650 f. Devon (350) Barnstaple Cork 13 
    Somerset (300)       
Aug '02 165 f. Not specified Barnstaple Cork 14 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Military levies to Barnstaple and Plymouth, 1595-1602. 
 
f. = foot   m. = mariner   h. = horse 
 
Barnstaple totals:  3,385 f.; 82 h.  
Plymouth totals:  3,303 f.; 500 m.; 50 h.  
Devon totals:  6,688 f.; 500 m.; 132 h. 
 
Notes: 1. McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, p. 179. 2. APC, xxvi, pp. 243, 346, 406-7. 
3. APC, xxvii, pp. 21-6; APC, xxviii, p. 599. 4. Cal. Carew MSS, iii, pp. 281-3; McGurk, 
Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, p. 179. 5. APC, xxix, pp. 237-42. 6. APC, xxix, p. 589; 
McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, p. 65. 7. APC, xxx, pp. 41-2, 102, 262, 388; McGurk, 
Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, p. 58. 8. APC, xxx, p. 790; APC, xxxi, p. 23. 9. APC, xxxi, pp. 
296, 314, 318, 325-6, 363. 10. APC, xxxii, p. 71, gives a levy of 270 soldiers, but all other 
references to the levy state 275; APC, xxxii, pp. 82-3, 126-7. 11. HMC, Salisbury, xi, p. 425. 12. 
APC, xxxii, 312-3; HMC, Salisbury, xi, pp. 431, 454, 461, 490-1; McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest 
of Ireland, pp. 58-9. 13. HMC, Salisbury, xii, pp. 13, 50-1, 154. 14. HMC, Salisbury, xii, pp. 277, 
320. 
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In recognition of the southern maritime counties’ war weariness the Privy 
Council spread the burden of troop levies by drawing them from the militias of 
multiple counties and, wherever possible, ordering the conduction of those 
levies to the most convenient port of embarkation. Thus, it was logical for the 
counties in northern England and Wales to conduct their military levies to 
Chester, whereas, for those counties situated in the English midlands and south 
Wales, Bristol was preferable.107 Similarly, figure 3.3 reveals that apart from two 
occasions in 1595 and 1598 when veterans from Brittany and the Low 
Countries were redeployed to Ireland via Plymouth, the troop levies that arrived 
at Barnstaple and Plymouth were made up entirely of militiamen from the six 
south-western counties of Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Hampshire, Wiltshire and 
Somerset.  
The responsibility of levying and conducting these men to either port 
customarily rested upon the lieutenancies – a process that John McGurk has 
explored in detail in relation to Kent. However, McGurk has also noted that for 
counties such as Lancashire and Cheshire, where the office of lord lieutenant 
became vacant following the death of the fourth Earl of Derby in September 
1594, the responsibility was shared by the shrievalty and muster commission.108 
Of course in Devon there was no such vacancy and so the responsibility of 
levying and conducting the county’s military levies to Plymouth and Barnstaple 
rested squarely on the shoulders of the Earl of Bath and his deputies. This is 
reflected in the Seymour Manuscripts which include a substantial number of 
items relating to the levying and conducting of men to Barnstaple between 
October 1596 and August 1602. It is therefore possible to provide an insight into 
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the practical steps taken by Bath and his deputies to balance the conflicting 
interests, exposed by the Irish rebellion, of the Crown and the county’s 
inhabitants.      
Bath responded to the Crown’s incessant military levies pragmatically, 
allocating the county’s three divisions an equal proportion of each levy. Thus, of 
the forty Devon footmen that arrived in Barnstaple in May 1601, thirteen were 
from the East Division, fourteen from the South Division and thirteen from the 
North Division.  Similarly, of the 100 that arrived in August 1601, thirty-three 
were from the East, thirty-three from the South and thirty-four from the North. 
And, of the 150 that arrived in October 1601, fifty were from the East, fifty from 
the South and fifty from the North.109 In doing so, Bath’s primary concern was 
not ‘to make choice of good men’ (which the Queen and Privy Council explicitly 
instructed him to do); rather it was to spread the burden as evenly as possible 
throughout Devon in recognition of the county’s war weariness.110 Indeed, this 
policy of equitable apportionment seems to have been replicated by Bath’s 
deputies within each division: the more parishes a hundred had, the more men 
that hundred provided.111 Moreover, it seems that Devon’s governors were not 
alone in their efforts to spread the burden of troop levies throughout each 
county. County officials in Lancashire and Cheshire, for example, seem to have 
adopted a certain degree of levy apportionment between the hundreds in their 
respective counties to achieve a similar result.112  
However, despite their best efforts to ameliorate the Crown’s demands, 
Devon’s lieutenancy could do nothing about the unwillingness of the men who 
were chosen to serve in Ireland. Such unwillingness originated not only as a 
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result of their desire to remain at home, work their land and protect their 
families, but also the complete disconnection that ordinary county folk felt 
towards the Irish rebellion. For them it was a conflict in a far away land and thus 
it was difficult to see a tangible benefit in helping the Crown to quell the 
uprising. Much the same feelings were felt throughout the northern counties 
during the Armada crisis. Indeed, Michael Braddick has explained that the 
reason for Yorkshire’s ‘difficult and grudging’ military mobilisation in 1588 was 
caused primarily by the belief ‘that the [Spanish] threat was not ... particularly 
immediate’ in north England.113 Thus, in light of these feelings it is unsurprising 
to find many recorded instances of desertion, not only within Devon but 
throughout the counties.114 Clearly, some impressed men were of the firm 
opinion that their personal, tangible interests far outweighed the impersonal, 
intangible interests of the Crown and thus chose desertion over service.  
 
 
 
The primary intention of this chapter has been to underline the high strategic 
value that central government attached to Devon throughout the late-
Elizabethan period. This manifested itself most markedly in the vital role that the 
county’s militia played in the Privy Council’s contingency measures during the 
Spanish Armada crisis of 1588 and the ‘Invisible Armada’ of 1599. Moreover, 
the utilisation of Barnstaple and Plymouth as critical centres for the embarkation 
and transportation of English troops across the Irish Sea during the Nine Years’ 
War in Ireland ensured that Devon’s governors and inhabitants were at the 
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forefront of England’s military endeavours even during periods when the threat 
from Spain was perceived to be low. To harness the realm’s military resources 
the Privy Council increasingly looked to the office of lord lieutenant. By 
examining the social command structure of Devon’s militia and the manner in 
which the county’s forces were mustered and trained, this chapter has 
underlined the practical importance of the Elizabethan lieutenancies in matters 
of defence and security. Specifically, it has shown how the local power and 
influence of Bath and his deputies served as the foundation from which Devon’s 
militia was organised. However, such a system made rivalry inevitable thereby 
highlighting an inherent problem in a political-military organisation that was 
structured around personal alliances as opposed to military aptitude. Yet 
despite the short period of disruption that occurred in the South Division during 
the late-1590s, the chapter has made it plain that Devon’s lieutenancy worked 
hard to meet, even exceed, central government’s defence policy. This was a 
relatively easy task during periods when the threat from Spain was perceived to 
be at its zenith – as it was in summer 1588 and summer 1599 – because the 
desire of the wider county community to protect their homes, livelihoods and 
families matched the Crown’s need decisively to repel a Spanish attack. 
However, during the much longer periods when the perceived benefit of 
meeting the Crown’s incessant military demands was low – as it was whenever 
the Privy Council ordered a general muster or levied troops for service in Ireland 
– the lieutenancy needed to adapt the centre’s defence policy to pacify Devon’s 
over burdened inhabitants. Indeed, such occurrences reveal an important 
aspect of the relationship that existed between the centre and periphery during 
the late-Elizabethan era, namely, that the Crown had to secure the consent and 
cooperation of those who inhabited the counties in order to implement an 
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appropriate defence policy in response to the threat from Spain and the 
rebellion in Ireland. This was achieved primarily through the office of lord 
lieutenant. The Earl of Bath and his deputies served as important mediators 
between central government and the inhabitants of Devon, utilising their local 
knowledge and extensive social connections to facilitate the implementation of 
the centre’s military demands while at the same time remaining mindful of local 
concerns and issues. Indeed, it is useful to envisage the existence of a dialogue 
taking place between central government and the inhabitants of Devon with the 
county’s lieutenancy providing the channel through which that dialogue flowed. 
How this dialogue was maintained is a central concern of the following two 
chapters, especially when the need for the centre rapidly to communicate with 
the inhabitants of Devon increased as the Elizabethan war with Spain and the 
Nine Years’ War in Ireland intensified.   
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4 
The Tudor South-West’s Royal Post-Stage Service: 
Structure, Speed and Efficiency 
 
The previous chapter concluded by stressing the increased necessity for central 
government rapidly to communicate with local government officials situated in 
Devon as England’s conflict with Spain and the rebellion in Ireland progressed.  
The next two chapters will reveal precisely how this was achieved. This chapter 
provides an in-depth analysis of the Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage service 
during the late-Elizabethan era. It focuses on the physical structure upon which 
the government’s postal arrangements rested (that is to say, the Tudor 
highway), the operational mechanics employed for conveying official mail 
nationwide (as well as overseas) and the network of Exchequer-funded post-
stages that connected London with the south-western periphery of the realm 
during periods of political turmoil. Moreover, it provides an important 
reassessment of the speed and efficiency of the south-west’s royal post-stage 
service, demonstrating that the network was more rapid and reliable than many 
scholars have been willing to recognise. A fundamental aim of the whole thesis 
is to abolish the notion that Devon was a backward, cut-off, distant, insular and 
impenetrable county during the late-Elizabethan period. By highlighting the 
complexity, organisation and relative efficiency of the Tudor south-west’s royal 
post-stage service this chapter makes an important and substantial contribution 
to this objective. Chapter three argued that the Elizabethan war with Spain and 
the Nine Years’ War in Ireland stimulated an increased level of interaction 
between central government policy-makers situated at Whitehall and local 
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government enforcers residing in Devon. This trend was mirrored throughout 
the realm making an effective and reliable postal service vital. Yet despite this 
necessity the majority of scholars interested in sixteenth-century postal 
arrangements have argued that the royal post-stage network was ‘insufficient’, 
‘unreliable’, ‘slack’, ‘slow’ and ‘tardy’.1 These judgements have been based 
largely upon the anecdotal evidence that survives among the State Papers 
which details numerous instances of when government dispatches were 
severely delayed or lost along the Exchequer-funded postal routes. However, 
relying solely on this type of evidence is inherently flawed because it presents a 
skewed and fundamentally inaccurate image of the royal post-stage service.  
More recent studies, however, have overturned the fallacy of early 
modern postal inefficiencies, arguing for a much quicker, more efficient network. 
Indeed, the pioneering work of Mark Brayshay, Philip Harrison and Brian 
Chalkley has helped to alter modern understanding of the relative speed of the 
Elizabethan royal post-stage service. By utilising 181 unique postal 
endorsements written on the outside panel of an unspecified number of letters 
transported along the south-west’s royal post-stage route between 1570 and 
1620, they have calculated that it customarily took approximately fifty-and-a-half 
hours for government letters to be conveyed between London and Plymouth 
during the late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart period. This, they argue, ‘provided 
an enhanced and sophisticated means of rapid communication between the 
core of government in Westminster and important places located on the 
principal thoroughfares of the realm’ and constituted a marked improvement on 
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the postal arrangements that had gone before.2 Such a comprehensive and 
systematic methodology has radically enhanced the reputation of the royal post-
stage service. Indeed, by utilising an even larger sample of 335 postal 
endorsements from a collection of seventy-three letters dispatched along the 
Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage route between 1595 and 1603, this chapter 
adopts the same approach to back up and reinforce Brayshay, Harrison and 
Chalkley’s findings. Moreover, the chapter measures the efficiency of the royal 
post-stage service relative to central government expectations. The Privy 
Council stipulated that the relays of mounted post-boys who carried government 
dispatches back and forth along Exchequer-funded post-stage routes were to 
maintain a speed of seven miles-per-hour in summer and five miles-per-hour in 
winter.3 This, as J. Crofts has rightly observed, was ‘seldom if ever’ achieved. In 
fact, by utilising postal endorsement data from a sample of forty-six letters, 
Crofts calculated an average speed of 4.6 miles-per-hour.4 On the face of it one 
could argue that this confirms the inefficiency of the royal post-stage service. 
However, by converting the Privy Council’s summer and winter target speeds 
into target times and comparing them with the times recorded in the 335 postal 
endorsements that have been gathered for the purposes of this chapter, a more 
refined interpretation of the royal post-stage service’s capability has been 
achieved.  
To summarise, in part because rather more coherent, comprehensive 
and systematic evidence has survived, an analysis of the royal post-stage 
service towards the south-west provides a valuable (perhaps the best) means to 
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probe the character and speed of communication between London and Devon. 
Yet it should be noted here that a variety of other forms of carriage were 
certainly employed to send and deliver Devon correspondence and other 
documents (see chapter five). Unfortunately, however, it is much harder with 
any certainty or precision to establish either the full extent to which other 
methods of conveyance were used to deliver government mail, or the swiftness 
of their delivery. Consequently, this chapter focuses solely on the post-stage 
system with the aim of further rehabilitating the reputation of late-sixteenth-
century royal postal communications and confirm that those at the apex of late-
Elizabethan Devon’s government enjoyed a rapid and sustained postal link with 
their superiors at Whitehall whenever a royal post-stage service was engaged 
between London and the south-west.     
 
Postal infrastructure: roads and bridges 
 
At the centre of any examination of the speed and efficiency of the Elizabethan 
government’s postal arrangements lies the physical infrastructure upon which 
the royal post-stage network rested: the Tudor highway. The condition of 
sixteenth-century roads and bridges – their upkeep, their maintenance and their 
ability to handle an ever increasing volume of traffic – is fundamental to 
contemporary understanding of the degree to which the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ of 
the Tudor state was ‘connected’. Older historiography has painted a rather dire 
picture of the state of the early modern road and bridge network: ‘insecure 
foundations accounted only in part for the hazards run by travellers in the 
crossing of bridges’; ‘neglect of the highways was by no means confined to 
country roads’; ‘they were everywhere deplorable and getting steadily worse’; 
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‘the worst possible way between two given points was along the common road’; 
‘rutted tracks called roads must have been a common sight for three hundred 
years’.5 Literary accounts by those who lived during the early modern era were 
similarly negative when it came to describing the roads and bridges of England. 
In his Description of England (1577), William Harrison portrayed the ‘common 
highways’ thus:  
Of the daily encroaching of the covetous upon the highways, I speak 
not. But this I know by experience, that whereas some streets within 
these five-and-twenty years have been in most places 50 foot broad 
according to the law, whereby the traveler might either escape the 
thief or shift the mire or pass by the loaden cart without danger of 
himself and his horse, now they are brought unto 12 or 20 or 26 at 
the most, which is another cause also whereby the ways be the 
worse and many an honest man encumbered in his journey.6  
 
Writing some forty years later the famous seventeenth-century antiquarian and 
topographer, Tristram Risdon, wrote an equally derisory account of the state of 
Devon’s roads in his Survey of Devon (1620): 
This county, as it is spacious, so it is populous, and very laborious, 
rough, and unpleasant to strangers travelling those ways, which are 
cumbersome and uneven, amongst rocks and stones, painful for man 
and horse; as they can best witness who have made trial thereof. For 
be they never so well mounted upon horses out of other countries, 
when they have travelled one journey in these parts, they can, in 
respect of ease of travel, forbear a second.7 
  
Thus, on a superficial level the capacity for the royal post-stage service to be 
speedy and efficient does not appear to have been achievable, particularly in 
peripheral regions such as the south-west, given the apparently woeful road 
and bridge network that it relied on. Nevertheless, it is a central purpose of this 
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chapter to challenge this notion and argue that in reality the government’s 
postal arrangements were more rapid and reliable than previously thought.    
 Indeed, despite the pessimistic depictions of early modern England’s 
apparently dilapidated travel and communication network, there has been a 
growing trend among scholars to present a much more positive picture. 
Medievalists have argued that the road and bridge network inherited by the 
Tudors was far from being in a perennial state of decay and disrepair. On the 
contrary, medieval roads and bridges were ‘adequate’ for a Tudor economy that 
relied on ‘quite a high level of internal trade’.8 Similarly, economic historians 
have convincingly revealed road conditions in the seventeenth-century to be 
‘sufficiently good to permit the running of a complex network of scheduled public 
carrying services’ and have thus helped to demonstrate ‘the major significance 
of roads in inland transport’.9 Roads also facilitated ‘the advance of [improvised 
commercial] postal services’ which were increasingly utilised by merchants to 
accelerate ‘the integration of domestic [and foreign] markets’.10 Moreover, the 
historical geographer, Mark Brayshay, has further undercut the ‘tenacious old 
myths about the isolation of England’s early modern provincial communities’ – 
which were supposedly ‘denied contact with their neighbours and regions 
further afield by impassable roads’ – by examining the extensive inter-urban 
road travel undertaken by a broad spectrum of early modern society.11 Evidence 
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revealing the use of roads to facilitate the widespread circulation of intelligence, 
news and rumour has also proven useful to social historians seeking to 
illuminate the frequent contact and interaction that occurred between those who 
inhabited different regions of the country. Adam Fox, for example, has shown 
how professional carriers and travelling trades-people served as important 
‘brokers of news’ in an age that preceded the daily press.12 Collectively studies 
of this nature have had the effect of eroding the view that peripheral regions of 
early modern England were disconnected and cut-off from London and each 
other. Instead, they suggest the existence of a highly integrated nation or, to 
borrow a phrase from Professor Brayshay, a ‘joined-up’ realm.13 Certainly they 
do not support the notion that the early modern road and bridge network was 
woefully inadequate. On the contrary, they provide substantial evidence to 
support James Daybell’s contention that ‘roads and the increasing numbers of 
travellers on them were crucial to postal and communication networks.’14 
Moreover, fundamental to this chapter, they suggest that a relatively speedy 
and efficient royal post-stage network was feasible.  
  
Tudor England’s royal post-stage network 
 
At the start of the sixteenth-century Tudor England’s royal postal system via 
which government letters, orders, proclamations and other official state 
documentation was nationally and internationally conveyed differed greatly from 
the much more intricate network that was in place by the end of the century. In 
1500 if central government wished to send official correspondence to the 
                                               
12
 Adam Fox, Oral and Literate Culture in England, 1500-1700 (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp. 335-
405. 
13
 Mark Brayshay, A Joined-Up Realm: Historical Geography of Early Modern Road 
Communications in England and Wales (Forthcoming: Exeter UP). 
14
 Daybell, The Material Letter, p. 114.  
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provinces it had to do so by way of court messenger or pursuivant.15 These 
royal messengers, who wore the King’s livery, carried their dispatch directly 
from the court to its intended addressee via a relay of post-horses which they 
hired from stable-owners at towns through which the main roads that linked 
London with the rest of the country ran.16 Thus, on the presentation of a royal 
warrant or placard, a royal messenger could acquire a fresh horse and guide for 
the next leg of his journey.17 Once that leg was completed the guide returned to 
his master’s stable with the tired horses and the process began again until the 
court messenger had reached his destination. This method of transportation, 
which was referred to by contemporaries as ‘riding post’, had been in place prior 
to the sixteenth-century but was extensively established throughout the realm in 
1533 under the direction of Brian Tuke who had been appointed as England’s 
first master of the posts in 1512.18 In a letter to Thomas Cromwell dated 17 
August 1533 Tuke expressed that it was  
the Kings pleasurs that postes be better appointed and laide in all 
places most expedient with comaundment to all townshippes in all 
places on payne of life to be in suche redynes and to make suche 
prouision of horses at all tymes as no ... losse of tyme be had.19  
 
                                               
15
 A pursuivant was a heraldic officer of the lowest rank. 
16
 Mark Brayshay, ‘Royal Post-Horse Routes in England and Wales: the Evolution of the 
Network in the Later-Sixteenth and Early-Seventeenth Century’, JHG, 17:4 (1991), 373-89 (p. 
373). The King’s livery might be a metallic badge, worn on a chain or cord around the neck or 
affixed to the tunic. It would have been a well recognised symbol to anyone concerned that the 
bearer was an important court official on important state business and as such facilitated a court 
messenger’s passage throughout the realm. I am grateful to Mark Brayshay for his guidance on 
this matter. 
17
 In the majority of cases post-horses were available to hire from a local innkeeper. This 
provided any traveller that required a fresh horse and guide with the opportunity to rest and 
obtain fresh victuals before commencing their onward journey. For a contemporary description 
of sixteenth-century inns and the main thoroughfares along which some were situated see 
Harrison, Description of England, pp. 397-406.  
18
 Tuke was formally appointed in 1517, serving until his death in 1545. His sixteenth-century 
successors were John Mason (1545-66), Thomas Randolph (1566-90) and John Stanhope 
(1590-1618). 
19
 SP 1/78 f.128. ‘Riding post’ was not a means of transport reserved exclusively for court 
messengers carrying correspondence, it was also used by individuals on other business to 
transport them with haste to their intended destination. 
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The cost for the retention of fresh post-horses and guides at each town was in 
the majority of cases met by the local municipal authorities – a burden which 
was compounded by the fact that royal messengers could request a post-horse 
and guide at a reduced price in accordance with the royal prerogative of 
purveyance.20   
 Two routes widely recognised and regularly used by court messengers 
and other royal representatives by the time Tuke assumed his role as master of 
the posts were the roads that connected London with Dover and Berwick.21 The 
former allowed vital communications to flow between those at the centre of 
English government and their counterparts in other ruling regimes throughout 
continental Europe, while the latter greatly assisted the Crown in coordinating 
the defence of the Scottish border and securing political control over England’s 
northern counties.22 However, early in the sixteenth-century it became apparent 
to central government that the slower ad hoc retention of court messengers 
personally to carry official correspondence as ‘through posts’ was insufficient for 
the rapidly growing level of communication that had begun to flow along these 
two strategically vital routes.23 This realisation prompted the Crown to introduce 
                                               
20
 The prerogative of purveyance was the monarch’s universal right to obtain goods and 
services at a reduced price to that which was paid on the open market. This principle extended 
to any representative of the monarch who carried a royal warrant or placard. Therefore, court 
messengers and royal representatives could demand this discount when they sought a post-
horse and guide, paying just 1d. per mile. For examples see APC, i, pp. 333, 465, 469; APC, ii, 
pp. 504-5.    
21
 For the Dover route, J. Crofts notes that as early as 1396 it is ‘highly probable ... the Kentish 
hackneymen were handling the royal dispatches’ (Crofts, Packhorse Waggon and Post, p. 64). 
They were certainly doing so by 1512, in addition to carrying a large volume of merchant 
correspondence (Housden, ‘The Merchant Strangers’ Post’, pp. 739-42). For the Berwick route 
reference is made to the ‘costs of posts between London and Berwick, June, 3rd year [1512]’ in 
J. S. Brewer, ed., Letters and Papers of Henry VIII (London, 1920), No 1463, pp. 669-70.  
22
 Once dispatches arrived at Dover there was no special shipping arrangements ordered. This 
contrasted to the post-barks (ships) periodically engaged to operate to and from Ireland. Instead 
the Dover post-master simply entrusted the royal packet to the captain of a departing vessel. 
However, it is highly probable that there were a number of captains regularly employed by the 
Dover post-master owing to their previous good service (Brayshay, ‘Royal Post-Horse Routes’, 
p. 379).  
23
 The delivery times of court messengers carrying letters, proclamations, writs, summonses, 
etc., (usually, though not always, to multiple recipients), would have been slower than the post-
stage service because messengers would have had to sleep; they could not travel non-stop. 
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Exchequer-funded post-stages running along the roads to Dover and Berwick.24 
By 1566 there were five Exchequer-funded post-stages situated approximately 
fifteen miles apart along the eighty mile Dover road, while for the 350 miles of 
road that connected London with Berwick there were a total of twenty-three 
Exchequer-funded post-stages similarly located approximately fifteen miles 
apart.25  
The two linchpins of the royal post-stage network were the court post-
master and his counterpart for the City of London.26 Both men constituted the 
central node of the entire network. The court post-master oversaw all 
dispatches emanating from and arriving at the court, wherever the court may 
be.27 He ensured that all outgoing royal letters or packets were promptly 
conveyed via mounted post-boys to the City of London post-master and that all 
incoming dispatches were delivered to the addressed court official.28 It was the 
post-master for the City of London’s duty to make certain that each royal 
dispatch he received from the court promptly began its journey to its assigned 
destination. He achieved this by retaining his own mounted post-boys to carry 
each royal letter or packet to the first post-stage along either the Dover or 
Berwick road. Conversely, he was also required to forward all incoming letters 
and packets to the court post-master, again utilising his mounted post-boys.  
                                               
24
 The exact date that Exchequer funding began is uncertain. However, the earliest Declared 
Accounts of the Master of the Posts (AO 1/1950/1) reveal that by 1566 both routes had become 
permanently funded by the state.  
25
 For a detailed map of these routes, together with a list of the post-stages, see Brayshay, 
‘Royal Post-Horse Routes’, pp. 376-7.    
26
 The term ‘post-master’ was not used until the seventeenth-century. Instead, in the sixteenth-
century individuals who oversaw the day-to-day running of a post-room were known simply as 
‘posts’. However, to avoid confusion the term post-master is used throughout the chapter. 
27
 The duties of the court post-master increased considerably whenever the monarch was away 
from London because he was required to establish and coordinate an ‘extraordinary’ (that is, 
temporary) royal post-stage service in order for official correspondence to be conveyed between 
the travelling court and those government officials who had remained in the capital. For 
examples see James Gairdner, ed., Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of 
Henry VIII, ix (London, 1886), pp. 7-8; APC, vii, p. 238; APC, x, p. 286; APC, xxiii, pp. 128, 150. 
For an overview of the ‘extraordinary’ posts laid during James I’s reign see Brayshay and 
Harrison, ‘Royal Progresses and Government Communications’, pp. 116-33. 
28
 APC, xxxii, p. 124. 
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Away from London, royal post-masters were appointed to manage the 
day-to-day running of each provincial post-stage. Initially the remit of the 
provincial royal post-master had been personally to carry royal letters and 
packets to his counterpart at the next post-stage. However, as with the court 
and City of London post-masters, by the second half of the sixteenth-century it 
was customary to outsource this task to a number of post-boys who also acted 
as local guides for any royal representative wishing to ‘ride post’ to the next 
stage. On arriving at the next royal post-stage the post-boy relinquished the 
royal dispatch and returned to his post-master together with the post-horses 
that had been used. The post-master of the neighbouring post-stage then 
arranged for his own mounted post-boys to carry the royal dispatch, along with 
any royal representative who desired a guide, to the next post-stage in exactly 
the same fashion. By the late-sixteenth-century the Exchequer was paying each 
post-master along the Berwick and Dover roads 20d. per day for these 
services.29 This was a rather modest figure when one considers that it stayed 
static throughout the final years of Elizabeth’s reign despite the ever increasing 
flow of official correspondence and government officials ‘riding post’ 
engendered by the war with Spain and Nine Years’ War in Ireland. 
Nevertheless, any resentment for this poor wage seems to have been largely 
offset by an additional benefit that the Crown bestowed upon its post-masters, 
which was to give them a monopoly right to all commercial livery business 
within the vicinity of their post-stage. Royal post-masters – who were 
customarily innkeepers and stable-owners – therefore enjoyed first refusal on all 
                                               
29
 Those post-masters situated along the Dover road had initially been paid on a ‘per packet’ 
basis rather than a ‘per day’ basis. However, as the volume of official correspondence reached 
unprecedented levels in the 1580s and 1590s this payment system became increasingly costly. 
The government therefore took the prudent step of abolishing the privilege, thus bringing the 
Dover service under the same payment system as the rest of the network (Brayshay, ‘Royal 
Post-Horse Routes’, pp. 379-80). 
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private and commercial horse hire which had the knock on effect of attracting a 
higher volume of people wishing to lodge in their inn situated adjacent to their 
stables.30  
Thus, by the mid-sixteenth-century these two crucial channels of 
communication linking London with the continent and Scotland became the 
blueprint from which the rest of the late-Elizabethan royal post-stage network 
was built. However, the rest of the network differed in one crucial characteristic: 
permanence. Whilst the necessity in having permanent Exchequer-funded post-
stages along the Dover and Berwick roads had become entrenched in central 
government’s thinking early in the sixteenth-century, similar attitudes did not 
exist for the royal post-stage routes that linked London with other parts of the 
realm. Indeed, Exchequer-funded post-stages towards Ireland and the south 
coast of England were introduced only during times of political instability and 
were promptly stood down once the threat level had receded. One occasion 
when this occurred was in autumn 1565 following the suppression of Shane 
O’Neill’s Rebellion in Ulster. Royal post-stages had been engaged whilst the 
uprising ensued between London and Liverpool together with a post-bark (or 
ship) that carried correspondence back and forth across the Irish Sea.31 
However, having quelled O’Neill and his followers, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, 
Sir Henry Sidney, was convinced that the Exchequer-funded post-stages and 
post-bark were no longer necessary. Thus, when the Privy Council wrote to him 
concerning the ‘dymynyshinge of the Postes towardes Irelande’ in November 
1565 Sidney’s response was confidently to advise ‘that the Postes layed 
betwene the Coourte and the realme of Ireland might well be sparyd and that 
                                               
30
 For example, Thomas Hutchins, whose father had been the royal post-master of the post-
stage at Crewkerne during the 1590s, owned an inn known as ‘The George’ located in 
Crewkerne’s Fore Street. He also owned ‘land in East Common Field’ which might well have 
served as paddocks for grazing post-horses (SRO, DD\BR\boa/1, Crewkerne deed, 1619). 
31
 Brayshay, ‘Royal Post-Horse Routes’, p. 382. 
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there is no necessarye cawse to have them contynued’.32 Thereafter, as the 
political instability of the province ebbed and flowed so too did Exchequer 
funding of the post-stages towards Ireland.33 Political turmoil in France following 
the assassination of King Henri III on 2 August 1589 also engendered the 
temporary expansion of the royal post-stage network to England’s south 
coast.34 During the immediate aftermath of the assassination the English 
government believed it vital to establish rapid and reliable communication with 
its agents and contacts in Europe. Thus, for 197 days between 15 September 
1589 and 31 March 1590, royal post-masters were paid Exchequer wages at 
London, Chipstead, Flimwell and the port of Rye in Sussex.35 Similarly, in 
February 1593 royal post-masters were engaged between London, Portsmouth 
and Southampton due to the Spanish presence in Brittany. However, true to 
form, this arrangement was short-lived and after only fifty-three days Exchequer 
funding of the service was discontinued.36  
 To summarise, an Exchequer-funded royal post-stage service was 
permanently engaged along the Dover and Berwick roads throughout the 
sixteenth-century to convey rapidly official mail back and forth from London. 
Periods of political turmoil engendered the temporary expansion of the network 
towards Ireland and England’s south coast but these additional services were 
always disengaged once stability had been regained. It is important also to 
                                               
32
 APC, vii, pp. 292 and 302.  
33
 For example, for fifty-nine days between 1 February 1599 and 31 March 1599 post-stages 
were funded between London and Holyhead, north Wales, at a cost of £102 13s. 8d. together 
with a ‘post bark with men and furniture’ (AO 1/1951/10). The London to Holyhead route 
remained between 1 April 1599 and 31 March 1602 during which time Robert Pepper (post-
master of Holyhead) was granted £10 per month for ‘enterteyninge a post bark with men and 
furniture to transporte her Majes
ties
 packetts into Ireland’. An additional route was introduced on 
1 October 1600 until 31 March 1602 linking London with Milford Haven, south Wales, via Bristol 
(AO 1/1951/11).    
34
 Mark Brayshay, ‘The Royal Post-Horse Routes of Hampshire in the Reign of Elizabeth I’, 
Proceedings of the Hampshire Field Club and Archaeological Society, 48 (1992), 121-34 (p. 
124).  
35
 AO 1/1950/6. 
36
 AO 1/1951/8. 
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stress that the royal post-stage service was above all else an official service to 
be utilised only for the conveyance of government mail to and from Elizabeth 
and her chief ministers at Whitehall and local officials at the apex of county 
government. Private letters, or ‘bye letters’ as they became known, do seem to 
have been unofficially carried alongside the royal packet but post-masters were 
never to delay the progress of official correspondence in order to post ‘private’ 
letters or deliver those that had been received.37 One final thing to note is that 
even when Exchequer funding was withdrawn from a post-stage court 
messengers and other royal representatives could still ‘ride post’ to that 
location, present a royal warrant or placard and requisition fresh post-horses at 
a cut-price in accordance with the royal prerogative of purveyance. In other 
words royal post-stages to the south-west and elsewhere remained intact during 
periods when Exchequer funding was withdrawn, operating as private 
commercial horse-hiring enterprises, and so could easily be re-engaged by 
central government should the need arise.  
 
Exchequer-funded post-stages to the south-west  
  
The fact that Exchequer funding was never a permanent feature along roads 
other than the two that connected London with Dover and Berwick has led some 
scholars to misinterpret the true extent that the state funded a royal post-stage 
service to the south-west. For example, Philip Beale has questionably 
suggested that a ‘temporary [Exchequer-funded] arrangement was made in July 
1574 when the Privy Council ordered post horses to be provided from the Court 
                                               
37
 As an alternative, Professor Daybell has described the ‘carrier network’ as ‘the most 
accessible and affordable option for ordinary letter-writers.’ An early modern carrier was ‘an 
individual paid to carry goods, packages and letters’ back and forth from London to the 
provinces (Daybell, The Material Letter, pp. 126-35). 
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at Windsor to Exeter for packets for the queen’s service’, while David Cornelius 
has insisted that 
Posts were again laid as far as Exeter in the critical year of the 
Spanish Armada – 1588 – and a new stage was inserted between 
Crewkerne and Honiton, at Chard, and three extra stages were again 
laid between Exeter and Plymouth in 1588 at Chudleigh, Ashburton 
and Brent, and these were still in use in 1590. Soon after, they were 
dismissed but were brought back into use by 1597: and about this 
time the Plymouth Road became a Standing Post.38 
 
Yet despite these confident assertions, Beale’s suggestion of a royal post-stage 
service being engaged in July 1574 must be treated with extreme caution owing 
to the lack of any reference being made to Exchequer funding in that month and 
year in the Declared Accounts of the Master of the Posts.39 Cornelius’s claims, 
moreover, are definitely wrong because, as will be shown below, central 
government curiously chose to utilise court messengers to carry dispatches as 
‘through posts’ between London and the south-west during the Armada crisis of 
1588 rather than to re-engage the royal post-stage system. Fortunately, 
however, the nature, extent and duration of royal post-stages engaged between 
London and the south-west has been painstakingly mapped by Professor Mark 
Brayshay, who discounted the ‘fragmentary and frequently misleading evidence 
yielded by the surviving State Papers’. Instead he has expertly utilised the 
Declared Accounts of the Master of the Posts – which record the towns that 
served as royal post-stages, the men who were employed as post-masters, the 
wages they received, the periods of Exchequer funding and, in some instances, 
                                               
38
 Beale, England’s Mail, p. 219; David B. Cornelius, Devon and Cornwall: A Postal Survey, 
1500-1791 (Reigate: Postal History Society, 1973), p. 2. 
39
 AO 1/1950/2. The Privy Council ordered that ‘post horses be laid in all convenient places 
betwixt the Coourte and Exeter, for the spedie conveyaunce of all such pacquettes as shalbe 
sent from thearle of Bedford out of the West Countrey for the service of her Majestie (APC, viii, 
pp. 268-9) and granted ‘An open placard for [Robert] Gascoigne [the court post-master] to lay 
postes in the West Partes for the sending of letters by thearle of Bedford to the Coourte and 
back again (APC, viii, p. 271). However, if this service was truly engaged one would expect 
accounts of wages to be present in the Declared Accounts of the Master of the Posts. They are 
not, leading one to suspect that the engagement of this route was cancelled. I am thankful to 
Mark Brayshay for his expert advice on this matter. 
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the reason for engagement – ‘to chart more accurately  ... the development of 
the royal post-horse routes of England and Wales’.40 This section utilises the 
same evidence. What is more, for the first time, King Henry VII’s Book of 
Payments is used in conjunction with the Declared Accounts of the Master of 
the Posts to demonstrate that an Exchequer-funded post-stage service to the 
south-west was first engaged much earlier than previously thought. 
The earliest known record of post-stages receiving Exchequer funding 
along the road that connected London with the south-west is currently a 1506 
entry in King Henry VII’s Book of Payments. The relevant information provides 
not only the locations of each post-stage (see figure 4.1), but also the names of 
each post-master, the duration of Exchequer funding, the post-master’s daily 
wage (20d.) and the total cost to the treasury (£9): 
Item to Gilbert burgh one post lying at Bagshote. 
Thomas Anesley an other post lying at Basyngstoke. 
Iohn Hume lying at Salesbury. Ieffrey More lying 
at Shaftsbury. Richard Dean lying at Sherborne. 
Iohn Power lying at Charde. Robert Churche lying 
at Hunnyngton[Honiton]. & Robert Byarde lying at Exceter. 
euyche of theim havyng for xxtie[20] dais at xxd[20d.] the 
pece. begynnyng upon this tewesday xvij[17] die Meij[May] 
anno xxj[21 Henry VII – 1506].41  
 
The duration of this arrangement was fleeting. Nevertheless, for twenty days 
commencing on Tuesday 17 May 1506 a royal post-stage service was 
established between the court and Exeter. Frustratingly there is no mention of 
why this temporary service was engaged. However, the south-west did attract 
attention  from  central  government  in  January  1506 when Archduke Philip of  
 
 
                                               
40
 Brayshay, ‘Royal Post-Horse Routes’, p. 375; id., ‘Royal Post-Horse Routes in South West 
England in the Reigns of Elizabeth I and James I, TDA, 123 (December, 1991), 79-103. 
41
 E 36/214 f.46: quoted in J. W. M. Stone, ed., The Inland Posts (1392-1672): A Calendar of 
Historical Documents with Appendixes (London: Christie’s Robson Lowe, 1987), p. 2. 
ixli[£9] 
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1. Bagshot – Gilbert Burgh 
2. Basingstoke – Thomas Anesley 
3. Salisbury – John Hume 
4. Shaftesbury – Jeffrey More 
5. Sherborne – Richard Dean 
6. Chard – John Power 
7. Honiton – Robert Churche 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Exchequer-funded post-stages and post-masters engaged between 
London and Exeter, 17 May 1506 to 4 June 1506.42  
 
                                               
42 E 36/214 f.46: quoted in Stone, Inland Posts, p. 2. 
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Burgundy and his wife were forced to land at Weymouth, Dorset, for a period of 
time as a result of rough seas in the English Channel.43 Whether the ensuing 
establishment of Exchequer-funded post-stages between the court and Exeter 
had anything to do with this situation is unclear. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
duration of Exchequer funding was set prior to the commencement of operation 
suggests that there was a specific reason for the establishment of rapid and 
reliable communications. 
With such an early precedent being set it is somewhat surprising that it 
was not until summer 1579 that central government deemed it necessary to re-
engage Exchequer-funded post-stages between London and the south-west. 
Nevertheless, from the available evidence it appears that this was the case. 
Indeed, even during the Western Rebellion of 1549 royal post-stages seem not 
to have been engaged.44 Instead letters were conveyed between central and 
local government officials via personal messenger – a process that will be 
explained in detail in chapter five. While the reason for the brief establishment 
of royal post-stages between London and Exeter in 1506 is unclear, the catalyst 
behind the recommencement of Exchequer-funded post-stages to Devon on 1 
August 1579 for 122 days was made explicitly clear in the Declared Accounts of 
the Master of the Posts: 
Also allowed ... for wages and enterteynement of ordinarie posts laid 
towards Ireland betwene London and Tavestocke[Tavistock] for more 
spedie intercourse in conveyaunce of lettres and dispatch of other 
her Majesties busines accordinge to th’ importaunce thereof after the 
rate of xxd[20d.] per diem to euerie severall post so imployed.45  
 
The reintroduction of royal post-stages to Devon was deemed essential due to 
the escalating instability in Ireland caused by the landing of Papal troops in July 
                                               
43
 Beale, England’s Mail, p. 219. 
44
 Anthony Fletcher and Diarmaid MacCulloch, Tudor Rebellions, Revised Fifth Edition (Harlow: 
Pearson Education, 2008), pp. 54-66.  
45
 AO 1/1950/2A.  
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1579. This triggered the second Desmond Rebellion (1579-1583), an 
insurrection throughout southern Ireland spearheaded by Gerald, fourteenth 
Earl of Desmond.46 Thus, due to the location of the rebellion within Ireland, 
central government believed it prudent to fund royal post-stages between 
London and Devon in order for vessels to carry official government dispatches 
concerning the Irish situation to and from the county’s ports in the same manner 
as the post-barks periodically engaged at Liverpool, Holyhead and Milford 
Haven.47 As one can see from figure 4.2, the route had been slightly altered 
from that of 1506 with new post-stages introduced at Staines, Hartfordbridge, 
Andover, Crewkerne, Crediton and Tavistock (the location of the second Earl of 
Bedford’s Devon residence), as well as the removal of the post-stages at 
Bagshot and Chard. The financial cost to the Crown for re-establishing royal 
post-stages for the 122 days amounted to £125 11s. 8d. 
The next political and military emergency to affect the south-western 
peninsula was the Armada crisis of 1588. One would have thought the 
escalating war with Spain would have encouraged central government officials 
to order the re-engagement of Exchequer-funded post-stages between London 
and the south-west. However, this did not occur despite the claims made to the 
contrary by David Cornelius. Instead the Privy Council believed it sufficient to 
increase the deployment of court messengers who were entrusted personally to 
carry official correspondence to and from Devon as ‘through posts’ – that is, 
individual letter-carriers travelling the whole journey via a relay of post-horses 
that they hired along the way. Evidence of this arrangement is revealed by a 
series  of  payments   made  to  various  court  messengers  between  May  and  
                                               
46
 Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, pp. 108-9. 
47
 Exchequer funding for post-barks is not stated in the Declared Accounts for the Master of the 
Posts. It therefore seems likely that an ad hoc system similar to that which was employed at 
Dover operated. Due to Tavistock’s proximity, Plymouth seems the most likely port from where 
this improvised service ran.  
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            Probable post-bark service to and from Plymouth and Ireland  
1. Staines – Thomas Dove 
2. Hartfordbridge – Christopher Abraham 
3. Basingstoke – John Hopkins 
4. Andover – John Smith 
5. Salisbury – Mathew Andrewes 
6. Shaftesbury – John Bartor [Bartholemew?] 
7. Sherborne – Stephen Exall 
8. Crewkerne – John Hutchins 
9. Honiton – Richard Hilliard 
10. Exeter – Richard Beckingham 
11. Crediton – No name given 
 
Figure 4.2: Exchequer-funded post-stages and post-masters engaged between 
London and Tavistock, 1 August 1579 to 30 November 1579.48  
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 Messenger   £ s. d. 
          
John Hedd   8 0 0 
William Page   7 0 0 
John Rydinges   8 0 0 
John Deacons   3 0 0 
Richard Swanson   9 0 0 
Carey Reynell   5 0 0 
John Deacons   4 0 0 
Captain Crosse   20 0 0 
William Page   7 0 0 
William Saunders   9 0 0 
Thomas Jobson   5 0 0 
Jonas Bodenham   10 0 0 
Robert Browne 
 
13 0 0 
Valentine Harrys   10 0 0 
Arthure Gyttins   10 0 0 
Gabriell Hills   4 13 4 
Arthure Gyttins   10 0 0 
          
  sum 142 13 4 
          
William Stallinge*   6 13 4 
Adam Charlton*   10 0 0 
          
  sum 16 13 4 
          
  total 158 6 8 
          
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Payments made to court messengers riding as ‘through posts’ 
between the court and Plymouth, May to September 1588.49  
 
                                               
49 SP 12/216 f.100: 'The names of such Gromes, Messengers, and others as haue had anie 
allowances wi
th
in thoffice of the Threr[Treasurer] of her majes
tes
 Chamber for the carriage of 
Lettres betwene the Court and the Towne of Plimouth in the monethes of Maie, Iune, Iulie, 
August, and September 1588'. * These men were paid separately for services rendered during 
the same period. 
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September 1588 (see figure 4.3). When one compares the total outlay of £158 
6s. 8d. paid to these court messengers over the five months (153 days) that are 
accounted for with the total expenditure of £125 11s. 8d. laid out over the four 
months (122 days) that royal post-stages were engaged in autumn 1579 it is 
clear that the decision not to re-engage Exchequer-funded post-stages in 1588 
was not a financial one. However, faced by a rapidly changing set of 
circumstances and an ever increasing ‘to do list’ it is likely that the Privy Council 
was reluctant to accord attention to the re-engagement of royal post-stages 
westward only for them to be dismissed once the Spanish threat had dissipated.    
 However, by autumn 1595 the Spanish threat had reasserted itself and 
turmoil in Ireland had recommenced. The Privy Council therefore made the 
decision to re-engage Exchequer-funded post-stages between London and 
Devon for an initial period of twenty months (1 August 1595 to 31 March 
1597).50 The route adopted was almost an exact replica of the 1579 route. 
However, instead of branching off to Tavistock via Crediton at Exeter the route 
proceeded to Plymouth via Ashburton (see figure 4.4).51 Post-bark services to 
Ireland were not paid for by the Exchequer. It therefore seems probable that an 
ad hoc shipping system similar to the one that was seemingly employed in 1579 
was again utilised. In addition, only Stephen Exall and John Hutchins remained 
in their position as post-master of Sherborne and Crewkerne respectively. 
Moreover, by 1 April 1597 Gilbert Bickton had replaced William Atkyns as post-
master  of  Staines,  while  between  1  April  1597  and  31  March 1599 Gilbert  
 
                                               
50
 AO 1/1951/9. 
51
 Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford, died in 1585. He was replaced as lord lieutenant of 
Devon by William Bourchier, third Earl of Bath, who resided at Tawstock, north Devon. Thus, 
there was no longer any need for a link to Tavistock. Instead official correspondence was 
carried to and from the Earl of Bath via Exeter by mounted messengers retained by the city’s 
corporation (see chapter five). 
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            Probable post-bark service to and from Plymouth and Ireland 
1. Staines – William Atkyns 
2. Hartfordbridge – Gilbert Lippescombe  
3. Basingstoke – George Yate 
4. Andover – Robert West 
5. Salisbury – John Dowley 
6. Shaftesbury – Roger Brice 
7. Sherborne – Steven Exall 
8. Crewkerne – John Hutchins 
9. Honiton – Christopher Searle 
10. Exeter – Thomas Newman 
11. Ashburton – John Hext 
 
Figure 4.4: Exchequer-funded post-stages and post-masters engaged between 
London and Plymouth on 1 August 1595.52  
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Lippescombe was succeeded by Henrie Davies as post-master at 
Hartfordbridge, Richard Hutchins took over from his father, John, at Crewkerne 
and Thomas Marwodd replaced Christopher Searle at Honiton.53 
The last significant development of Exchequer-funded post-stages 
engaged between London and the south-west to occur during the reign of 
Elizabeth I took place between 1 October 1600 and 31 March 1602. By October 
1600 the Nine Years’ War in Ireland was in its sixth year and England’s war with 
Spain had continued unabated since 1585. Consequently, in order to coordinate 
an effective response to these persistent threats from the confines of Whitehall, 
the Privy Council ordered the extension of Exchequer funding beyond Plymouth 
further westward into Cornwall. Initially, on 1 October 1600, extra royal post-
stages at Looe, St Austell and Truro were engaged to carry royal packets to and 
from Vincent Scoble in Plymouth and Francis Glover in Penryn while a year 
later, on 1 October 1601, another new route was engaged between Scoble in 
Plymouth and Robert Belman in Padstow via Looe and Bodmin. Both were 
designed to speed up the conveyance of government mail to and from Ireland 
and the Declared Accounts of the Master of the Posts reveal that to achieve this 
Belman was paid an additional £10 per month ‘for kepinge a post barke with 
men and furniture’.54 In addition, on 1 November 1601 another branch was 
added between Exeter and Barnstaple via Chulmleigh ‘for sendinge of lettres to 
and from Ireland for her Majesties service’.55 Again, although it is not explicitly 
itemised  in  the  accounts,  John Bryan,  post-master   of  Barnstaple,   similarly  
 
 
 
 
                                               
53
 AO 1/1951/10. 
54
 AO 1/1951/11. 
55
 AO 1/1951/11. 
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             Post-bark services to and from Ireland 
 
 
1. Chulmleigh – John Newman 
2. Looe – George and John Cumming 
3. Bodmin – Richard Triggs 
4. St Austell – Richard Dallamayne 
5. Truro – Ralph Bird 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Additional Exchequer-funded post-stages and post-masters 
engaged in Devon and Cornwall.56  
 
                                               
56 AO 1/1951/11. Royal post-stages to Penryn were engaged in October 1600, to Padstow in 
October 1601 and to Barnstaple in November 1601. 
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arranged vessels to carry letters between the north Devon port and Ireland.57 
The fact that the London to Plymouth route was extended into Cornwall and 
north Devon indicates that the flow of official correspondence to and from the 
south-west and London reached a watershed moment during the two year 
period when an extended service was engaged (1 October 1600 to 31 
September 1603).58 This is reinforced by the fact that both Vincent Scoble and 
Thomas Newman received additional payments ‘over and above’ their daily 
wage of 20d. throughout this period. Clearly Plymouth and Exeter, the two most 
crucial bottle-necks of the south-west’s royal post-stage network, were seen as 
more burdensome than any other with Scoble and Newman being expected to 
channel vital correspondence to and from Cornwall and north Devon in addition 
to handling the correspondence of their immediate locales.59 Following the 
death of Elizabeth the requirement of having an extended royal post-stage 
service diminished – Hugh O’Neill, the leader of the Irish rebels, had 
surrendered and war with Spain was all but over. As a consequence, James I 
authorised the withdrawal of Exchequer funding from the post-stages in 
Cornwall and north Devon but retained funding for the main service between 
London and Plymouth. A link to Padstow was re-engaged by the Crown in June 
1608 until March 1611 by which time James I ‘thought fit to discharge certain 
post stages not usually maintained but in time of war, and not now necessary’ 
which included ‘all those to Plymouth and Padstow’.60  
To review, the periods when London was connected to the south-west 
via a network of Exchequer-funded royal post-stages were a product of political 
                                               
57
 HMC, Salisbury, xi, p. 497. 
58
 AO 1/1951/12. 
59
 Vincent Scoble received an additional 4d. per day when royal post-stages were engaged 
westward into Cornwall, while Thomas Newman received an additional 12d. per day when royal 
post-stages were engaged at Chulmleigh and Barnstaple (AO 1/1951/11).   
60
 Stone, Inland Posts, p. 42; Brayshay, ‘Post-Horse Routes in the South West’, pp. 94-5. 
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necessity and highlight the reactive nature of Tudor government. Conflict with 
Spain and rebellion in Ireland stimulated an increased level of interaction 
between politicians at the core and periphery of the Tudor state. Devon’s 
geographical situation and strategic importance placed it at the forefront of both 
crises and led to a strong connection being formed between Elizabeth’s chief 
ministers at Whitehall and the county’s political elite throughout the late-
Elizabethan era. A rapid and reliable postal service between the capital and the 
county was therefore crucial for the successful implementation of central 
government policy. Yet while the royal post-stage system could be quickly 
mobilised during times of stress, it curiously did not feature during the Spanish 
Armada crisis of 1588. Instead a slower ad hoc messenger service was 
regarded as sufficient. Nevertheless, by autumn 1595 the war with Spain 
persisted and rebellion in Ireland had broken out making the need for an 
Exchequer-funded post-stage service between London and the south-west 
paramount.       
 
Post-stage travel times between Plymouth and London, 1595-1603 
 
As noted earlier, previous scholarly research has primarily presented a slow 
and unreliable royal post-stage service by utilising anecdotal evidence from the 
State Papers that reveal instances when the network broke down and misfired. 
The remainder of this chapter will undercut assertions of this nature and, with 
the help of postal endorsement data, argue that, at least by sixteenth-century 
standards, the south-west’s royal post-stage network was relatively speedy and 
efficient. This section will employ data from a sample of 335 postal 
endorsements written by the south-west’s royal post-masters on the outside 
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panel of seventy-three letters to measure the average (mean) travel time of 
official mail conveyed to and from the south-west and the capital between 
autumn 1595 and spring 1603. Moreover, the range of times calculated will be 
presented alongside the mean times in order to establish how efficient the post 
was at this level.  
Post-master endorsement of the royal packets and individual letters that 
passed through their post-rooms supplemented the ledgers that they were 
ordered to keep by the Privy Council. Thus, when a packet or letter arrived at a 
post-room the time of arrival (to the nearest quarter-of-an-hour), the date (in 
some cases) and the name of the post-stage were all customarily scribbled on 
the outside panel of a dispatch in addition to being entered in a ledger. 
Unfortunately, however, it seems that no ledgers have survived. This is highly 
surprising when one considers the fact that post-masters were required to make 
monthly copies of what had been entered into them which they then forwarded 
to the Master of the Posts. Nevertheless, the only surviving ledger evidence to 
have been discovered is a fair copy of the ledger entries made by John Rigges, 
post-master of Huntingdon, during August 1585.61 Even more disappointing for 
the modern researcher is the fact that very little of the paper used to wrap royal 
packets, which would have had postal endorsements written on them, appears 
to have survived. This is to be expected because they offered no immediate 
worth to the recipient.62 However, postal endorsements written on the outside 
panel of individual letters do survive in sufficient number to provide a useable 
amount of serial data for measuring the travel speed and, ultimately, the 
efficiency of the Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage network.  
                                               
61
 Brayshay et al., ‘Speed of the Royal Post’, pp. 275-8; CP 138/202. 
62
 Daybell, The Material Letter, pp. 50 and 121. 
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For example, post-master endorsements scribbled on the outside panel 
of a letter written by Lieutenant Edward Doddington in Plymouth to the Privy 
Council in London reveal the progress it made along the south-west’s royal 
post-stage network following its dispatch from the town’s fort at 19.00 on 25 July 
1599.63 The letter reached John Hext’s post-room in Ashburton at 02.00 on 26 
July, Thomas Newman in Exeter at 06.00, Thomas Marwodd in Honiton at 
08.00, Richard Hutchins in Crewkerne at 11.00, Steven Exall in Sherborne at 
13.00 and Roger Brice in Shaftesbury at 16.00. Unfortunately, John Dowley 
failed to endorse the letter when it arrived at his post-room in Salisbury. 
However, it was with Robert West in Andover at 08.00 on 27 July, George Yate 
in Basingstoke at 13.00, Henrie Davies in Hartfordbridge at 15.30, Gilbert 
Bickton in Staines at 19.00 and William Goffe in London at what appears to be 
23.00. Thus, the letter took approximately fifty-two hours to travel the twelve 
post-stages connecting Vincent Scoble’s post-room in Plymouth with William 
Goffe’s post-room in London. Similarly, a letter written by the Mayor of 
Plymouth, Thomas Payne, and other chief inhabitants to Lord Admiral 
Nottingham and Sir Robert Cecil on 30 July 1601 bears postal endorsements 
for much of its journey from Plymouth to London.64 It left Plymouth’s fort at 
01.00 on 30 July and was received by John Hext in Ashburton at 05.00, 
Thomas Newman in Exeter at 08.00, Thomas Marwodd in Honiton at 10.00, 
Richard Hutchins in Crewkerne at 15.00, Steven Exall in Sherborne at 18.30 
and Roger Brice in Shaftesbury at 22.00. Once again John Dowley failed to 
endorse the letter on its arrival in Salisbury. Nevertheless, it was with Robert 
West in Andover at 10.30 on 31 July, George Yate in Basingstoke at 15.00, 
Henrie Davies in Hartfordbridge at 17.30, Gilbert Bickton in Staines at 22.00 
                                               
63
 SP 12/271 f.184. 
64
 SP 12/281 f.65. 
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and William Hynchley (who succeeded Goffe on 1 July 1601) in London at 
04.00 on 1 August 1601. In all it had taken the letter fifty-one hours to be 
conveyed from Vincent Scoble in Plymouth to William Hynchley in London. Both 
letters therefore took nearly the same amount of time to travel the twelve post-
stages that connected Plymouth with London – a distance of approximately 230 
statute miles. However, how usual were these times during the last eight years 
of the Elizabethan era? By using the postal endorsement data from both of 
these letters in conjunction with data from seventy-one other letters it has been 
possible to calculate, with a fair degree of accuracy, mean travel speeds 
achieved by the mounted post-boys who carried government mail to and from 
Plymouth and London between autumn 1595 and spring 1603. 
 However, before revealing the times that have been calculated there are 
a number of methodological issues that must be flagged up. First, the modern 
concept of Greenwich Mean Time was not known in early modern England. In 
fact in the late-sixteenth-century each town in England functioned according to 
its own distinct local time.65 This meant that the inhabitants of Elizabethan 
Plymouth conducted their daily lives at approximately sixteen minutes behind 
their counterparts living in London.66 One might therefore think it necessary to 
adjust the postal endorsement data to take into account this variation. However, 
this would have no bearing on the results whatsoever because time-keeping 
was not as precise as it is today. Indeed, the endorsements written by the post-
masters were calculated only to the nearest quarter-of-an-hour and were 
accompanied by time-markers such as ‘morning’, ‘before noon’, ‘afternoon’, 
‘evening’ and ‘night’. Moreover, in some instances a post-master’s endorsement 
is not fully legible or is incomplete. This information has therefore not been 
                                               
65
 D. Howse, Greenwich Time and the Discovery of the Longitude (Oxford: OUP, 1980), pp. 80-
8. 
66
 Brayshay et al., ‘Speed of the Royal Post’, pp. 270-3. 
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used. In addition, there are some occasions where a letter has not been 
endorsed at all by certain post-masters along the route. This was presumably 
because they regarded a ledger entry as sufficient. Thus, many letters only 
reveal travel times for part of their journey. Having conducted a thorough 
analysis of the postal endorsements chosen for this study it also seems highly 
probable that errors were made by the hurried post-masters when scribbling 
down the time that a letter arrived in their custody. In particular, when using 
Roman instead of Arabic numerals it must have been all too easy for a post-
master to mistakenly write ‘before vj at night’ when in actual fact he should have 
written ‘before vij at night’, while during the long nights of winter ‘three quarters 
of an hour past iiij at night’ could quite easily have been early evening or 
morning. Thus, taking all of this into consideration, the use of postal 
endorsement data will only ever provide an approximate arrival time for an 
unequal number of royal post-stages. This is compounded by the fact that the 
inevitable post-master mistakes and the use of vague time-markers have 
engendered ambiguity with regards to the unusually fast and the pitifully slow 
speeds that were recorded on rare occasions. Such methodological problems 
have led Dorian Gerhold to remark that: ‘evidence of this kind does not readily 
lend itself to statistical analysis’.67  
Nevertheless, postal endorsement data can still be used to calculate the 
speed of journeys undertaken to transact matters of state providing that a 
method is applied to ameliorate any potential inaccuracy. Whilst not providing a 
complete  solution  to  the problem, nineteen instances that were more than two  
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 D. Gerhold, ‘Packhorses and Wheeled Vehicles in England, 1550-1800’, JTH, 14 (1993), 1-
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standard deviations  above  or  below  the ‘mean’ time have been omitted when 
calculating the ‘adjusted mean’ (see figure 4.6).68 By applying this safeguard 
any unreliable endorsements which indicate either an extremely fast or slow 
travel speed do not affect the final calculation of the ‘mean’ travel time that was 
achieved by the post-boys who carried government mail to and from Plymouth 
and London during the eight years of analysis. Therefore, despite the inherent 
problems, postal endorsements offer an invaluable source of information and 
provide a vital indication to the rapidity of the south-west’s Exchequer-funded            
royal post-stage service.  
The information presented in figure 4.6 confirms that by the end of the 
sixteenth-century it was customary for government mail to travel between 
Plymouth and London in just over forty-six hours. However, the fact that 61% of 
all cases were under this mean time indicates that travel times were usually 
even speedier. In addition, the minimum and maximum stage-to-stage travel 
speeds reveal that potentially a dispatch could be conveyed between Plymouth 
and London in a rapid twenty-seven hours or a woefully slow 131.75 hours. Of 
course both figures are constructed from the data of multiple letters and 
therefore represent the royal post-stage system’s limits, which would have very 
rarely, if at all, been achieved by a single letter. Nevertheless, the purpose of 
this chapter is to present a relatively speedy service. Reasons for delays 
therefore need briefly to be explained. The ‘slow’ travel times revealed by the 
data often involved quite challenging terrain – it would have been tough to ride 
the way from Plymouth up to Ashburton, for example. Some of the other post-
                                               
68
  Standard deviation is a measurement of statistical variability. It shows how much variation 
exists from the average (mean) value. Small standard deviation indicates data points that are 
very close to the mean. High standard deviation indicates data points that are spread out over a 
large range of values. 
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stages would have been, by contrast, rather less taxing. Congestion on the 
roads, especially on market days, would also have hindered a post-boy’s 
progress.69 Indeed, Alan Everitt has observed that in Shaftesbury grain 
merchants often complained that the ‘narrowness’ of the main street where the 
market was held meant that the road could not handle the ‘continual 
thoroughfare ... of travellers’, leading to excessive congestion.70 Delays may 
also have been caused because the post-boys were sometimes all already out 
riding, and there was a need to wait for one of them to come back before a royal 
packet could be on its way. Maybe, sometimes, all the horses were out on hire, 
or had just returned and were in need of food, rest and a drink before they could 
be sent out again. In other words, there might be perfectly legitimate reasons 
why a packet was held up for a few hours at a particular post-room. When 
delays dragged on for most of a day, however, something worse must have 
happened.71  
Nevertheless, in spite of these unavoidable and, on rare occasions, 
seemingly negligent delays, the data reveals that by the late-Elizabethan period 
local government officials based in Devon were customarily no more than two 
days distant from their superiors in London. When one compares this to the rare 
data that exists for the fifteenth-century, it would appear that this was a distinct 
advance in ‘core-periphery’ connectivity. For example, in 1450 news of the 
Duke of Suffolk’s execution took two days to travel seventy miles from Dover to 
London; in 1453 news of Prince Edward’s birth took over twenty-four hours to 
                                               
69
 Overuse of the road connecting London with Plymouth was certainly a cause of concern for 
the inhabitants of Staines. Indeed, a copy of a petition that the town’s inhabitants wrote in 1589 
(located in Exeter’s City Archives) underlines the overuse of the Plymouth road during the late-
Elizabethan period: ‘her Highnes hauinge occasion to sende diuers into the west partes aboute 
speciall busines in haste as often as to anie other places wi
th
in this Realme & the passage that 
waye lieth as Frequente as to anie quarters or Coastes wi
th
in her Highnes Dominions’ (DRO, 
ECA, Book 55, f. 180). 
70
 A. Everitt, ‘The Market Towns’, in The Early Modern Town, ed. by P. Clark (London: 
Longman, 1976), p. 180. 
71
 I am indebted to Professor Brayshay for discussion on these matters. 
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travel the fifty-five miles between Westminster and Canterbury; in 1461 and 
1484 it took at least six days for news to be conveyed 210 miles between York 
and London; while the conveyance of messages between Exeter and London 
during the fifteenth-century appears to have customarily taken about four 
days.72 Thus, whereas in the fifteenth-century travelling between London and 
Plymouth in less than two days was inconceivable, by the end of the sixteenth-
century the south-west’s royal post-stage network had made it the norm for 
official correspondence.  
 
Privy Council target travel times 
 
The previous section has revealed that at the end of the sixteenth-century it was 
the norm for government mail to be conveyed between Plymouth and London in 
just over forty-six hours. However, to what extent did a travel time of forty-six 
hours meet central government expectations? The aim of this section is to 
answer this question by comparing the actual travel times achieved by the royal 
post-horses operating along the Plymouth road with the expected target times 
that were predetermined by the Privy Council. In a bid to regulate the royal post-
stage network orders were issued by central government periodically 
throughout the second half of the sixteenth-century.73 When one reads the 
orders it is clear that there were two things the Privy Council were keen to see 
enforced: speed and efficiency. For example, it was repeatedly stipulated that 
                                               
72
 J. Gairdner, ed., Paston Letters, vol. ii (London, 1904), pp. 146-8; W. G. Searle, ed., ‘J. 
Stone, Chronicle of Christ Church Canterbury, 1415-71’, Cambridge Antiquarian Society, Eighth 
Series, 39 (1902), 87-94; A. Raine, ed., ‘York Civic Records’, Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 
98:1 (1938), pp. 1 and 88; Gairdner., Paston Letters, p. 49; S. A. Moore, ed., Letters of John 
Shillingford (London: Camden Society, 1871), pp. 5-6, 61 and 454; C. L. Kingsford, ed., 
Chronicles of London (London, 1905), p. 217. 
73
 BL, Lansdowne MS., 78/92: ‘Ordynaunces deuised by the Kynge Philip and Quenes Mary 
Maiestie for the order of the Postes and Hackeneymen betwene London and the bordere of 
Scotland’; SP 12/96 f.193:5/1574; SP 12/167 f.64: 14/1/1583; CP 141/368: 1/1/1591.  
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post-masters ‘shall keepe a booke of v. or vj quires of paper’ to register the time 
that they received each royal letter or packet; post-boys were to have a leather 
bag ‘lyned with good cotton or bayes’ to safely carry royal dispatches between 
post-stages; they were also provided with a horn and were expected to blow it 
‘at the leaste foure tymes euery mile’; on hearing the horn post-masters were to 
make ready their own post-boy so that he could ‘depart with the pacquette within 
one quarter of an houre’.74 All of which was to be performed twenty-four hours a 
day seven days a week. Central government orders also stipulated the speed 
(in miles-per-hour) at which government dispatches were to be carried along 
each royal post-stage route during summer and winter months. The following 
extract from a set of orders issued in May 1574 provides a typical example: 
the boy or man that carrieth the royal packet ..., do ride in Sommer 
tyme, counting from theAnnuntiacon of our Ladye[25 March], to the 
feaste of St Michael Thearchangell[29 September], at the leaste vij[7] 
myles everie houre, and in the winter, which muste be counted for the 
reste of the yeare, v:[5] myles everie houre or more, as the waie is 
good or badd.75 
 
When one examines other sets of orders published throughout the Elizabethan 
era the required speed of seven miles-per-hour in summer and five miles-per-
hour in winter are consistently stated.76 Moreover, post-masters and post-boys 
were reminded of the need to provide a speedy and efficient service by more 
informal measures. This most commonly manifested itself with a written 
advertisement on the outside panel of an individual letter or packet stressing 
that its contents concerned matters ‘For her Majesties especiall affayres’ and 
therefore required ‘hast post hast for lyffe’ or similar words to that affect. More 
                                               
74
 SP 12/96 f.193. 
75
 SP 12/96 f.193. 
76
 The notable exception to this is the set of orders drawn up by Lord Burghley and John 
Stanhope in January 1591 (CP 141/368). Instead of seven miles-per-hour in summer the orders 
stipulate that post-boys must ride at ‘sixe miles the houre’. The speed of five miles-per-hour 
during winter was retained.   
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forceful still were the crude sketches of a gallows that often adorned the outside 
panel of a letter thereby making it clear, even to an illiterate post-boy, that the 
speedy conveyance of royal mail was paramount.77 
 Previous research on whether the royal post-stage network customarily 
achieved the Privy Council’s summer and winter target speeds have rightly 
observed that they ‘seldom if ever did’.78 However, this has been adjudged by 
calculating the speed post-boys achieved along the royal post-stage network in 
miles-per-hour using postal endorsement data. Such an approach is 
problematic because it provides a ‘yes or no’ answer to a question that is far 
from straightforward. To clarify, it infers that the relays of post-boys progressed 
from one post-stage to the next continuously without stopping – an inference 
which is of course incorrect. In reality, delays inevitably occurred along a royal 
post-stage route, most of which were beyond the control of either post-boy or 
post-master. For example, as argued above, the tough undulating terrains 
between certain post-stages, congestion on the roads and the overuse of the 
network during times of political turmoil were all perfectly legitimate reasons 
why a royal packet did not meet the Privy Council’s summer and winter target 
speeds. Moreover, because the royal post-stage service was a twenty-four hour 
service it must have been nigh on impossible to maintain such arbitrary speeds 
in pitch darkness particularly during the long nights of winter. Small delays 
therefore do not equate to an inefficient network, on the contrary, they were to 
be expected given the increased interaction between the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ 
that occurred as a result of the Elizabethan war with Spain and Nine Years’ War 
in Ireland. Consequently, this section converts the Privy Council’s target travel 
speeds for the south-west’s royal post-stage network into target travel times in 
                                               
77
 Daybell, The Material Letter, pp. 6, 8, 28 and 142. 
78
 Hemmeon, The British Post Office, p. 99; Crofts, Packhorse, Waggon and Post, p. 87. 
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order to measure the number of hours under or over Privy Council expectations 
that government mail arrived in London from the south-west. Given the 
inevitable and unavoidable delays outlined above one would expect all of the 
post-stage to post-stage travel times to be over the Privy Council’s target times 
by one or two hours and therefore such results should not lead one to conclude 
that the service was poor. Anything more than this, however, would indicate that 
the royal post-stage network was relatively unreliable and inefficient.   
Devising an appropriate methodology to achieve this goal began by 
analysing the concept of mileage in the sixteenth-century. While the modern 
statute mile was introduced in 1593 it was not adopted on a wholesale basis 
until 1824.79 Instead, during the early modern era there was a marked variation 
in terms of what constituted a mile. This was noted by Fynes Moryson in 1617 
when he wrote: ‘Of the divers measures of miles, through divers parts of the 
world ... five Italian miles, or three French, or two and a halfe English, make one 
Dutch mile’.80 Even within countries there were disparities. For example, in 
England a mile was shorter in London and longer ‘through the desert places of 
the North’.81 Thus, an ‘old English’ mile could equate to anything from 1.20 to 
1.30 modern statute miles.82  
Having established that an ‘old English’ mile varied in length, the next 
course of action was to find a way of calculating the ‘old English’ mile used by 
the Privy Council when they stipulated summer and winter target speeds of 
                                               
79
 I. M. Evans, ‘A Cartographic Evaluation of the Old English Mile’, GJ, 141:2 (July, 1975), 259-
64 (pp. 259-60). 
80
 Quoted in Evans, ‘The Old English Mile’, p. 259. 
81
 Evans, ‘The Old English Mile’, p. 259. 
82
 For detailed analyses of the ‘old English’ mile see J. B. Pearson, ‘On the Table of Distances 
Between Different Towns Given by Holinshed in his Description of England’, Cambridge 
Antiquarian Communications: being papers presented at the meetings of the Cambridge 
Antiquarian Society, iv (1881), pp. 261-70; W. F. Petrie, ‘The Old English Mile’, Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 12 (1883-84), 254-66; C. Close, ‘The Old English Mile’, GJ, 
76:4 (1930), 338-42; J. B. P. Karlslake, ‘Further Notes on the Old English Mile’, GJ, 77:4 (1931), 
358-60; E. H. Smith, ‘Lancashire ‘long measure’’, Transactions of the Historic Society of 
Lancashire and Cheshire, (1959), 1-14.     
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seven and five miles-per-hour. The starting point for this was the information 
contained in the May 1574 and January 1584 Privy Council orders. Both 
stipulated that if a speed of seven miles-per-hour in summer and five miles-per-
hour in winter was achieved by the post-horses operating up and down the 
Great North Road then ‘the royal packet may be caried in sommer betweene 
London and Barwicke[Berwick] in fortie two houres, and in winter in 
threescore[60].’83 From these figures one can approximate how far the Privy 
Council believed London was from Berwick in ‘old English’ miles (oem).84 Thus, 
in both sets of orders the Privy Council regarded Berwick as being 
approximately 297 ‘old English’ miles from London. However, this figure on its 
own is not sufficient to calculate the approximate length of the ‘old English’ mile 
used by the Privy Council. It was therefore necessary to find a way of 
calculating the approximate distance between London and Berwick in modern 
statute miles which would ultimately enable a reasonably accurate conversion 
from statute mile to the Privy Council’s ‘old English’ mile and vice versa. This 
was achieved by measuring the distances that separated each of the royal post-
stages between London and Berwick in modern statute miles using electronic 
route planning software. Whilst an exact route was clearly not possible, a 
reasonably accurate one was plotted at a distance totalling 366.10 statute 
miles. With both the ‘old English’ and statute mileage calculated it was possible 
to determine that one statute mile equated to 1.23 ‘old English’ miles and that 
one ‘old English’ mile equated to 0.8 statute mile.85  
  
                                               
83
 SP 12/167 f.64. 
84
 Summer target time (42 hours) x Summer target speed (7 mph) = 294 oem. Winter target time 
(60 hours) x Winter target speed (5 mph) = 300 oem. Summer mileage (294 oem) + Winter 
mileage (300 oem) = 594 oem. Total mileage (594 oem) / 2 = 297 oem. 
85
 London to Berwick in statute miles (366.10) / London to Berwick in ‘old English’ miles (297) = 
1.23. London to Berwick in ‘old English’ miles (297) / London to Berwick in statute miles 
(366.10) = 0.8. 
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Armed with this information it was then possible to calculate the ‘old 
English’ mileage between London and Plymouth. By adopting the same 
approach as the one used to calculate the approximate statute mileage 
between London and Berwick the figure of 229 statute miles was calculated for 
the London to Plymouth royal post-stage route. This figure was then multiplied 
by 0.8 as per the mileage conversion to give an ‘old English’ mileage between 
London and Plymouth of 183.20. In addition, individual stage-to-stage statute 
mileage was noted and then converted into ‘old English’ miles (see figure 4.7). 
With the ‘old English’ mileage calculated it was then possible to approximate the 
Privy Council’s summer and winter target times for each stage. All times were 
then rounded to the nearest quarter-of-an- hour due to the nature of royal post-
master time-keeping.86 Thus, at twenty ‘old English’ miles, Plymouth to 
Ashburton was the longest section of the south-west’s royal post-stage route 
and accordingly had the lengthiest summer and winter target times of 3.00 and 
4.25 hours respectively. In contrast, at just eight ‘old English’ miles, Basingstoke 
to Hartfordbridge was the shortest section and so had summer and winter target 
travel times of just 1.50 and 1.75 hours respectively. Overall, the south-west’s 
royal post-stage route was adjudged to have had a Privy Council target time of 
approximately 29.50 hours in summer and 39.75 hours in winter. 
Having calculated the approximate Privy Council summer and winter 
target times for each post-stage along the Plymouth road it was then possible to 
employ the same postal endorsement data used in the previous section to 
measure how close the actual royal post-stage travel times were in comparison 
                                               
86
 Post-stage distance in ‘old English’ miles / Summer target speed (7 oemph) + Post-master 
make ready time (0.25 hour) = Privy Council summer target time. Post-stage distance in ‘old 
English’ miles / Winter target speed (5 oemph) + Post-master make ready time (0.25 hour) = 
Privy Council winter target time.  
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with the Privy Council’s summer and winter target times (see figure 4.8).87  The 
data reveals that all post-stage to post-stage sections of the network were 
capable of exceeding the Privy Council’s expectations. Indeed, the potential 
was there for official mail to be conveyed seven-and-a-quarter hours under 
central government’s predetermined summer and winter target times. 
Conversely, the potential also existed for official mail to be conveyed ninety-six 
hours over central government’s summer and winter target times. Both times, 
however, were rarely if ever achieved by a single letter or packet and, just like 
the overall travel times outlined in the previous section, represent the limits of 
the network’s capability. The crucial figures to consider for present purposes are 
the post-stage to post-stage ‘adjusted means’ and the percentage of cases that 
fell under these times. Out of the south-west royal post-stage network’s twelve 
stage-to-stage sections four (Exeter to Honiton, Sherborne to Shaftesbury, 
Shaftesbury to Salisbury and Basingstoke to Hartfordbridge) achieved ‘adjusted 
mean’ travel times within one hour of the Privy Council’s target travel times, 
while a further seven (Ashburton to Exeter, Honiton to Crewkerne, Crewkerne to 
Sherborne, Salisbury to Andover, Andover to Basingstoke, Hartfordbridge to 
Staines and Staines to London) were within one-and-a-half hours. Such small 
amounts of time can be attributed to the inevitable and unavoidable delays 
outlined above and are small enough not to undercut the proposition that the 
south-west’s royal post-stage service was a relatively rapid and efficient one. 
Indeed, even Plymouth to Ashburton’s comparatively slow ‘adjusted mean’ 
travel time of 2.32 hours over central government targets is not too bad when 
one considers that it was the lengthiest section of the network. Moreover, 
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because the road followed the contours of Dartmoor, it probably included the 
most undulating terrain.  
The data also reveals that royal dispatches customarily arrived at William 
Goffe’s post-room in London from Vincent Scoble’s post-room in Plymouth 
approximately thirteen-and-a-half hours over the Privy Council’s target travel 
times with 51% of all government mail arriving inside this ‘adjusted mean’ time. 
To modern eyes this figure may seem substantial. However, it must be 
reiterated that royal post-masters only wrote the time of arrival of a packet or 
letter at their post-stage to the nearest quarter-of-an-hour. Thus, while Paul 
Glennie and Nigel Thrift are right in arguing that the prevalence of ‘time 
consciousness’ was ‘both assumed and promoted’ very much earlier than the 
Industrial Revolution, the fact that a quarter-hour remained the minimum time 
unit for England’s royal postal network throughout the late-Elizabethan period 
meant that dispatches arriving half a day late would not have overly concerned 
Elizabeth’s chief ministers.88 If, however, delays dragged on for days on end 
then questions were most certainly raised. The fact that the south-west’s royal 
post-stage network customarily conveyed official mail in less than half a day 
over the Privy Council’s target travel times would therefore not have raised 
eyebrows at Whitehall and the network would have probably been regarded by 
those in charge as relatively speedy and efficient. 
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The central purpose of this chapter has been to examine the Tudor south-west’s 
royal post-stage service – the principal method by which Elizabeth and her chief 
ministers maintained a dialogue with those local officials at the apex of Devon’s 
government between August 1595 and March 1603. In doing so, the chapter 
has endeavoured to repair the reputation of this mode of communication. From 
the outset it was argued that the postal infrastructure upon which the royal post-
stage network rested was not in a dilapidated state of disrepair. On the contrary, 
the Tudor road and bridge network provided an adequate infrastructure upon 
which a relatively reliable postal service could operate. Initially, Exchequer-
funded post-stages were engaged on the highway from London towards Dover 
and Berwick, providing successive Tudor monarchs with a permanent postal 
connection to the continent and northern border. However, as a consequence of 
the Elizabethan war with Spain and periodic turmoil in Ireland, additional routes 
were temporarily engaged from the capital along the main arterial roads towards 
the south-west and Ireland. Curiously, however, during the Armada crisis of 
1588 Devon was not connected to the centre via an Exchequer-funded post-
stage service. Instead, the slower method of dispatching court messengers was 
utilised. Yet by 1595 the war with Spain persisted and rebellion in Ireland had 
begun making a rapid and reliable royal post-stage link between London and 
the south-west vital. How rapid and reliable this service was has been a key 
concern of this chapter. Indeed, by utilising postal endorsement data, it has 
been feasible systematically to reveal that the south-west’s royal post-stage 
network constituted a significant improvement on postal times. Thus, when one 
considers all this collectively, it is clear that inter-urban connectivity between 
London and late-Elizabethan Devon’s two major urban centres (Exeter and 
Plymouth) was relatively rapid and sustained. The notion that late-Elizabethan 
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Devon was strongly connected-up to the centre, and not cut-off or isolated, 
therefore seems well-justified. Indeed, the postal endorsement evidence 
indicates that this ‘superior service’ between London and Devon was 
impressively fast (though the authorised users were strictly limited to the 
political elite). Nevertheless, as chapter five will reveal, it was not the only 
means by which official mail was conveyed and virtually all the other means 
available were slower and, in some though not all cases, less reliable.    
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5 
Intra-County Postal Networks:  
Connectivity, Communication and Scribal Culture 
 
The central purpose of this chapter is to elucidate late-Elizabethan Devon’s 
internal government postal arrangements and to explore the process of letter 
production employed by the Earl of Bath, his deputies and other local 
government officials during the critical years of 1588 to 1603. Thus, whereas 
chapter four provided an in-depth analysis of the Tudor south-west’s royal post-
stage network during the late-Elizabethan era, highlighting the manner in which 
central government achieved relatively rapid and reliable connectivity with those 
local officials situated within or near to Devon’s principal urban centres, this 
chapter investigates how official government mail was delivered to those living 
more distant from a royal post-stage in the regional hinterland. Equally, it 
unravels the different modes of local letter delivery available to Devon’s political 
elite for circulating official orders, directives, news, intelligence and other 
information amongst each other and their subordinates working at a division, 
hundred and parish level. Moreover, the issue of letter production and 
dissemination is explored through an examination of the role of secretaries and 
the practice of chain copying of letters which was customarily deployed by 
networks of politicians, family members, factions, co-religionists and other 
identifiable social groups during the late-Elizabethan era. 
 Existing research on provincial letter delivery has articulated the function 
of foot-posts, bearers and servants in delivering letters and parcels personally 
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to an addressee.1 Alan Stewart and Heather Wolfe, for example, have shown 
that rather than being carried by the ‘employees of impersonal, organized postal 
systems’ many of the official and unofficial letters written during the sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century were delivered on behalf of the nobility and gentry by 
‘identifiable and often personally known individuals’ ranging from chance 
travellers to the friends and family members who occupied the inner-most circle 
of an individual’s entourage.2 More specifically, by utilising the household 
accounts of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, James Daybell has been able to 
disentangle ‘the complexities of informal letter-carrying’. Leicester’s accounts 
reveal that he authorised the payment of a wide range of individuals personally 
to carry his correspondence including servants, footmen, royal pursuivants and 
state messengers. Indeed, as Professor Daybell notes, such ‘detailed accounts 
highlight the huge variety and ad hoc nature of postal methods available to early 
modern social elites.’3  Such studies confirm the improvised character of intra-
county and inter-regional postal arrangements during the early modern period 
and will be utilised in tandem with other relevant secondary literature, as well as 
primary material located in the Seymour Manuscripts and local receivers’ 
accounts, to outline in detail the makeshift postal services that Devon’s political 
elite and town corporations utilised during the late-Elizabethan period to deliver 
and receive official government mail.  
However, whereas improvised postal arrangements have received a 
reasonable degree of scholarly interest in recent years, much less is currently 
understood about more formal mechanisms of intra-county letter-delivery 
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available at different levels of local government periodically during the late-
sixteenth-century. In Devon particularly there existed a standardised postal 
service which supplemented the ad hoc employment of foot-posts, letter-
bearers and servants during periods of political crisis. Namely, an intra-county 
post-stage network similar in nature to the national network outlined in chapter 
four was periodically engaged by the Earl of Bath for the rapid conveyance of 
official correspondence to and from his deputies while a parish-to-parish postal 
network was employed by Devon’s local elite to distribute information and 
knowledge speedily down the hierarchical chain of command to the constables 
of the hundreds and the petty-constables of the parishes. Of the latter, Lindsey 
Boynton has provided the briefest of appraisals during her analysis of the 
Elizabethan militia:  
The lord-lieutenants were given directions for the post-system, which 
was based on the parishes. Each supplied horse and foot posts, 
preferably men living near the parish church and so readily available. 
The posts were used at all times, not merely in emergencies; and, 
subject to extraordinarily bad weather, they were remarkably 
efficient.4       
 
This chapter will utilise Devon as a case study to significantly build upon the 
cursory mention that Boynton affords the parish-to-parish postal system and 
demonstrate in detail how it functioned alongside Devon’s hitherto 
unacknowledged provincial post-stage network. In particular, it will be revealed 
that the persistent threat posed by Spain throughout the late-Elizabethan period 
necessitated the establishment in Devon of a comprehensive, systematic and 
multi-faceted postal network that not only connected local politicians at the apex 
of government but also provided a speedy and sustained link between the 
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county’s political elite and their minor associates who operated at a division, 
hundred and parish level.     
 Having outlined the variety of informal and formal letter delivery methods 
available to late-Elizabethan Devon’s political elite for the conveyance of official 
mail, the second half of the chapter will shift focus to matters pertaining to letter 
production. Specifically, it will investigate the role of the personal secretary in 
the authorship and handling of official documentation and briefly discuss the 
scribal culture of chain-copying which facilitated the rapid dissemination of 
political ideas amongst networks of local government officials not only at the 
apex of county government but also at a parish level. Research conducted on 
the role of secretaries is substantial. Henry Woudhuysen, for example, has 
written an informative evaluation of their role and remit during the early modern 
period while A. G. R. Smith and Paul Hammer have examined specifically the 
secretariats of the Cecils and Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, 
respectively to provide detailed insight into the day-to-day function of those 
secretaries who were on the payroll of Elizabeth’s chief ministers.5 Provincially-
based members of the nobility and gentry have also been identified as 
employing personal secretaries to handle their affairs and produce 
correspondence on their behalf.6 It is thus one of the key objectives of this 
chapter to examine the roles of Thomas Hinson and Roger Papworth who jointly 
performed the function of secretary for the Earl of Bath during the 1590s in 
order to more fully appreciate the activities of the provincial secretary and 
establish precisely where they fitted into intra-county communication networks.  
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‘Scribal publication’, to borrow a phrase from Harold Love, has similarly 
received detailed scholarly attention over the past twenty years.7  For example, 
Arthur Marotti has shown that ‘scribal communities’ formed amongst groups of 
young men whilst they attended university or a legal inn, providing them with a 
mechanism for exchanging contemporary poetical literature; Nancy Pollard-
Brown has exposed the benefits of manuscript transmission for networks of 
Catholic recusants who needed a platform from which to share clandestine 
religious ideas; and Peter Beal has conducted seminal work on Philip Sidney’s 
Letter to Queen Elizabeth, articulating in detail how it circulated indiscriminately 
in copied form amongst national scribal networks.8 Moreover, Professor Daybell 
has mapped the mechanisms by which hundreds of scribally copied letters 
written by or relating to the most famous, and indeed infamous, people or 
events of the period achieved the ‘widest currency’ (that is, circulation) in 
manuscript form.9 In short, the Loveian concept of ‘scribal publication’ 
encompasses a broad range of early modern letter production practices. The 
final section of this chapter will concentrate on just one of these, the circular 
missive, whereby ‘networks of friends or associates would regularly exchange 
texts with each other either by a process of chain copying or by a member 
making copies for the entire group.’10 To clarify, it will scrutinise not only how 
circular letters were disseminated amongst the Earl of Bath and his deputy 
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lieutenants at the zenith of county government, but also how circular precepts 
were similarly distributed between the constables of the hundreds and petty-
constables of the parishes in order for them to be read aloud in Devon’s parish 
churches. Such an analysis is crucial to appreciating fully how this form of letter 
production facilitated the transaction of state business not only within Devon but 
also throughout the realm and confirms that ‘scribal publication’ pervaded all 
sections of society and was not merely a culture exclusive to the political elite. 
Collectively this chapter thus provides the first comprehensive survey of 
a county’s official intra-county postal arrangements during the late-Elizabethan 
period. It will be argued throughout that Devon’s frontline location, vulnerability 
to invasion and high strategic value necessitated the establishment of a highly 
organised, complex and efficient internal postal network to complement the 
south-west’s Exchequer-funded royal post-stage service outlined in the previous 
chapter. The detailed primary evidence relating to Devon’s formal 
communication network extant in the Seymour Manuscripts coupled with the 
numerous items relating to the ad hoc payment of foot-posts, letter-bearers and 
servants in the receivers’ accounts of the county’s town corporations provide 
the documentary platform for this analysis. Indeed, it should be noted that but 
for this material an accurate reconstruction of Devon’s internal postal 
infrastructure and practices would not have been possible. The use of Devon as 
a case study therefore provides a rare opportunity to witness how local officials 
(at all tiers of government) in other frontline maritime counties are likely to have 
rapidly communicated with central government officials at Whitehall and each 
other during the critical years that followed the Armada crisis of 1588.  
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Letter delivery: foot-posts, letter-bearers and servants 
 
By utilising the Declared Accounts of the Master of the Posts, postal 
endorsement data and Privy Council directives, among other documents, 
chapter four was able to present clearly the royal postal network that functioned 
along the main highways to and from London and the south-west periodically 
during the late-Elizabethan era. However, what was not explained is what 
happened to official mail once it had reached Honiton, Exeter, Ashburton or 
Plymouth and required onward delivery to addressees living distant from these 
royal post-stages. It is therefore the objective of this section to answer this 
question and outline the informal postal arrangements used by Devon’s political 
elite and town corporations to post a response to their nearest royal post-master 
who then dispatched it along the royal post-stage network to central 
government at Whitehall. Moreover, it will be explained that these informal 
mechanisms of letter delivery were similarly deployed by local government 
officials to send official orders, instructions, progress reports, news and the like 
among each other.  
 The task of carrying official mail from the royal post-stages at Honiton, 
Exeter, Ashburton and Plymouth to an addressee’s residence was ordinarily 
undertaken by foot-posts retained by the local civic authorities.11 Indeed, 
according to Brayshay, Harrison and Chalkley,  
correspondence arriving at a post-stage from London, or any other 
origin, which was directed to a person of importance in the local area 
would, under the regulations governing the royal posting system, be 
delivered within a five- or 10-mile radius by a ‘foot post’.12   
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Similar onward delivery services existed elsewhere. For example, on 10 
December 1618 John Stanhope, Master of the Posts, issued an order to certain 
justices of the peace to aid John King, post-master of Southwark, ‘in delivery of 
letters six miles round’, while the royal post-master at Marshfield, 
Gloucestershire, customarily sent a foot-post to Bath with official mail 
addressed to the city’s chief inhabitants – a trip of approximately eight miles 
which ordinarily took three hours.13 
 The receivers’ accounts of Exeter and Plymouth provide crucial evidence 
of the onward delivery services that operated out of Devon’s two principal royal 
post-stages. Indeed, the accounts reveal that as well as foot-posts, mounted 
messengers and shipmasters were customarily employed by Exeter’s and 
Plymouth’s civic authorities to carry official mail received from Whitehall off the 
main highway to the residences of addressees located in the nearby hinterland. 
Thus, in Exeter the receivers’ accounts reveal that foot-posts were employed to 
deliver central government letters addressed to the Devon deputy lieutenants 
Sir Robert Denys, Sir William Courtenay and Sir John Gilbert I who lived at 
nearby Bicton, Powderham and Greenway respectively.14 Moreover, apart from 
the brief period when an Exchequer-funded post-stage service was engaged 
from Exeter to Barnstaple via Chulmleigh, Exeter’s chief inhabitants arranged 
the onward delivery of central government mail directed to Devon’s Lord 
Lieutenant, the Earl of Bath, who lived at Tawstock Court in north Devon. Thus, 
the Exeter accounts disclose that Richard Tolliscoote was paid 2s. in the 1588/9 
year of account for ‘caryinge lettres to my Lord of Bathe’; Thomas Bayley was 
paid 2s. 8d. in 1589/90 ‘for goinge to my Lord of Bathe’ (presumably with royal 
letters); John Smith was paid 6s. 8d. in 1594/5 ‘to Ride to the Lord of Bathe with 
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lettres’; an unnamed messenger was paid 2s. 6d. in 1595/6 ‘for carryage of the 
Lord Tresaurers Lettre vnto the Lord of Bathe’; and 3s. 3d. was paid out by 
Exeter’s receiver in 1595/6 ‘for a footman sent to my lord of Bathes’ (again, no 
doubt with government mail from Whitehall).15 Similarly, Plymouth’s accounts 
during the late-Elizabethan era reveal that the town corporation paid for letters 
from central government to be forwarded locally, for example, to naval 
commanders moored in Plymouth Sound, Sir John Gilbert I at Greenway and 
Sir George Carew at Antony, as well as further afield, for example, to Captain 
Fenner at Falmouth, Sir Francis Godolphin at west Cornwall and the deputy 
lieutenants of Cornwall.16 Collectively, such evidence reveals that the onward 
delivery service organised by the civic authorities of late-Elizabethan Exeter and 
Plymouth far exceeded the prescribed five to ten mile radius expected of them. 
In reality, government mail was regularly forwarded approximately forty miles 
from Exeter to the Earl of Bath at Tawstock and over sixty miles from Plymouth 
to individuals located at the western-most tip of Cornwall. Thus, these services 
exemplify how ‘private enterprise extended the reach of the royal post network, 
well beyond main arterial roads into relatively remote parts of the realm’.17  
However, what then happened once a government dispatch had been 
forwarded to its designated addressee in these ‘remote’ locations? How did an 
addressee set about posting a response back to Whitehall and what postal 
mechanisms did they have at their disposal for disseminating the information 
that they had received to other local government officials within Devon? The 
remainder of this section will outline the common informal methods of letter 
delivery available to all members of the early modern nobility, gentry and town 
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corporations, while the following two sections will detail the ‘extraordinary’ (that 
is, temporary) formal postal arrangements engaged specifically by Devon’s Lord 
Lieutenant during the crisis years of 1588 to 1603. 
The most frequent and sustained mode of letter delivery available to the 
English nobility, gentry and town corporations during the early modern era was 
via private messenger. Indeed, Alan Stewart and Heather Wolfe have noted that 
before the royal post began officially accommodating private letters in 
1635, mailing a letter involved paying a carrier, bearer, servant, or 
messenger, or enjoining a friend or a stranger headed in the desired 
direction, to carry the letter for you.18  
 
It is therefore of no surprise that Devon’s political elite commonly utilised their 
most trusted household servants and town corporations employed their most 
dependable footmen personally to carry correspondence addressed to central 
government officials to their nearest royal post-stage where it would be 
forwarded, along with other royal mail, to Whitehall via the relay of mounted 
post-boys discussed in chapter four. Alternatively, when Exchequer funding of 
the south-west’s royal post-stage network was absent or when mail did not 
relate to her Majesty’s ‘especial affairs’, these private and personal letter-
bearers carried such items personally to the relevant central government official 
or London-based contact either by ‘riding post’ in similar fashion to court 
messengers and pursuivants or travelling the whole way on a single horse or on 
foot.19 The former ‘through post’ method was speedier but significantly more 
expensive owing to the fact that only officials possessing a royal warrant or 
placard could benefit from the discounted post-horse hire charges that were 
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afforded them by the royal prerogative of purveyance, whereas the latter modes 
were inevitably a great deal slower but altogether cheaper and more secure.  
Nevertheless, using one’s own horse or hiring one from a local horse-
owner was still costly. This is confirmed by a list of expenses present in the 
Barnstaple Borough Records which itemise the money disbursed by an 
anonymous messenger who rode to London from Barnstaple and back again 
via the South Hams and Plymouth at some point between November 1564 and 
November 1565 ‘in Chichesters Cause’ which presumably related to Sir John 
Chichester’s purchase of the manor and borough of Barnstaple in 1566.20 His 
expenses included: 1s. 4d. ‘at London for the chamberlaine hoslers [hostlers] 
and other servantes ther and a haulfe a pecke of otes for my horse’; 4s. ‘at 
Hartele [probably Hartley Wintney, Hampshire] come the same night for my 
horse and my sealfe’; 4s. 6d. ‘paid at Salisbury the second night homewardes’; 
10d. ‘paid at Evelye [probably Eveleigh, near Cullompton] for horse shewing’; 
2s. ‘paid more at Evelighe for horse meat’; 1s. 6d. ‘paid for my horse meate’ at 
Honiton; 2s. ‘paid at Exon [Exeter] for my supper and horse meat’; 1s. 2d. ‘paid 
for my dinner at Kenton [near Exmouth] wher I staye to speake with Mr 
Holocombe and my horse meat ther’; 1s. ‘paid at winckley [Winkleigh] for my 
horse meat and dinner riding to the southe hames’; 2s. 2d. ‘paid at Chagford for 
my supper and horse meat’; 2s. 6d. ‘for a guyde to goe over the more to st 
Buttockes [St Budeaux] beyond plimouth [Plymouth] to one of the attales[sic] 
men Stephen Iustice’; 4d. ‘paid for shewing my horse nire plimouth with one 
Somers’; 4s. 6d. ‘paid at plimouthe for my supper and guides and horse meat 
and my dinner at chilton with the fare of the passage botes on the waye’; 12s. 
‘paid at Dodbroke [Dodbrook, near Torpoint, Cornwall] at the bayliffes howse 
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with horse meat and the charge of an other guide’; 3s. ‘paid for my supper horse 
meat and guides supper at kinges bridge [Kingsbridge]’; 1s. 1d. ‘paid at Brent 
[South Brent] for my dinner and horse meat’; 3s. 6d. ‘paid at Shagford 
[Chagford] retorning for my guide and horse meat’; £1 7s. ‘I owe to Iohn Homes 
for hire of his horse for London and the Southehames’. Thus, as well as 
spending money on his own accommodation, food and drink, the mounted 
messenger also had to pay for oats, meat and two re-shoeings for his hired 
horse, two guides, their accommodation, food and drink, ferries and John 
Homes’ horse hire charge. Such expenditure therefore underlines the financial 
costs involved in travelling on horseback during the sixteenth-century as well as 
illuminating some of the other payments that were inevitably necessary during 
the course of a long inter-regional trip. Indeed, with horse travel costing so 
much, delivery of correspondence by this method was very expensive and it is 
therefore unsurprising that on many occasions town corporations chose 
footmen to carry their letters instead.                     
In fact as well as being cheaper, J. Crofts has suggested that a footman 
was quicker over long distances because a horse’s speed, when not used in 
relays, was thought to fall off ‘much more steeply than that of a man as the 
distance increased.’21 It was therefore customary for the receivers of Exeter and 
Plymouth to pay footmen rather than mounted messengers for the conveyance 
of letters to and from the capital – a fact revealed by numerous payments in the 
receivers’ accounts of both corporations. For example, in Exeter John Chappell 
disbursed 18s. ‘to a footeman for goinge to London with letters’ during the 
1589/90 year of account; Henrye Hull paid 20s. ‘To a Footeman which caryed 
lettres to London’ in 1593/4; and Thomas Edwardes similarly ‘paide Wyatt the 
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footman’ 20s. ‘to Carrye Lettres to London Concerninge Bidwell being in prison’ 
in 1599/1600.22 Likewise, in Plymouth John Martyn issued 20s. to ‘a footeman 
to Carrye lettres ... to London to Mr Recorder’ during the 1592/3 year of 
account; John Golson paid a miserly 6d. to ‘Iorye the Footman for bringinge a 
lettre from London’ in 1594/5; and Roberte Trelawnie authorised the payment of 
35s. for ‘a footeman to Carrie lettres to Mr Sparke and Mr Bacon at London 
soundrie tymes’ in 1597/8.23 
Similarly, letter-bearers personally known to and on the payroll of 
Devon’s political elite and town corporations frequently conveyed important 
official dispatches via horse, foot and boat on an intra-county and inter-regional 
basis to other local government officials and organisations located within and 
beyond the county.24 Indeed, there are a number of letters in the Seymour 
Manuscripts which refer specifically to letter-bearers entrusted with transporting 
correspondence from sender to recipient. The Earl of Bath in particular regularly 
made reference to letter-bearers in his correspondence. For example, in a 
series of letters that Bath wrote to Edward Seymour between summer 1596 and 
autumn 1601 the following comments were made: ‘I haue receyued youre lettre 
by this Messenger’; ‘I haue receyued youre lettre by the Messenger’; ‘this 
bringer youre seruante’; ‘the bearer hereof my servaunte Iohn Allyn’; ‘the 
particulars whereof I then sent as I doe nowe againe by my servaunte 
Papwarthe’; ‘I hope youe shall receyve my letter by this messenger your 
servaunte’; ‘I haue sent vnto youe by this bringer so manie particulers’; ‘I haue 
                                               
22
 DRO, ECA, Receivers’ Rolls, 32, 36 and 42 Elizabeth I. 
23
 PWDRO, 1/132, Widey Court Book, ff. 96, 104 and 123.   
24
 Items pertaining to riders and footmen bearing letters are numerous in Plymouth’s receivers’ 
accounts during the late-Elizabethan period. By contrast, payments pertaining to the use of 
boats for transporting letters are less common and include: 1588/9, ‘Item paied to Edward hill 
for rowing vp to the howe to aduertise the lord: Chamberlen of the Spaniard that Came in to 
Bigberie Baie’, 2s.; 1596/7, ‘Item pai
d
 for Carrienge a lettre to Crymmell [Cremmel] passage 
[ferry] sent from the llordes of the Councell to Si
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 Fraunces Goddolphin’, 2d.; 1598/9, ‘Item pai
d
 
for a Pinnis [Pinnace – small nimble vessel] to carrie y
e
 Counselles lettres to her Majes
ties
 
shippes’, 2s. (PWDRO, 1/132, Widey Court Book, ff. 80, 118 and 126).   
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receiued your last lettre by the bearer hereof your Servaunte’; ‘I haue once more 
sent ... my servante Skippon ... to bringe vnto youe theise instructions’.25 
Evidence of using personally known letter-bearers can also be found in the 
receivers’ accounts of late-Elizabethan Devon’s town corporations. In 
Dartmouth, for example, during the August 1599 Spanish invasion scare, Jon 
Lomer, Henry Osborne and Henry Collins, along with two individuals referred to 
as ‘Speed’ and ‘Beers man’, were paid to convey letters, messages and news to 
local government officials living in nearby Blackawton, Blackpool, Berry 
Pomeroy, Modbury, Plymouth and Totnes.26 Throughout the late-Elizabethan 
period, moreover, Plymouth’s civic elite made payments to a wide range of 
personally known individuals, including Edward Hill, Edward James, Francis 
Blewett, George Sterling, Henrie Ellis, Henrie Stoute, John Veizie, John 
Gibbons, Nicholas Doe, Nicholas Lane, Richard Berryman, Richard Isacke, 
Thomas Edmondes, Thomas Payne, as well as men known colloquially as 
‘Ballemaie’ or ‘Ballamye’, ‘Collins’, ‘Dodge’, Fletcher’, ‘Peter the post’, ‘Peters 
boy’ and ‘Russell the post’, for delivering letters and messages to local elite 
living throughout Devon and Cornwall.27 In terms of remuneration, it would 
appear that these personally known letter-bearers were paid twice for their 
services by both sender and recipient.28 Thus, as well as paying letter-bearers 
for carrying outgoing mail, Devon’s town corporations also disbursed money to 
those letter-bearers and servants who brought incoming mail from their 
correspondents. For instance, Exeter’s receivers made a number of payments 
to the Earl of Bath’s junior secretary, Roger Papworth, during the 1590s for the 
                                               
25
 DRO, 1392M/L1596/6; DRO, 1392M/L1596/9; DRO, 1392M/L1596/22; DRO, 1392M/L1600/1; 
DRO, 1392M/L1601/13; DRO, 3799M-3/O/1/4; DRO, 3799M-3/O/1/21; DRO, 3799M-
3/O/9/1/24. 
26
 DRO, DD.61619. 
27
 PWDRO, 1/132, Widey Court Book, ff. 72-146. 
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 Daybell, The Material Letter, p. 139. 
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delivery of letters to Exeter from Tawstock Court, while in Plymouth William 
Downeman noted in his 1593/4 year of account the 5s. ‘geiven Sir William 
Courtenye his man for bringinge a lettre from the Earle of Essex for the 
Pilchardes cause’.29  
The two main advantages of utilising personally known letter-bearers and 
servants to carry official government mail direct from sender to recipient instead 
of the impersonal royal post-stage, carrier or mercantile service was security 
and trust. In terms of security, the risk of a dispatch misfiring or falling into the 
wrong hands was minimised because private messengers ensured ‘that a letter 
would be handed directly to the hands of the addressee or at least left at their 
residence’.30 While, with regards to trust, a sender could furnish his most 
dependable personal messengers with additional information not contained in a 
dispatch in order for it to be conveyed orally to a recipient. This saved vital time, 
allowing the sender to write a brief précis of the main points he wanted to 
communicate, leaving the messenger to ‘fill in the gaps’, answer any questions 
and relay any sensitive information verbally. Thus, it was common for late-
Elizabethan Devon’s political elite to refer to oral messages in their 
communiqués. Once again the Seymour Manuscripts provide a crucial snapshot 
of this phenomenon with a number of letters written from the Earl of Bath to 
Edward Seymour containing references to oral messages: ‘Since the writinge 
hereof I haue thoughte good to write vnto my Coosen Champernowne in such 
sorte as this bringer youre seruante can informe youe’; ‘I aunsweared mr 
Richard: Champernownes servaunt by worde that I had signified my mynde 
vnto my Llordes of the counsell’; ‘my servaunte Papwarthe ... shall be readye to 
attende you’; ‘I haue thought it good to forbeare to delyver anye other aunswere 
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 DRO, ECA, Receivers’ Rolls, 31, 38, 39 and 43 Elizabeth I; PWDRO 1/132, Widey Court 
Book, f. 99. 
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 Daybell, The Material Letter, p. 140. 
203 
 
therevnto then by worde of mouthe to his Messenger which I haue also willed 
Papworthe to declare vnto you’.31 Moreover, it was customary for personal 
messengers to wait with a recipient for a response (either oral or written) before 
returning to his master thereby speeding up the execution of government 
business and providing an explanation as to why personal letter-bearers 
received payment from both sender and recipient. Thus, when the Earl of Bath 
desired a response ‘without anye delaye’ on 22 May 1600, he endorsed a letter 
to Edward Seymour, Thomas Reynell and Amice Bampfield thus: ‘I praye geue 
this messenger for his paynes Twoe shillinges And retourne me your aunsior by 
him.’32 Nevertheless, despite efforts to maximise the rapidity of these informal 
postal arrangements they were, understandably, inherently slow. Thus, during 
the critical years of 1588 to 1603 Devon’s political elite needed a speedier and 
more sustained link with the county’s royal post-stages, each other and their 
subordinates to facilitate the heightened degree of interconnectedness at all 
tiers of government engendered by the war with Spain and rebellion in Ireland. 
It is the intention of the following two sections to outline in detail how this was 
achieved.  
 
Devon’s intra-county post-stage service 
 
A number of documents in the Seymour Manuscripts reveal that the Earl of Bath 
established an intra-county post-stage service similar in nature to the national 
facility outlined in chapter four in order for government mail to rapidly be 
conveyed to and from himself, his deputies, civic elites located in Devon’s 
principal port towns and certain other high status county officials. The specific 
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 DRO, 1392M/L1596/22; DRO, 1392M/L1598/6; DRO, 1392M/L1601/13; DRO, 3799M-
3/O/9/1/19. 
32
 DRO, 3799M-3/O/1/22. 
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date when this intra-county post-stage network was established is presently 
unknown. However, it was definitely engaged by autumn 1596 and operated in 
conjunction with the south-west’s Exchequer-funded post-stage network (itself 
engaged on 1 August 1595) in order to replicate the rapid inter-urban 
transmission of government mail on an intra-county basis. This section provides 
an in-depth analysis of this intra-county postal network outlining wherever 
possible the locations of Devon’s intra-county post-stages and, where there is 
insufficient evidence, providing logical suggestions as to where the remaining 
intra-county post-stages are likely to have been situated. In addition, by 
combining relevant primary material from the Seymour Manuscripts with the 
postal endorsement data utilised in chapter four, evidence in the borough 
records of Okehampton, the receivers’ accounts of Exeter and Plymouth and 
the wills of certain members of late-Elizabethan Devon’s political elite, the 
section outlines to whom the service was available, how it functioned and the 
probable delivery speeds achieved. 
 However, before discussing Devon’s intra-county post-stage network it is 
important to note that a less formalised and more primitive forerunner existed. 
To clarify, there is substantial evidence in the borough records of Plymouth and 
Exeter which confirms that prior to 1596 Devon’s town corporations regularly 
received letters from the Earl of Bath, his deputies and other political elite 
addressed to individuals residing in the nearby hinterland which required 
onward delivery. For example, in 1588/9 Plymouth’s incumbent receiver, John 
Geare, disbursed 18d. ‘to Georg Sterling for riding to mr Champernons of 
Modberie with Sir Frauncis Drake his lettre for staieng of the moneies which hath 
bin gathered’ and another 18d. ‘to Collins for riding to mr Stroudes & to the 
Constables and to mr Champernons at Modberie with a precept from mr George 
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Carie of Cokenton [Cockington]’.33 Similarly, Exeter’s Act Book for the years 
1587 to 1601 contains an acknowledgement that ‘Lettres receiued this daye [20 
January 1590] from the Earle of Bathe were sente theone directed to Sir William 
Courteney ... theother directed to Sir Roberte Dennys’.34 Then, in 1593/4 
Exeter’s incumbent receiver, Henrye Hull, paid 9s. 4d. ‘for sixe post horses 
vppon reporte of the landinge of the Spanyardes at Sidmoth bye Sir Thomas 
Denys Sheriffe’.35 Presumably Denys had sent a messenger to Exeter from his 
home at Bicton with orders to relay this news via six post-horses to the Earl of 
Bath and his five fellow deputy lieutenants. However, by 1596 these informal 
post-horse relay arrangements were evidently regarded as insufficient to 
operate alongside the south-west’s Exchequer-funded post-stage service and 
so more formal arrangements were enacted.  
On 19 November 1596 the Earl of Bath convened at Okehampton with 
four of his deputy lieutenants (Sir Ferdinando Gorges, George Cary, Edward 
Seymour and Richard Champernowne) to discuss certain matters pertaining to 
the government of Devon. Item twelve on their agenda related to the provision 
of post-horses which they ordered to operate along an intra-county post-stage 
network: 
Item yt is ordered that there be poast horsses laid in readynes 
through all the princypall trade waies leadinge from the places of 
descent in this County of Devon to the Lord Leiuetenante & his 
Deputies accordinge to a former order therof sett downe by the Lord 
Leiuetenante in that behalf.36 
 
The ‘places of descent’ refer to the likely landing sites that the Spanish were 
expected to choose in the event of an amphibious assault on Devon which, as 
outlined in chapter three, were thought to be Plymouth, Dartmouth and Tor Bay, 
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 PWDRO, 1/132, Widey Court Book, ff. 80-1. 
34
 DRO, ECA, Act Book V (1587-1601), pp. 150-1. 
35
 DRO, ECA, Receivers’ Rolls, 36 Elizabeth I. 
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while the principal residences of the Earl of Bath and his deputy lieutenants are 
illustrated by figure 2.2 in chapter two. A subsequent order made by Bath and 
three of his deputies (Sir William Courtenay, Hugh Fortescue and Edward 
Seymour) when they met at Exeter on 19 April 1599 confirms the engagement 
of late-Elizabethan Devon’s intra-county post-stage network: 
Item yt is ordered for the ease & benefytt of the Country that from 
hencefourthe at all places where post horsses haue byn vsuallie 
Comaunded to be layd for the more expedicon & Convayaunce of 
lettres & messuages from the Lord: Leiuetenante to Exeter 
Plymouthe & other places for the seruice of her majestie That the said 
post horsses shalbe dismissed & tourned into foote post.37 
 
The fact that both Exeter and Plymouth are explicitly mentioned verifies the 
location of two of Devon’s intra-county post-stages. Moreover, the notion that 
this network was a permanent feature in late-Elizabethan Devon from at least 
autumn 1596 is indicated by the fact that the order stipulates the downgrading 
of the service from a post-horse to a foot-post facility. This therefore implies that 
during periods of heightened Spanish threat the more expensive engagement of 
post-horses was ordered to establish optimum intra-county communication 
speeds amongst Devon’s political elite, whereas during periods of diminished 
threat the network was turned into a less expensive and comparatively slower 
foot-post service rather than being dismissed altogether.  
 As well as Plymouth and Exeter, it is logical to assume that Dartmouth 
was engaged as an intra-county post-stage because, as noted above and in 
chapter three, it was considered one of the ‘places of descent’ likely to be 
chosen by the Spanish in the event of an invasion attempt. Thus, the town’s 
civic elite needed to be in ready contact with Bath and his deputies to relay 
incoming  news  and  intelligence  from  the  continent  and  receive  orders  and  
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Tawstock Court to Plymouth                          Tawstock Court to Dartmouth 
A. Tawstock Court     1. Tawstock Court 
B. Chulmleigh     2. Chulmleigh 
C. Okehampton     3. Exeter 
D. Tavistock      4. Newton Abbot 
E. Plymouth      5. Dartmouth 
 
                          
 
Figure 5.1: Late-Elizabethan Devon’s intra-county post-stage network.38 
 
                                               
38
 DRO, 3799M-3/O/2/8; DRO, 3799M-3/O/2/18; DRO, 1392M/L1599/12; DRO, 3248A/9/3; 
PWDRO, 1/132, Widey Court Book, f. 139.   
0km 50 100 
CORNWALL 
SOMERSET 
DORSET 
ENGLISH CHANNEL 
1 
2 
3 C 
D 
4 
5 
E 
A 
B 
BRISTOL CHANNEL 
208 
 
directives concerning matters of defence and security. The remaining intra-
county post-stages linking Dartmouth with Tawstock Court may well have been 
Ashburton, Exeter and Chulmleigh. All three served as royal post-stages during 
the late-Elizabethan era and as such possessed the logistical capability to 
function in this secondary capacity. That said, a letter from Sir William 
Courtenay to Edward Seymour dated 3 August 1599 when the former was at 
Cullompton in east Devon and the latter was at Dartmouth suggests that 
Ashburton may not have been an intra-county post-stage. Postal endorsements 
on the outside panel of the letter reveal that the dispatch was at Exeter ‘the 3 of 
Aug at one a cloke after nowne’ before being forwarded to the ‘Counstable of 
Newton ... with speed’.39 Had Ashburton been engaged as an intra-county post-
stage the letter would surely have been conveyed there. The fact that it was not 
therefore suggests that Newton Bushel (present-day Newton Abbot) functioned 
as the intra-county post-stage linking Exeter with Dartmouth. At approximately 
fifteen-and-a-half statute miles from Exeter and eighteen statute miles from 
Dartmouth it was ideally placed. What is more, unlike Ashburton, Newton Abbot 
is located adjacent to Tor Bay (one of the ‘places of descent’ thought likely to be 
chosen by the Spanish). Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, Newton Abbot is 
considered an intra-county post-stage instead of Ashburton (see figure 5.1).  
Additional evidence of late-Elizabethan Devon’s intra-county post-stage 
network is located in the borough records of Okehampton.  On 1 August 1599 
Sir Ferdinando Gorges, Sir William Strode, Thomas Hele, John Copleston, 
Tristram Gorges, William Crymes and Christopher Harris wrote from Plymouth 
to the Mayor of Okehampton ordering  
in her Majesties name streightlie to charge and Comaunde you that 
vpon receipte hereof you provide twoe able and sufficiente post 
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horses to be alwayes in ... readines within your Towne for the speedie 
transportinge and sendinge of ... all such lettres as shall from tyme to 
tyme be directed from hence or from any other the partes here 
adioyninge by any of vs to ... the Lord: Lyuetenante for her Majesties 
service, or from him vnto vs or any of vs.40 
 
This letter is of crucial importance because it confirms that a second intra-
county post-stage connection, largely independent from the Exchequer-funded 
royal post-stage network, was established between Tawstock Court and 
Plymouth via Okehampton during the late-1590s. In addition to Okehampton, it 
seems likely that Tavistock and Chulmleigh functioned as the route’s other post-
stages. The supposition of the former’s engagement is based largely on a single 
entry made by William Can in the Plymouth’s receivers’ accounts during 1601/2: 
‘Item paid Thomas Pavie for Carrienge a letter to ... Tavistocke beinge directed 
to the Earle of Bathe’.41 While this is rather tenuous evidence it nevertheless 
implies that letters directed to the Earl of Bath were sent from Plymouth to 
Tavistock before being directed to Okehampton and then on to Chulmleigh 
which, as noted, was a logical location for the final link to and from Tawstock 
Court and Plymouth owing to its periodic engagement as a royal post-stage. 
Moreover, the distance between Plymouth and Okehampton is approximately 
thirty statute miles. Thus, when one remembers the comparatively slow speeds 
(outlined in chapter four) achieved by the post-boys who carried royal mail 
between Plymouth and Ashburton – a distance of twenty-five statute miles – a 
midway point between Plymouth and Okehampton would have been desirable. 
At approximately fourteen statute miles from Plymouth and sixteen from 
Okehampton, Tavistock was ideally placed. 
Who then in Devon could utilise this intra-county post-stage network? 
The Earl of Bath, his deputies and the civic authorities in Plymouth, Dartmouth 
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and Exeter were of course the primary users, but whom else, if anyone was 
permitted to utilise the system? The letter written by Sir Ferdinando Gorges and 
others to the Mayor of Okehampton on 1 August 1599 ordering the provision of 
two post-horses helps to answer this question because not only was it signed 
by two of Bath’s deputies (Gorges and Sir William Strode) it was also signed by 
Thomas Hele, John Copleston, Tristram Gorges, William Crymes and 
Christopher Harris – none of whom were either a deputy lieutenant of Devon or 
a leading member of Plymouth’s civic elite. All however were from influential 
south-west families. Thomas Hele, for example, was the third son of Sir John 
Hele of Wembury (c.1542-1608) – the powerful lawyer whose legal prowess 
ensured that he occupied the position of recorder for both Exeter (1592-1605) 
and Plymouth (by c.1604) during his career – while Christopher Harris of 
Radford (c.1553-1625) was a very prominent local official in both Devon and 
Cornwall, most notably as a JP (from 1591) and vice-admiral (1596 and 1600).42 
It thus appears that as well as the primary users, a secondary set of local 
government officials operating immediately subordinate to Bath and his 
deputies were able to utilise Devon’s intra-county post-stage network if 
necessary. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the network was designed first 
and foremost to enable Devon’s Lord and Deputy Lieutenants – a small elite 
group of politicians at the apex of the county’s government – to communicate 
rapidly with each other and with the civic authorities in Devon’s most vulnerable 
port towns and seems only to have been available to lower level government 
personnel on the explicit say-so of either Bath or one of his deputies.     
 Having outlined the probable structure of Devon’s intra-county post-stage 
network and the individuals to whom the network was available it is now 
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necessary to demonstrate how this formal method of speedy letter delivery is 
likely to have functioned. Each intra-county post-stage illustrated in figure 5.1 
seems to have been overseen and funded by the local civic authorities. For 
example, as noted above, the Mayor of Okehampton was instructed to ‘provide 
twoe able and sufficiente post horses to be alwayes in ... readines’, while 
Plymouth’s receivers disbursed £3 in 1596/7 to Thomas Pavie ‘for keepinge of a 
post horse to Carie letters to the Earle of Bathe’ and 40s. in 1597/8 ‘for half a 
yere for a post horse to Carrye lettres to the Earle of Bathe’.43 Thus, from these 
few examples it is likely that local civic elites were able to retain a sufficient 
number of post-horses to serve along Devon’s intra-county post-stage network 
and thereby ensure the smooth and speedy running of their section of the 
service. Indeed, when in 1588 Sir Walter Ralegh’s entourage arrived at Exeter 
and demanded the hire of thirty-two post-horses to transport them to Sir John 
Gilbert I’s house at Greenway Exeter’s authorities duly accommodated them, 
charging ‘for 22 myle at jd[one pence] ob[of] per mylle for euery horse’ in 
accordance with the royal prerogative of purveyance.44 Of course such an 
outlay had nothing to do with Devon’s intra-county post-stage arrangements; 
nevertheless, it indicates that even during the most critical year of the late-
Elizabethan period the civic authorities in Exeter were able to supply a 
substantial number of post-horses if the need arose.      
 However, the availability and provision of post-horses at each of Devon’s 
intra-county post-stages would have been irrelevant had post-horses not been 
readily available at the residences of the Earl of Bath and his deputies. Indeed, 
to utilise the service at its optimum speed an appropriate number of horses, 
along with sufficient stabling facilities, was needed at each of their homes to 
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enable the rapid conveyance of important government mail to their nearest 
intra-county post-stage. How then does one determine whether Bath and his 
deputies owned a sufficient number of horses to make the most of Devon’s 
intra-county post-stage network? The answer lies in the extant wills of Devon’s 
Lord and Deputy Lieutenants which include numerous references to horse 
ownership. For example, the Earl of Bath bequeathed to his son, Edward 
Bourchier, fourth Earl of Bath, ‘six of the best winter geldings and fower of the 
best somer nagges’ and to Francis, Lord Russell, ‘the best stone horse, and 
best gelding’. Sir Robert Denys left certain members of his household ‘One 
guelding with Sadle and other necessaryes meete for her owne Rydinge, one 
other for a gentlewoman with furniture to the same, And fower other geldings 
with theire Sadles and furnitures fit for Servingmen’. Hugh Fortescue granted to 
his wife and executors ‘one haulf of all my other horsses geldinges mares and 
Coultes’. Sir John Gilbert II gave his servant, Edward Crompton, his ‘olde 
blacke nagge’. And Sir Amyas Bampfield, who assumed Sir George Cary’s 
lieutenancy duty during the latter’s time in Ireland, bequeathed his wife his ‘best 
Ambling gelding or nagge’.45 While not revealing the true extent of horse 
ownership among Bath and his deputies, these bequests nevertheless indicate 
that it was substantial. After all, several legacies refer to the grant of ‘best’ 
horses implying that the deceased owned many more horses besides. Indeed, 
in his analysis of horses and social status, Peter Edwards has described the 
quantity and type of horses owned by the nobility and upper-gentry thus: 
Good horsemanship was deemed to be one of the essential 
attributes of a gentleman ... For this reason, the stables belonging to 
the upper classes contained the largest and most varied stock. Local 
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 PROB 11/142: 31/10/1622; PROB 11/80: 15/7/1592; PROB 11/96: 5/6/1599; PROB 11/112; 
PROB 11/148: 4/6/1625. A ‘gelding’ is a castrated male horse of any age. A nag or ‘nagge’ is a 
‘small riding horse’. A ‘stone’ horse is a male horse of four years or older – in other words, a 
stallion. A ‘mare’ is a female horse of four years or older. A colt is a male horse under the age of 
four years.     
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gentry might keep ten to twelve head but the nobility would have 
dozens of horses in their stables.46 
 
The extant wills of Bath and his deputies therefore collectively confirm that each 
maintained ample equine services at their homes to facilitate the intra-county 
post-stage network’s best possible postal speeds. 
 What then were the likely postal speeds achieved between late-
Elizabethan Devon’s intra-county post-stages assuming that the network 
outlined above is an accurate reconstruction? Unfortunately, unlike the 
Exchequer-funded royal post-stage network, there seem to have been no 
stringent guidelines in place for recording the time of arrival at each post-stage 
in a ledger or indeed on the outside panel of a dispatch. However, despite this, 
there are a number of letters present among the Seymour Manuscripts which 
were endorsed with a time of dispatch. The letter written by Sir William 
Courtenay to Edward Seymour on 3 August 1599 (used above to argue the 
case for Newton Abbot being an intra-county post-stage) is a notable example, 
as is the letter written by Sir John Gilbert II at Plymouth to the Earl of Bath at 
Tawstock Court on 28 July 1601, which is endorsed ‘the fort the 28th Iuly 1601 
at 7 of the clock at night’, and the letter from Amyas Bampfield and Thomas 
Reynell to Edward Seymour and others dated 16 October 1601, which is 
certified as being ‘At the Castell of Exon [Exeter] friday half an hower past 10 of 
the clock in the forenoon’.47  Unfortunately, postal endorsements like these are 
too rare and fragmented to enable one to apply the same methodology as the 
one used in chapter four to approximate the mean travel times between 
Plymouth and London. Nevertheless, they do point to an intra-county post-stage 
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network that was similarly geared to speed and efficiency. Indeed, this is 
supported by the fact that a number of letters present in the Seymour 
Manuscripts which were dispatched on an intra-county basis possess the 
phrases ‘For her majesties spetiall seruice’ and ‘haste hast post hast for life’, or 
similar words to that affect, and some even include a sketch of a gallows – the 
usual caution for a prompt delivery repeatedly found on the letters that were 
conveyed along the south-west’s Exchequer-funded post-stage network by 
relays of semi-literate post-boys.48 It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
mean travel times between Devon’s intra-county post-stages were equally as 
rapid as the mean travel times achieved along the south-west’s Exchequer-
funded post-stage network. Consequently, by utilising the postal endorsement 
data from chapter four, it has been possible to calculate estimated mean travel 
times that are likely to have been achieved by the post-boys who carried 
government mail via late-Elizabethan Devon’s intra-county post-stage 
network.49 The results are presented in figure 5.2 and suggest that Devon’s 
intra-county post-stage service enabled the Earl of Bath customarily to send 
and receive mail to and from his subordinates in Dartmouth in just over fourteen 
hours and, in Plymouth, a little under twelve-and-a-half hours.   
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 DRO, 1392M/L1595/7; DRO, 1392M/L1596/20 and 24; DRO, 1392M/L1599/3, 8, 11-14, 25, 
29, 31 and 37; DRO, 1392M/L1601/2, 4, 10, 12, 15 and 17; DRO, 1392M/L1602/3; DRO, 
3799M-3/O/1/13, 17-19, 21 and 29; DRO, 3799M-3/O/9/1/20.  
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 The first step taken when calculating estimated mean travel times between Devon’s intra-
county post-stages was to measure the distance in statute miles between each post-stage using 
route planning computer software. This revealed that the Tawstock Court to Dartmouth route 
totalled approximately seventy-one statute miles while the Tawstock Court to Plymouth route 
was approximately sixty-one-and-a-half statute miles (see figure 5.2). Having established these 
distances it was then necessary to calculate the mean time it took for a letter to be conveyed 
one statute mile via the south-west’s Exchequer-funded post-stage route: adjusted mean travel 
time between Plymouth and London (46.09 hours) / approximate distance between Plymouth 
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to estimate the mean travel times achieved between late-Elizabethan Devon’s intra-county 
stages by multiplying the distance between each post-stage in statute miles by the 0.20 hours-
per-mile customarily achieved by the post-boys operating along the south-west’s royal post-
stage network. 
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However, what concrete evidence is there to confirm that these 
estimated travel times were achievable? Fortunately, this question can be 
answered by certain letters among the Seymour Manuscripts and State Papers 
written during the summer 1599 Spanish invasion scare. One of these was sent 
from the Earl of Bath at Tawstock Court to Edward Seymour at Berry Pomeroy 
Castle on 26 July 1599. The opening few lines of the letter read as follows: 
Good Coosen Seymour: since I wrote to youe laste, which was aboute 
nyne of the Clocke in the forenowne this presente daye (and then in 
some haste as aunswere to your lettre which I receyved by the poste) 
Captayne Dodington hath gyven me aduertisement that the Fleete 
which was discouered yesterdaye before Plymouthe are all Fleminges 
bounde for Salte [La Rochelle].50  
 
To place this letter into context, ‘Captayne Dodington’ was in fact Lieutenant 
Edward Dodington – Sir Ferdinando Gorges’ second-in-command at Plymouth 
Fort. At seven o’clock on the evening of 25 July 1599 he mistook an 
approaching Flemish fleet for Spanish warships and hurriedly dispatched two 
letters warning his superiors of the perceived threat. One was conveyed via the 
Exchequer-funded post-stage service to the Privy Council in London and the 
other was directed to the Earl of Bath at Tawstock presumably via Devon’s 
intra-county post-stage network.51 The earliest that Dodington could have 
dispatched his letter to Bath from Plymouth was seven o’clock in the evening of 
25 July and the latest that it could have arrived at Tawstock Court was nine 
o’clock in the morning of 26 July because by that time, as Bath states in the 
above extract, the Earl had forwarded the information to Edward Seymour.52 In 
                                               
50
 DRO, 1392M/L1599/2. 
51
 SP 12/271 f.184. Reference to Dodington’s letter to Bath can be found in DRO, 
1392M/L1599/3. 
52
 Dodington also wrote a follow-up letter to the Privy Council explaining to them, no doubt with 
much embarrassment, that the suspected fleet were: ‘Fleminges bounde for Rochell [La 
Rochelle]’ but that ‘the manner of there woorkinge caused vs ... to misdoubte them, whereof I 
thought it my dutie to geue you
r
 honours: the speediest notise ... pardon my hastie writinge’ (SP 
12/271 f.185). 
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fact it is feasible to assume that Bath received Dodington’s letter much earlier 
than nine o’clock on the morning of 26 July because by that time he had read it, 
considered it, written a letter to Seymour informing him of the perceived threat 
and dispatched that letter forthwith. The time it took for Dodington’s letter to 
travel from Plymouth to Tawstock Court therefore could not have taken any 
longer than fourteen hours and, in all likelihood, was in the Earl of Bath’s 
possession no later than the estimated mean travel time of twelve-and-a-half 
hours outlined in figure 5.2. Consequently, when on 26 July Bath instructed 
Seymour to ‘comaunde the post horses betwene you and me to be in present 
readynes to convaye lettres to eache of vs with speede, and lett me heare from 
you daylie in anye wise so longe as this daunger lasteth’ he did so safe in the 
knowledge that daily contact between himself in north Devon and his 
subordinates in south Devon was easily achievable thanks to the intra-county 
post-stage network that he and his deputies had established.53  
 
Devon’s parish-to-parish postal network  
 
So far this chapter has outlined the various modes of letter delivery available to 
the Earl of Bath, his deputies and the county’s civic elite for sending and 
receiving government mail and messages among each other. However, during 
the critical years of 1588 to 1603 Devon’s political elite needed also to be 
readily connected with those local government officials operating at a division, 
hundred and parish level so that they could promptly order the mustering of the 
county’s militia within ‘an hour’s warning’, initiate the widespread levying of 
                                               
53
 DRO, 1392M/L1599/3. Similarly, when Sir William Courtenay wrote (most probably from 
Exeter) to Edward Seymour at Dartmouth on 4 August 1599 he endorsed the letter thus: ‘I 
expect aunswer of this this night’ (DRO, 1392M/L1599/14). Had there not been an appropriately 
rapid means of conveyance engaged such a request would have likely been considered futile. 
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troops for service in Ireland and circulate important pieces of news and 
intelligence throughout the county.54 Consequently, a parish-to-parish postal 
network was established whereby a combination of post-horses and foot-posts 
were kept on standby in each of Devon’s parishes to carry orders, directives 
and precepts to all corners of the county. By utilising relevant material from the 
Seymour Manuscripts in conjunction with the receivers’ accounts of Plymouth, 
the Institute of Heraldic and Genealogical Studies’ map of Devon parishes and 
the Plymouth Market Toll Book this section clarifies how Devon’s parish-to-
parish postal network functioned, to whom it was available and how it 
undoubtedly facilitated the widespread dissemination of political information and 
ideas among not only late-Elizabethan Devon’s political elite but also the 
county’s wider population.  
 Evidence of late-Elizabethan Devon’s parish-to-parish postal network can 
be found in certain orders among the Seymour Manuscripts. Thus, item nine of 
a set of orders devised by Devon’s Deputy Lieutenants on 12 August 1595 
stipulates: ‘That therebe postes Appoynted Aswell one horse as one foote in 
eache parishe for the more expedicon to be vsed for all intellygences as 
occasyon shall Requyer’; while a draft precept from Edward Seymour to the 
petty-constables of the parishes near to his house at Berry Pomeroy dated 2 
August 1599 instructs them to: ‘haue in each parish one suffycient post horsse 
for the more spedier execucon of all directions that shall Come vnto you’.55 
Furthermore, the longevity of these postal arrangements is confirmed by an 
order made by the Earl of Bath and his deputies on 2 August 1620 wherein they 
agreed: ‘That two or three fit men be appointed in every parish by the 
                                               
54
 HMC, Somerset, p. 48. 
55
 DRO, 3799M-3/O/2/3; DRO, 3799M-3/O/2/20. 
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constables to be foot posts for conveyance of letters upon all occasions.’56 
According to the eighteenth-century writer, John Bruce, such parish-to-parish 
postal arrangements were not peculiar to Devon, rather it was a widespread 
communication expedient utilised throughout the realm during the Armada crisis 
of 1588 rapidly to convey official government mail.57 Thus, while the evidence is 
somewhat tenuous, it would appear that a parish-based communication network 
operated throughout the realm on an intermittent basis from at least the time of 
the Spanish Armada to well beyond the accession of James I. 
 Further evidence of late-Elizabethan Devon’s parish-to-parish postal 
service can be gleaned from the postal endorsements on certain letters written 
to Edward Seymour from his fellow deputy lieutenants, Sir Ferdinando Gorges 
and Sir William Strode. Gorges wrote from ‘Plymoth att xij[12] a Clocke the 
xx[20]th of August 1599’ to Seymour ‘att Berie Castle’ in order to query why a 
detachment of fifty militiamen from Sir George Cary’s regiment was unable to 
reinforce his troops. Crucially the words ‘from tything to tything’ (a tithing being 
an administrative unit that consisted of ten households) can faintly be discerned 
on the outside panel of the letter beneath the customary declaration that the 
missive was ‘For her Majesties especiall afaires’, Seymour’s name and address 
and the location, time and date the letter was sent.58 Similarly, Strode wrote a 
letter at Meavy, near Tavistock, on 18 October 1601 to Seymour at Berry 
Pomeroy Castle in order to acknowledge the receipt of certain letters and 
arrange a meeting ‘at the Parlement very shortly’. The letter was endorsed thus: 
‘For her Majesties speciall seruice’; ‘To the right Worshipfull: my verie lovinge 
                                               
56
 HMC, Somerset, p. 63. 
57
 John Bruce, Report On The Arrangements Which Were Made, For The Internal Defence of 
These Kingdoms, When Spain, By Its Armada, Projected The Invasion and Conquest of 
England (London, 1798), p. cxxx. The relevant passage reads: ‘that there be a foote poste 
appoynted in every parish within the shire, whose dwellinge should be chosen, neere unto the 
churche’. 
58
 DRO, 1392M/L1599/29. 
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Cosen Edward Seymour esquire at Berry Castle geue theise’; ‘hast hast post 
hast’; ‘At Meuoy [Meavy] the 18th of October by 11: in the forenoone.’; ‘from 
parish to parish by the Cunstables to be conveyed’; ‘William Strode’.59 Indeed, 
Strode seems to have been a regular user of Devon’s parish-to-parish postal 
network for ‘at night’ on 7 March 1602 he wrote again from Meavy to Seymour 
at Berry Pomeroy Castle this time enclosing a letter from the Earl of Bath which 
related to the first payment of the second subsidy together with ‘bookes which 
his lordship: sent touching the same’. At eight o’clock the next morning Strode 
dispatched this bundle of documents to Seymour ‘from parish to parish by the 
Cunstables or other officers with speed’.60   
Town corporations also seem to have had ready access to the county’s 
parish- and tithing-based postal infrastructure. For example, Plymouth’s 
receiver for 1596/7, Thomas Reynolson, paid 4d. ‘for Carrienge a lettre to the 
next tythinge sent to the Earle of Bathe’, 6d. ‘for Carienge a lettre at next 
tithinge sent to the Earle of Bathe’, 15d. ‘for Carrienge three hues & Cries to the 
next Tithinges’ and 3d. ‘for carrienge a hue & Crie at next tithinge’; while his 
successor, Robert Trelawnie, disbursed 15s. 2d. ‘for passinge of lettres this 
yere from tythinge to tythinge’.61 Much can be learnt from these examples in 
terms of the nature of Devon’s parish-to-parish postal service. In particular, its 
raison d’être was speed; it was utilised by Devon’s Deputy Lieutenants to 
communicate rapidly not only with their subordinates but also each other; it was 
used by Plymouth’s civic elite as an alternative method of letter delivery to the 
Earl of Bath; and its maintenance depended not on Devon’s political elite but on 
the constables, petty-constables and tithingmen. The last mentioned of these is 
particularly important given the fact that orders stipulated that there was to be 
                                               
59
 DRO, 1392M/L1601/14. 
60
 DRO, 1392M/L1602/2. 
61
 PWDRO, 1/132, Widey Court Book, ff. 115-6, 118 and 123.  
221 
 
‘in each parish one suffycient post horsse’ thereby raising the crucial question of 
whether constables, petty-constables and tithingmen had easy access to at 
least one adequately nimble horse in their immediate vicinity. 
 To place this into context, mainland Devon was made up of 483 
ecclesiastical parishes.62 Thus, if one takes the letters, orders and precepts 
extant in the Seymour Manuscripts at face value, the county’s parish-to-parish 
postal network required the same number of post-horses. Consequently, when 
Sir Ferdinando Gorges directed his letter to Edward Seymour ‘from tything to 
tything’ on 20 August 1599 it was potentially (although this is complete 
speculation) carried through the seven parishes separating Plymouth and Berry 
Pomeroy via a relay of eight mounted post-boys. Likewise, when Sir William 
Strode dispatched his letters to Seymour on 18 October 1601 and 7 March 
1602 ‘from parish to parish’ they too may well have travelled through the seven 
parishes separating Meavy and Berry Pomeroy via a relay of eight mounted 
post-boys, while the letters dispatched from Plymouth to the Earl of Bath at 
Tawstock Court in 1596/7 could quite possibly have travelled through nineteen 
parishes via a relay of twenty mounted post-boys.63 Constables having access 
to at least one appropriately agile horse in each of Devon’s 483 parishes was 
therefore essential to the smooth-running of the county’s parish-to-parish postal 
network. Crucially, horse ownership in England transcended the social elite to 
encompass all ranks of the gentry, yeomanry and mercantile community. 
Indeed, it seems that even the English ‘peasantry’ had access to horses, 
something which the Venetian Ambassador observed in June 1558:  
there is no male or female peasant ... who does not ride on 
horseback, and miserable must that man be who follows his cart on 
                                               
62
 However, according to a document from among the Harley Manuscripts at the British Library 
there were only 394 parish churches (BL, Harley MS., 7022 ff.75-7). 
63
 The number of Devon parishes has been obtained from the Institute of Heraldic and 
Genealogical Studies’ Map of Devon Parishes.  
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foot. Thus the rustic on horseback drives the oxen or horses of his 
team, and hence comes it that England is also called the land of 
comforts.64       
 
According to Peter Edwards one must interpret the Ambassador’s use of the 
word ‘peasant’ with caution and regard it ‘as a farmer of some means rather 
than a smallholder and therefore a person of standing in his community’.65 
Nevertheless, it is clear that both the ownership of and access to horses was 
more socially democratic throughout early modern England than has previously 
been assumed. It is therefore unsurprising to note that amongst those who 
purchased and sold horses at Plymouth Market between 1590 and 1600 was a 
blacksmith, a butcher, a chandler, a cutler, a goldsmith, a joiner, a labourer, a 
mariner and a sadler, as well as five yeomen and five husbandmen.66 Thus, 
orders to place one sufficient post-horse on standby in each of mainland 
Devon’s 483 parishes should not be regarded as a fanciful pipedream. In reality 
these orders were issued on the premise that they were readily achievable. 
 The significance of late-Elizabethan Devon’s parish-to-parish postal 
network and similar networks which, according to Bruce, were established 
elsewhere should not be underestimated. Indeed, as well as providing the 
political elite with an additional means of communicating with each other, the 
parish-to-parish network also constituted an important mechanism for 
disseminating orders and precepts throughout all tiers of local government. 
Such a system is crucial for further developing a modern-day understanding of 
precisely how policies devised at Whitehall were articulated and implemented at 
a parish level. However, it was not merely letters, orders and precepts that 
circulated from parish to parish. Indeed, in relation to the Exchequer-funded 
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 CSPV, vol. vi (1555-8), n. 171, p. 1672. 
65
 Edwards, Horse and Man, pp. 74-5. 
66
 PWDRO, W89, Plymouth Market Toll Book. 
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post-stage network, Brayshay, Harrison and Chalkley have persuasively argued 
that a post-boy also functioned as ‘an important purveyor of news and gossip, 
passed by word of mouth in the post-rooms from one rider to the next’. The 
riders who carried mail between Devon’s intra-county post-stages and parishes 
would also undoubtedly have circulated oral information off the main highway 
and throughout the surrounding hinterland thereby providing Devon’s ordinary 
folk with ‘an appreciation of a wider geography and a larger community’ as well 
as ‘a spatial context’ within which they could sense their own particular place.67  
Thus, an ordinary inhabitant of late-Elizabethan Devon was not as cut-off or 
distant from regional, national and international affairs as previously thought. On 
the contrary, they were intrinsically linked to events that were unfolding well 
beyond the horizon of their home parish. 
 
Letter production: the role of a secretary  
 
Having provided a comprehensive overview of the informal and formal modes of 
letter delivery available to late-Elizabethan Devon’s political elite for sending 
and receiving official government mail on an inter-regional and intra-county 
basis this chapter will now shift focus to examine the production of letters. The 
aim of this section is to outline the role of a secretary in the collaborative letter-
writing process and to assess the extent to which the secretaries of Devon’s 
Lord and Deputy Lieutenants were embedded into the county’s post and 
communication network. Thus, as well as functioning as a scribe, this section 
will examine the supplementary responsibilities of a secretary. These included 
being their master’s confidant, chief advisor, point of contact and representative, 
                                               
67
 Brayshay et al., ‘Speed of the Royal Post’, p. 284. See also Fox, Oral and Literate Culture. 
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as well as acting as a trusted messenger and de facto post-master. To achieve 
these objectives the section will focus primarily on the activities of Thomas 
Hinson of Fordenham, Cambridgeshire (d. 1614), and Roger Papworth of 
Hoxton, Middlesex (d. c.1620), who jointly performed the role of personal 
secretary to the Earl of Bath during the late-Elizabethan period. Most notably 
this will involve conducting a palaeographical analysis of the Earl of Bath’s 
extant letters to Edward Seymour in order to gauge the level of involvement that 
both men had in the production of the Earl’s official correspondence and the 
level of access that they had to his public and private affairs. Christopher 
Burlinson and Andrew Zurcher have undertaken similar research on the scribal 
duties of Edmund Spenser who served as Arthur, Lord Grey of Burlington’s 
chief secretary during the latter’s two-year tenure as lord deputy of Ireland 
(1580-2). In doing so they have convincingly argued that the relationship 
between Spenser and Grey was ‘that of a servant, and not ... an intimate’ and in 
some ways have challenged the prevailing understanding of secretaries in the 
context of Irish politics.68 The extent to which Hinson and Papworth were 
intimates as well as servants of the Earl of Bath is therefore a key concern of 
this section. It is also worth noting that the focus on Bath’s secretaries has been 
dictated by the available primary material. Thus, whereas there is extensive 
documentary evidence surviving for Hinson and Papworth in the Seymour 
Manuscripts, State Papers, borough records and various other collections, there 
is unfortunately no known primary evidence exposing the identity and activities 
of the individuals who were undoubtedly employed by each of Devon’s Deputy 
Lieutenants to serve them in a similar capacity. Nevertheless, a central 
argument of this section is that each of Bath’s deputies probably had at least 
                                               
68
 Christopher Burlinson and Andrew Zurcher, ‘‘Secretary to the Lord Grey Lord Deputie here’: 
Edmund Spenser’s Irish Papers’, The Library, Seventh Series, 6:1 (2005), 30-75 (pp. 49 and 
68); id., eds., Edmund Spenser: Selected Letters and Other Papers (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
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one personal secretary who performed the same array of duties that Hinson and 
Papworth did for Bath. Therefore by examining the activities of Bath’s 
secretaries as a case study it is possible to intuitively infer what role the 
secretary had in the household of each of Devon’s Deputy Lieutenants. 
 Professor Daybell has described the process of letter production during 
the early modern period as an ‘often collaborative’ affair in which ‘various 
parties might be involved’ in addition to the person whose name was signed at 
the bottom of a missive.69 Consequently, in the words of Alan Stewart, ‘an 
examination of collaborative writing forces us to re-think our notion of 
authorship’ – in other words, scholars must now ‘accept that the author may not 
be the person who writes (either mentally composes or physically pens) a 
text.’70 In reality, early modern husbands and wives, children and parents, 
extended family and friends, neighbours and associates regularly pooled 
resources to pen a letter.71 Indeed, Alison Wiggins has recently identified no 
less than twenty-one different scribal hands among the seventy-six known 
letters sent from Elizabeth Talbot, Countess of Shrewsbury (‘Bess of 
Hardwick’), during her lifetime.72 Such informal activities were ordinarily 
performed free of charge or in return for a favour. However, if a family member 
or close associate was not at hand to offer their letter-writing assistance, an 
individual could employ a semi-professional letter-writer or scrivener.73 
Scriveners’ costs were ‘roughly a penny or two a page’ which meant that for 
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 Daybell, The Material Letter, p. 74. 
70
 Alan Stewart, ‘The Making of Writing in Renaissance England: Re-Thinking Authorship 
Through Collaboration’, in Renaissance Transformations: The Making of English Writing, 1500-
1650, ed. by M. Healy and T. Healy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), pp. 81-96 (p. 82). See 
also James Daybell, ‘Women’s Letters and Letter-Writing in England, 1540-1603: An 
Introduction to the Issues of Authorship and Construction’, Shakespeare Studies, 27 (1999), 
161-86. 
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 Daybell, Women Letter-Writers, ch. 3. 
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 Alison Wiggins, Bess of Hardwick’s Letters (Forthcoming, Aldershot: Ashgate). 
73
 A. E. B. Owen, ‘A Scrivener’s Notebook From Bury St. Edmunds’, Archives, 14:61 (1979), 16-
22 (p. 17).  
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those below the social and political elite their employment was ‘an occasional 
extraordinary’ expense.74 By contrast, there was a frequent commonplace need 
for early modern England’s civic elite to employ semi-professional penmen. This 
can clearly be seen in the receivers’ accounts of late-Elizabethan Devon’s town 
corporations. For example, between 1588 and 1602 Barnstaple’s receivers 
made the following disbursements: 8d. ‘for wretynge  the Indentures 
concernynge the burgeses of the parliament’; 10s. ‘to mr Iohn Dodderidge for his 
paynes taken in provsynge [providing] the Towne wretynge’; 2s. 6d. ‘to Iames 
Sparowe for wretynge of an obligacon [obligation] and dyuers lettres 
concernynge Captayne Grenes’; 12d. to James Sparowe ‘for wretynge diuers 
other lettres to my lord of Bath’;  12d. ‘for wretynge the book of the Subsedye’; 
12d. ‘for wretynge a paire of Indentures betwixt the Corperacon of this Towne 
and the Sheriff concernynge the Elecon of the Burgeses of parliament’; 3s. 2d. 
‘for the booke of the last Statutes made’; 11s. 8d. ‘to Iohn Combe for dyuers 
wretynges he made there this yere Concernynge the Townes busynes’; 12d. ‘for 
wretynge the Indentures of all the Burgeses names of this Towne the one parte 
whereof was sent to the vndershiriff’; 4s. ‘paid Harry Myller for the booke of 
Estatutes [statutes] made the last parliamente’; 17s. ‘for the Drawynge of a 
Supplicacon to the Iustices’; and 12d. ‘for wretynge the first Subsedy booke’.75 It 
is unclear whether all of these payments were made to scriveners employed on 
an ad hoc basis. More likely, some were made to clerks employed by 
Barnstaple Corporation – individuals who received piecemeal rates for 
occasional pieces of writing.   
However, while the ad hoc employment of semi-professional letter writers 
sufficed the needs of Devon’s town corporations, individuals from the ranks of 
                                               
74
 Peter Beal, In Praise of Scribes, pp. 69-72; Woudhuysen, Circulation of Manuscripts, p. 176; 
Daybell, The Material Letter, p. 75.  
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 NDRO, B1/3972, Barnstaple Receivers’ Accounts, ff. 130, 133, 141-2, 149, 158 and 162.  
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the county’s social and political elite would have customarily employed personal 
secretaries on a permanent basis to handle their public affairs. These 
individuals received a regular salary for their letter writing duties as well as 
being granted allowances for paper, ink and parchment, reimbursements for 
rewards to messengers and gratuities from suitors attempting to acquire their 
master’s patronage.76 In addition, they would have been frequently rewarded for 
their loyal service via non-monetary grants such as the allocation of important 
positions in local government. Thus, the Earl of Bath nominated Thomas Hinson 
as one of Barnstaple’s two MPs in 1586, 1589, 1597 and 1604, as well as 
securing a position for him on Devon’s commission of the peace.77 Similarly, 
Roger Papworth’s enduring trustworthiness towards Bath was no doubt the 
driving force behind his election as one of Dartmouth’s two MPs in 1589.78 Of 
course the employment of secretaries was by no means peculiar to Devon. On 
the contrary, secretaries supported the machinery of government throughout 
late-Elizabethan England: the monarch used them to draft formal 
correspondence; chief ministers outsourced specific responsibilities to them; 
and the nobility and upper echelons of the gentry relied on them to oversee 
matters pertaining to local government. Thus, William Cecil, Lord Burghley, 
employed no less than three secretaries concurrently between 1580 and 1598 
while his son, Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, retained as many as eight 
secretaries concurrently between 1594 and 1612.79 However, whereas the 
demands on Elizabeth’s chief ministers necessitated the establishment of a 
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 Paul E. J. Hammer, ‘The Earl of Essex, Fulke Greville and the Employment of Scholars’, 
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multi-member secretariat, the comparably modest duties of the Earl of Bath 
required the employment of just two secretaries. 
 Thomas Hinson’s position as one of Bath’s secretaries is confirmed by a 
document located amongst the Seymour Manuscripts entitled: ‘An aunswere 
vnto the severall articles presented vnto the most honorable my lordes of the 
Counsell by the Earle of Bathe our lord leutenaunte with some of the Deputies for 
the Countie of Devon againste Richard Champernown.’80 The document 
presents Richard Champernowne’s answers to a series of accusations levelled 
at him by Bath and some of his deputies in relation to Champernowne’s dispute 
with Edward Seymour over the command of certain sections of south Devon’s 
militia (see chapter three). Crucially, it is Champernowne’s answer to article 
eight that confirms Hinson as one of Bath’s secretaries: ‘Some differences 
heerevppon growinge betwixt Mr Seymor, Mr Cary and myself ... were referred 
to my Lord: Leiutenante, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, and Hynson my Lord: of 
Bathes Secretary.’ Although undated this document must have been written 
during the Seymour-Champernowne dispute which lasted from autumn 1596 to 
summer 1599. However, the evidence presented below indicates that Hinson 
was the Earl of Bath’s personal secretary from at least 1578. As for Roger 
Papworth, his employment as Bath’s other secretary is confirmed by an entry 
made by Phillipp Yearde in Exeter’s receivers’ accounts during his tenure as the 
city’s receiver in 1588/9: 40s. ‘for Mr Pappworthe my lorde of bathes secretarye 
some Concideracon’.81 The increased workload that followed Bath’s 
appointment as lord lieutenant of Devon in 1586 must surely have been the 
primary reason for Papworth’s employment in addition to Hinson. Thus, 
throughout the late-Elizabethan period the Earl of Bath utilised two secretaries 
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to manage his public affairs, with Thomas Hinson seemingly the senior 
secretary and Roger Papworth working subordinate to him as the Earl’s junior 
secretary.  
 Bath and Hinson’s close personal relationship was cemented during the 
1570s at Cambridge University where Hinson served as the young Earl’s 
personal tutor.82 He then accompanied Bath to north Devon following the latter’s 
relocation to Tawstock Court in 1578 and from then until his death in 1614 
served as the figurehead of the Earl’s household staff.83 Bath and Hinson were 
also related to each other as a result of Hinson’s marriage to one of Bath’s first 
cousins, Anne Spring.84 Indeed, the intimate connection that the Bourchiers and 
the Hinsons enjoyed is made plain in the will of Bath’s mother Francis, Lady 
Fitzwarren:  
Item I giue and bequeathe to Thomas Hinson of Towstock gent And 
to my neece Anne his wiffe all my howsehold stuff and stock of cattell 
remayning at Coveney in the Isle of Elye most hartely praying my 
sonne to be gard vnto them, for that next vnto my selfe they haue 
bene his most faithfull and best frendes.85         
 
In addition, Lady Fitzwarren made the following bequests to Hinson’s children: 
‘vnto Margaret Hinson one hundreth poundes’; ‘vnto every other of the children 
... twenty poundes a peece’; and to all of them ‘the rest of my goodes and 
chattels vnbequeathed that shall remaine after my debtes legacies and 
Funeralles Discharged’. Unfortunately, the relationship between Bath and Roger 
Papworth is much harder to gauge. Nevertheless, because Papworth was a 
native of Hoxton, Middlesex, it seems likely that the pair forged a strong 
friendship during the Earl’s early life in south-east England. 
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 The close personal relationship that Bath enjoyed with both Hinson and 
Papworth was crucial when one considers the role of an early modern 
secretary. Manuals written during the late-Elizabethan period clearly set out the 
prerequisites of the office. In the second edition of Angel Day’s English 
Secretorie (1595), for example, Day summarises ‘the partes, place and Office’ 
of a secretary’.86 Chief among a secretary’s duties according to Day was: ‘the 
vse and exercise of the Pen, the Wit and Inuention’; the relinquishment of ‘any 
affectation to his own doings, or leaning herein to any priuat iudgment or 
fantasie’; and the acceptance that his pen ‘is not his owne, but anothers, and for 
this cause the matters to him committed, are to depend vpon the humor of his 
commanded, and vpon none others’. In the words of Sir Francis Walsingham’s 
private secretary, Nicholas Faunt, a secretary was to be his employer’s ‘owne 
penne, his mouth, his eye, his eare, and keeper of his most secrett cabinett.’87 
Consequently, Alan Stewart has persuasively argued that the early modern 
closet (or study) was ‘not designed to function as a place of individual 
withdrawal, but as a secret nonpublic transactive space between two men 
[master and secretary] behind a locked door.’88 It is therefore unsurprising that 
the intimacy, influence and access that Hinson and Papworth enjoyed with the 
Earl of Bath attracted resentment from some individuals who believed both men 
abused their privileged status. Most notably, in November 1591 Hugh Fortescue 
and Robert Dyllon described Hinson to Lord Burghley as a ‘basse’ man who 
pretended ‘to rewle a great parte’ of Devon through the Earl of Bath and 
believed Papworth to be ‘a man yt dareth doe nothinge withoute Hinson’, while 
George Cary similarly suggested ‘that mr Hinson is one that my Lord of Bathe is 
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cheefely & princepally directed by’.89 In early-1593 criticisms of this nature seem 
to have been at least partly responsible for Hinson being temporarily 
incarcerated and interrogated by the Privy Council, thereby demonstrating the 
common concern among the Elizabethan political elite that the office of 
secretary was open to abuse.90 Indeed, it is important to note that secretaries 
(and this level of servant in general) were by no means menials, but often highly 
educated, well-connected and ambitious individuals. The position of secretary 
was therefore sought after because it allowed individuals to rise. Thus, Henry 
Percy, ninth Earl of Northumberland, took the precaution of warning his son that 
men who sought employment as a secretary were: ‘very witty ... want noe 
ambition ... [and] by yow they may clime.’91 Nevertheless, by maintaining 
Hinson and Papworth as his secretaries throughout the late-Elizabethan period, 
Bath clearly trusted both men implicitly, was content with their performance and 
utilised their proficiency with the pen to produce much of his official 
correspondence – a fact which is confirmed by a palaeographical analysis of the 
thirty-one original letters and seven copied letters written from Bath to Edward 
Seymour between 1593 and 1601 which survive among the Seymour 
Manuscripts.92  
 Out of the thirty-eight letters examined, Thomas Hinson appears to have 
written twenty-one (55%), Roger Papworth nine (24%) and a third individual, 
                                               
89
 BL, Lansdowne MS., 68 f. 226.     
90
 BL, Harley MS., 6995 ff. 171-2.  
91
 James Heywood Markland, ed., ‘Instructions by Henry Percy, ninth Earl of Northumberland, to 
his son Algernon Percy, touching the management of his Estate, Officers, &c. written during his 
confinement in the Tower’, Archaeologia, 27 (1838), 306-58 (p. 348). 
92
 A palaeographical analysis is possible because two letters exist among the Seymour 
Manuscripts which were personally written to Edward Seymour in secretary hand (a pro-forma 
handwriting used throughout the sixteenth-century in official government correspondence) and 
signed by Thomas Hinson and Roger Papworth (DRO, 3799M-3/O/9/1/11 and 12). Thus, by 
comparing the distinct nuances of their secretary handwriting with each of the original letters 
written to Seymour in Bath’s name it has been possible to identify Hinson and Papworth as 
producers of a certain number of Bath’s letters with a reasonable degree of confidence.      
232 
 
who was most likely the Earl of Bath himself, eight (21%).93 These figures 
support the notion that Hinson was Bath’s senior secretary while Papworth was 
his junior secretary. Moreover, the fact that Hinson wrote all seven of the copied 
letters written to Bath from the Queen (one letter) and Privy Council (six letters) 
indicates that his senior position granted him access to more sensitive 
information than his junior associate.94 As for the twenty-two original letters 
written to Edward Seymour in Bath’s name by Hinson (thirteen letters) and 
Papworth (nine letters) both secretaries appear to have been privy to a similar 
variety of matters pertaining to the office of lord lieutenant including trained 
bands apportionment, the Seymour-Champernowne dispute, mustering and 
training Devon’s militia, levying and conducting troops to Barnstaple for service 
in Ireland, the garrison at Plymouth Fort, the supposed death of Sir Walter 
Ralegh, the commission of lieutenancy, news and intelligence gathering, intra-
county troop deployment and the engagement of Devon’s intra-county post-
stage network. However, despite his employment of Hinson and Papworth, Bath 
retained a high level of control over the production and dissemination of his 
letters, a fact which is confirmed by his personally written post scripts, marginal 
notes and closing modes of address on a certain number of the letters written 
by his secretaries on his behalf.95  Moreover, as noted above, the eight letters 
written in Bath’s name to Seymour by a third individual were most probably 
penned by the Earl himself. Certainly the sensitive nature of these 
communiqués supports this notion. For example, one letter which relates to the 
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Seymour-Champernowne dispute contains the line: ‘I praye you to assure your 
selues that myne honor is so farre engaged to maineteyne our informacons 
against them to be true’.96 This implies that Bath, Seymour and their supporters 
were manipulating the truth in order to further their cause against 
Champernowne. Thus, if one accepts the logic that Bath wrote this letter himself 
it is likely that he did so in order to prevent Hinson and Papworth from becoming 
aware of such deceit. Indeed, the nature of the other seven letters that were 
apparently personally written by Bath indicates that he believed there were 
certain matters either too sensitive or too important for anyone but himself to 
write about. Namely, news and intelligence during the 1599 Spanish invasion 
scare (DRO, 1392M/L1599/2, 8 and 11), levying thirty-four men for service in 
Ireland in February 1600 (DRO, 1392M/L1600/1), mustering the militia in order 
to assess weaponry losses in May 1600 (DRO, 3799M-3/O/1/22), desertion of 
troops levied for service in Ireland in June 1601 (DRO, 3799M-3/O/1/25) and 
support for Sir Thomas Denys’ cause against Humphry Walronde in October 
1601 (DRO, 1392M/L1601/13). Collectively these eight letters therefore suggest 
that even Thomas Hinson was not privy to all of the Earl’s public dealings in 
spite of being his senior secretary, married to his cousin and enjoying a close 
personal relationship.   
As well as their scribal duties, Thomas Hinson and Roger Papworth 
undoubtedly performed an array of subsidiary functions. As Bath’s senior 
secretary Hinson would have been regarded as the administrative linchpin at 
Tawstock Court advising his master when required, providing a confidential ear 
if necessary and undertaking managerial duties when needed. Moreover, he 
was probably Tawstock’s initial point of contact for visiting letter-bearers and 
                                               
96
 DRO, 3799M-3/O/9/1/20. 
234 
 
messengers, would have possibly been required to record the receipt of mail in 
a memorial book and, depending on the nature of a dispatch, open, peruse and 
advise the Earl of Bath on its content.97 The majority of outgoing mail, too, may 
well have passed through Hinson’s hands, been recorded in a memorial book 
prior to its dispatch and assigned to a trusted subordinate for delivery. Indeed, 
one could speculate that Hinson oversaw the arrival and departure of letter-
bearers carrying mail via horse and foot on an intra-county and inter-regional 
basis in much the same manner as a royal post-master. Thus, the 
contemporary view noted above that Hinson exerted undue influence on the 
Earl of Bath may simply have been caused by Hinson’s critics misconstruing the 
extent to which Bath entrusted him with his public affairs. This certainly seems 
to have been Bath’s view in July 1602 when he described the Barnstaple 
merchant, John Delbridge’s accusation that Hinson was his enemy as a 
‘causeless fear’.98 As for Roger Papworth, his seemingly lesser scribal duties as 
Bath’s junior secretary enabled him to undertake errands for his master distant 
from Tawstock. This included collecting £9 4s. on the Earl’s behalf from 
Barnstaple’s chief inhabitants ‘for the charge of the soldiers impressed ... for 
Ireland’ in 1586/7 and receiving 10s. from them ‘for his favorable Allowance’ in 
viewing the town’s store of gunpowder in 1588/9.99 Papworth’s business trips to 
Exeter were similarly fruitful. For example, Exeter’s receivers rewarded him with 
20s. ‘for a deputacon of the Letennasye’ in 1588/9, 20s. ‘about the Comysion of 
muster’ in 1595/6 and £3 for an unspecified service in 1598/9.100 Clearly then, 
the subsidiary functions that Papworth performed for Bath as a ‘go for’, letter-
bearer and spokesperson constituted a significant supplementary revenue 
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stream over and above the salary he received from the Earl for his secretarial 
work. 
To summarise, one should not view early modern letter-writing as a 
solitary affair. On the contrary, it was a frequently collaborative process with 
many individuals in elite social and political circles outsourcing a significant 
amount of their scribal activities to a third party. Friends, family and associates 
wrote letters as a favour, scriveners and semi-professional scribes charged a 
fee per page for their penmanship and secretaries were frequently employed by 
members of the nobility and gentry permanently to be on hand should the need 
arise for a letter to be written. On securing his appointment as lord lieutenant of 
Devon in 1586 the Earl of Bath deemed it necessary to employ two secretaries, 
Thomas Hinson and Roger Papworth, to assist with his increased administrative 
responsibilities. The pivotal role that both men played in the functioning of late-
Elizabethan Devon’s intra-county postal networks makes it inconceivable to 
imagine that some, if not all, of the county’s Deputy Lieutenants had at least 
one personal secretary performing similar duties on their behalf. Thus, when Sir 
Thomas Denys bequeathed one hundred marks to his ‘trustie and faithfull 
servaunt Charles Hoppinge’ for his ‘long and honest service’ in the belief that no 
man ‘had a more honest Carefull servant’ it is plausible to suppose that he did 
so as reward for Hoppinge’s career-long service as his personal secretary.101   
 
Circular letters and parish publication  
 
A central aim of the previous section was to articulate the pivotal role that 
personal secretaries had in the production of early modern letters. In doing so 
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the section focused primarily on the original letters penned by the Earl of Bath 
and his secretaries to Edward Seymour between 1593 and 1601. However, the 
section did identify seven letters that were not originals. Rather they were fair 
copies of letters sent to Bath by the Queen and Privy Council which were 
enclosed within original letters sent from Bath to Seymour in order to provide 
the deputy lieutenant with a verbatim transcript of central government’s 
instructions on certain matters relating to national defence and security. Bath 
also authorised his deputies to copy and circulate some of his own letters. Thus, 
there exist certain original and copied letters among the Seymour Manuscripts 
written in the Earl of Bath’s name to his deputies as a group. Each letter 
contains a postscript instructing the first receiver of the original letter to make a 
copy of it, retain either the original or copy for future reference and forward the 
other to one of the remaining addressees. The process was then repeated until 
all the specified addressees had received either a copy or the original letter 
from Bath. Similarly, precepts written by Bath’s deputies and directed to the 
constables of the hundreds were reproduced in multiple-copied form and 
circulated to the petty-constables of the parishes to be read aloud by them 
during church services. The present section will analyse this chain copying 
culture in order to explain how this form of ‘scribal publication’ facilitated a 
heightened degree of connectivity among all tiers of late-Elizabethan Devon’s 
government. Moreover, it will help confirm precisely how policies and orders 
devised at Whitehall filtered down to the ‘ground floor’ of government 
whereupon they were digested and debated by the ordinary men, women and 
children of Elizabethan England. 
 By scrutinising the selection of circular letters extant among the Seymour 
Manuscripts it becomes apparent that the Earl of Bath chose to correspond with 
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his subordinates in this manner primarily to speed up the time lag between the 
formation and implementation of certain central government initiatives. Most 
notably this included the levying of troops for service in Ireland. Thus, when 
Bath received letters by royal messenger from the Queen and Privy Council 
ordering him to levy forty militiamen on 6 May 1601 he chose to notify the 
deputy lieutenants and justices of the South Division as a group in order to 
achieve the ‘good and speedy performaunce of these affaires’.102 Consequently, 
on 8 May 1601 the Earl instructed Roger Papworth to pen him a letter outlining 
the protocol for levying the forty men and addressed it:  
To my verie lovinge Cosens & Freindes Sir William Strode Sir Richard 
Champernowne Knightes and Edwarde Seymour Esquire: And also 
vnto my lovinge Freindes Mr Amyas Bampfield Mr Thomas Reynell 
Esquires & other the Iustices of Peace in the Southe Devision of 
Devon to whome it maie apperteyne.   
 
In addition, Bath instructed his junior secretary to write the following postscript: 
‘I praye and require you to whome these my lettres shalbe first deliuered to 
sende the same or the true Copie thereof vnto the rest of the Gentlemen to 
whom yt doth apperteine withall possible expedition.’ Similar circular letters were 
dispatched on 14 October 1601 and 2 August 1602 instructing Bath’s 
subordinates in Devon’s South Division speedily to levy additional troops for 
service in Ireland.103 Indeed, as well as speeding up the dissemination and 
implementation of councillor orders, circular missives seem also to have been 
produced by Bath and his deputies rapidly to convey news and intelligence of 
the Spanish fleet as well as place the county’s militia on a war footing. Thus, 
when Bath received intelligence in March 1602 from the Mayor of Plymouth that 
‘a great fleete of Shippes’ was being prepared by the Spanish to carry an 
invasion force of 30,000 soldiers he chose to write a circular letter to Sir John 
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Gilbert II, Sir William Strode, Sir Richard Champernowne, Edward Seymour and 
Hugh Pollard advertising them of this threat as well as instructing them to make 
ready their trained bands of militiamen, ensure the manning of the beacons and 
check the stores of powder, match and bullets in their local vicinity.104 
 To action directives of this nature Bath’s deputies distributed precepts 
amongst the constables of the hundreds informing them specifically what was 
required of them. Thus, when Edward Seymour received the Earl of Bath’s 
circular letter dated 8 May 1601 informing him that the Queen and her Privy 
Council required forty men from Devon to be levied for service in Ireland he 
directed precepts dated 10 May to the constables of the hundreds ordering 
them to ‘bringe or cause to be brought before me at Tottnes on Fridaye next 
beinge the xv[15]th daie of this instant Maye by eight of the Clocke in the 
morninge fower good & seruiceable men within your hundred’.105 Likewise, 
Bath’s circular letter dated 2 August 1602 prompted Seymour on 4 August to 
instruct the constables of the hundreds to ‘bring or cause to be brought before 
me at Totnes on Monday next being the nynthe daye of this instant August by 
vij[7] of the Clocke in the morning nyne very sufficient & seruiceable men’.106 
Both precepts were therefore issued by Seymour within two days of Bath writing 
his circular letters. Moreover, the strict deadline given to the constables for their 
proportion of the levy to be at Totnes was on both occasions just five days after 
Seymour had issued his precepts. Indeed, similarly strict deadlines were 
imposed on the constables of the hundreds and petty-constables of the 
parishes for implementing a whole range of military initiatives. For instance, on 
4 September 1595 precepts were issued to the constables of the South Division 
instructing them to  
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geve warning to all pettie Counstables within your Devisions that they 
and you bring before vs at Tottnes on Frydaie being the xij[12]th of 
this moneth by eight of the Clocke in the morning all the trayned and 
vntrayned souldiers.107  
 
Similarly, on 24 August 1599, in anticipation of a supposedly imminent Spanish 
attack, Seymour distributed precepts to the constables ordering them ‘ymediatly 
after receipte herof to giue notyce vnto all the trayned souldiers within your 
hundred that they vppon pain of death make their repaire to Dartmouth withall 
possible speede’.108  
It was therefore imperative that the constables of the hundreds were 
readily connected to their petty-constables so that military initiatives such as 
these could be articulated to the ordinary inhabitants of the parishes and 
implemented within their strict designated time frames. Clearly, the parish-to-
parish postal network outlined in section three of this chapter facilitated this 
necessity. However, chain copying also played a critical part – a fact confirmed 
by a draft precept from among the Seymour Manuscripts dated 20 February 
1598 wherein the constables of the hundreds were instructed  
withall possible expedicion after the receipt therof to cause Copies of 
the same to be dispersed into the seuerall parishes of your hundred 
& ther to be openlie & publiquelie read in the Churches & all the 
inhabitauntes of what Condicion or Degree soeuer menctioned in the 
said orders to be Comaunded in Her Majesties name to accomplish 
their partyculer duties therin vppon paine of their alleageance.109 
   
Thus, the scribal culture of chain copying was not only used by the Earl of Bath 
as a mechanism for rapidly disseminating Privy Council orders amongst his 
deputies at the apex of Devon’s government, it was also utilised by the 
constables of the hundreds to communicate speedily with each and every 
parish constable. Moreover, the fact that these copied precepts were read 
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‘openlie & publiquelie’ to the ordinary men, women and children who 
congregated in each of Devon’s parish churches explains precisely how the 
population of Devon (in its widest sense) was co-opted into furthering the 
Crown’s interests at home and abroad and helps elucidate more broadly how, in 
Eamon Duffy’s words, ‘the Tudor state increasingly harnessed the parish to its 
own purposes’.110 That said it is not difficult to imagine the parish churches of 
Elizabethan England quickly turning into arenas of hot political debate as soon 
as a contentious precept was read out: being levied for service in Ireland would 
have been regarded by many as tantamount to a death sentence; orders 
initiating the mobilisation of the militia during the harvest would have been 
viewed as economically disastrous; and even commands to watch the beacons 
day and night would have been shunned for fear of boredom. Thus, while Steve 
Hindle is right in saying that ‘the most distinctive cultural characteristic of the 
English polity was arguably the extent to which the interests of such ruling 
groups intersected with the centralized policies of church and state’ it did not 
necessarily follow that individuals outside the government always shared the 
same interests – a fact that was demonstrated throughout chapter three.111  
 
 
 
To conclude, the postal delivery services available to Devon’s political elite 
during the late-Elizabethan era for sending and receiving official government 
mail and messages on an intra-county and inter-regional basis were wide 
ranging. During periods when an Exchequer-funded post-stage service was 
engaged between London and the south-west, royal mail was forwarded to and 
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from the post-masters at Honiton, Exeter, Ashburton and Plymouth via a 
combination of foot-posts, horsemen and shipmasters thereby dramatically 
extending the reach of the Crown’s national postal system off the main highway 
and into the surrounding hinterland. Alternatively, for non-royal business or 
when an Exchequer-funded service was not engaged, the county’s gentry and 
town corporations employed servants and personally known letter-bearers to 
carry official correspondence to London via foot or horse as and when the need 
arose. Indeed, this informal and ad hoc postal arrangement was also utilised by 
Devon’s political elite to carry government mail on an intra-county basis 
throughout the period. However, in response to the persistent threat posed by 
Spain and the outbreak of rebellion in Ireland more rapid, reliable and sustained 
connectivity between the Earl of Bath, his deputies and the civic authorities of 
the port towns thought most vulnerable to invasion became increasingly critical. 
Thus, by autumn 1596 an intra-county post-stage network similar in nature to 
the national Exchequer-funded service was established thereby enabling Bath 
to maintain daily contact with his subordinates in the south of the county from 
the confines of Tawstock Court. In addition, a parish-to-parish postal network 
seemingly operated throughout the late-Elizabethan period (not just in Devon 
but in other counties too) providing Bath’s subordinates with a means of 
maintaining daily contact with each other as well as providing them with a 
mechanism for speedily conveying orders and directives down the hierarchical 
chain of command. Horse ownership and/or access to horses were therefore 
crucial for both services to achieve optimum postal speeds and, from the 
available evidence, seems not to have been an issue. As well as an appropriate 
assortment of postal delivery methods, the smooth-running of late-Elizabethan 
Devon’s intra-county communication network depended a great deal on the 
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personal secretaries of the county’s political elite. One should therefore regard 
secretaries as pivotal to the success of early modern provincial post and 
communication networks not only in Devon but throughout the realm. Indeed, a 
secretary’s scribal duty was not limited solely to the composition of his master’s 
original letters but also involved making copies of circular missives received 
from other individuals and organisations. These circular letters constituted an 
important method for speeding the delay between policy formation and 
implementation. It is therefore unsurprising that the constables of Devon’s 
hundreds also customarily produced multiple copies of the precepts that they 
received from their superiors and distributed them to the petty-constables of the 
parishes. These precepts were then read aloud during church services and thus 
provided central government with a tangible connection to the ordinary men and 
women of Elizabethan England.                       
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6 
Intelligence from the Frontline: 
Local Government Newsletters and the Commodity of Information  
 
The previous two chapters have articulated in detail the various modes of letter 
delivery available to late-Elizabethan Devon’s political elite for communicating 
with each other, their superiors at Whitehall and their subordinates within the 
county. Consequently, such postal services were necessarily vital to the speedy 
dissemination of news and intelligence within and beyond the county. This 
chapter’s primary aim is to map and interpret the dissemination of the oral and 
manuscript exchange of news and intelligence that flowed into the ports of late-
Elizabethan Devon. In doing so it broadens the current London-centric model of 
early modern news, which has tended to focus predominantly on the 
transmission of information from the centre to the provinces. This is achieved by 
recognising the important role played by local government officials in servicing 
the localities, as well as the centre, with intelligence. Existing research on early 
modern news has outlined a network prominently focused on the single ‘hub’ of 
London. As a result, little attention has been paid to the more complex sets of 
news networks that operated in the first instance at a local level, but which also 
had connections with the centre. In particular, while the regional ports of early 
modern England have been acknowledged as vital hubs for receiving 
continental news and intelligence in their own right, detailed elaboration on this 
matter has not been forthcoming. This chapter engages directly with this 
proposition, providing a detailed examination of how the ports of south Devon 
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operated as important provincial news centres during the Elizabethan war with 
Spain.  
The chapter therefore supports the notion that Devon was a strategically 
crucial county during England’s war with Spain. Throughout this study it has 
been demonstrated that the county’s governors, and the postal links between 
them, and with the Privy Council, were particularly active during the acute 
political uncertainty and sustained foreign threat that marked the 1590s. 
Devon’s geographical vulnerability coupled with the daily advertisements that 
arrived in the county’s ports aboard merchant shipping concerning the 
whereabouts and intention of the Spanish fleet served as the underlying reason 
for this. It therefore must be reiterated that Elizabethan Devon between 1588 
and 1603 provides an ideal case study for excavating the richness and 
complexity of provincial networks – in this case, provincial news and intelligence 
networks.  
 
‘What news at London?’ 
 
Existing historical and literary research on early modern news has outlined a 
network prominently focused on the single ‘hub’ of London. Richard Cust has 
stressed that the sheer volume of visitors flowing in and out of the capital turned 
London into ‘a melting-pot for information’; Adam Fox has described London ‘as 
a magnet, drawing in visitors and their news stories from around the country 
and then radiating them out once again’; while Harold Love has labelled St 
Paul’s Cathedral as a news ‘emporium’ in which visitors to London could learn 
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the latest parliamentary proceedings.1 Indeed, the importance of St Paul’s as an 
entrepôt of news was no less well documented by contemporaries of the period. 
For instance, the seventeenth-century writer Francis Osborne described the 
cathedral in the following manner:     
It was the fashion of those times, and did so continue till these ... for 
the principal Gentry, Lords, Courtiers, and men of all Professions ... 
to meet in St. Pauls Church by eleven, and walk in the middle Isle till 
twelve; and after dinner, from three to six; during which time some 
discoursed of Business, others of News.2 
 
The Royal Exchange operated in a similar fashion for those wishing to learn the 
latest foreign news from the mercantile community; while the inns and taverns 
that lined Fleet Street, the Strand and Westminster hummed with the latest 
affairs of state and court gossip.3 Consequently, ‘what news at London?’ 
became the customary greeting to those that travelled home from the capital 
along England’s roads. The country’s thoroughfares thus acted as the arteries 
through which London news was pumped into the country’s provincial towns of 
trade and commerce. Once there the oral exchange of information continued. In 
particular, on market days these provincial centres attracted an influx of traders 
from smaller towns, villages and outlying areas who – as well as selling their 
wares and purchasing sought after items – were able to learn the latest London 
news should they venture into any tavern or alehouse. Having conducted their 
business these traders then returned to their town or village where they retold 
the information that they had heard amongst their friends and families. As a 
result, ‘the towns and villages of England were’, as Adam Fox has argued, 
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 Richard Cust, 'News and Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England', P&P, 112 (1986), 60-
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246 
 
‘linked with London, and to some extent with each other, through a verbal web 
woven by travellers.’4    
As well as the oral exchange of London news, scholars have also shown 
that from the 1590s onwards it became increasingly common for newsletter 
writers to collate and transcribe the information that circulated in the capital.5 
Originally these newsletters had been informal, that is to say, writers were 
amateurs who inserted news amongst the personal correspondence that they 
wrote to their absent friends or relations. Both men and women participated in 
this process, a fact that has been illuminated by James Daybell in his detailed 
investigation of the news and intelligence network of Elizabeth Talbot, Countess 
of Shrewsbury.6 However, as the demand for information concerning the war 
with Spain grew ever more insatiable during the last years of the Elizabethan 
era there developed a second type of newsletter: the ‘pure’ newsletter. Cust 
defines the ‘pure’ newsletter as being ‘given over wholly to news, both domestic 
and foreign’ and describes them as ‘the forerunners of the internal news-sheets 
of the 1640s’. Indeed, whilst the informal newsletter constituted an intimate 
exchange of information between friends and family, the proliferation of the 
‘pure’ newsletter represented the emergence of semi-professional journalism.7 
‘Pure’ newsletter writers such as John Chamberlain, Rowland Whyte, John Pory 
and Edmund Rossingham gleaned juicy tit-bits of information at St Paul’s, the 
Royal Exchange and Westminster; information that was sifted through and 
summarised in the weekly manuscript bulletins that they dispatched to their 
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discerning subscribers throughout the provinces, as well as overseas.8 This 
provided the county and expatriate aristocracy with a vital ‘lifeline to the wider 
world’ and as a result writers were able to charge yearly subscription fees in the 
region of £20.9  Manuscript newsletters (informal and ‘pure’) thus played a vital 
role in the dissemination of political ideas and information from London to the 
provinces – a phenomena that has been explored in detail by both Cust and 
Fritz Levy in their quest to appreciate the development of political attitudes in 
the run up to the English Civil War.10  
The political attitudes of early-seventeenth-century English society also 
developed as a result of the burgeoning printed periodical news market. This 
has been identified as beginning in 1620 when the first coranto (a single printed 
sheet containing various foreign news items) was published in English by the 
Dutch printer, Pieter van den Keere, and exported to England to be sold on the 
streets of London. Throughout the remainder of the decade London-based 
printers began to produce their own corantos and an English foreign news 
market, stimulated largely by the onset of the Thirty Years War (1618-48), 
steadily grew.11 However, as the political situation within England deteriorated 
into civil war during the 1640s the desire for foreign news ebbed and the 
demand for domestic news intensified to such an extent that both 
parliamentarian and royalist printers (who saw an opportunity to make a 
monetary and political profit) began to produce the first English newsbooks. 
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These newsbooks took the form of multi-paged weekly diurnals and kept the 
nation up to date with the latest domestic developments in a particularly 
partisan manner.12 With regards to the production and dissemination of English 
newsbooks, London once again served as the preeminent hub. Indeed, as Levy 
puts it, ‘printing was concentrated in London, so that England in the period we 
are considering had no provincial presses except those at the two 
universities.’13 Once printed, editors organised the initial distribution of their 
newsbooks by employing street vendors – known to contemporaries as hawkers 
and mercuries – to sell their relatively cheap publications throughout the capital 
to a broad spectrum of society.14 This exchange constituted the initial 
distribution; however, it was customary for a secondary distribution to take place 
whereby individuals purchased one or more newsbook in order to enclose them 
within their letters of correspondence to friends and relatives living throughout 
the realm. Furthermore, Joad Raymond has explained that colonists also 
received English newsbooks, albeit weeks and months after publication. He 
describes this ‘network of information stretching from northern Massachusetts to 
the western frontier, and from Plymouth Colony to southern Connecticut, with 
outliers in Newfoundland, Virginia, Bermuda and the Caribbean.’15  
Existing scholarly research on early modern news has thus adopted a 
predominantly London-centric focus. Consequently, little attention has been 
paid to the existence of more complex sets of news networks that operated in 
the first instance at a local level, but which also had connections with London. In 
                                               
12
 For a detailed account of the history of the English newsbook see Joad Raymond, The 
Invention of the Newspaper: English Newsbooks, 1641-1649 (Oxford: OUP, 1996). For an 
analysis of how newsbooks were used as a propaganda tool during the Interregnum and how 
Oliver Cromwell sought to censor the newsbook market for his own ends in 1655 see Ian 
Cooper, ‘Propaganda and Censorship: English Newsbooks and Foreign Affairs During 1655’ 
(unpublished master’s thesis, Plymouth University, 2008). 
13
 Levy, ‘How Information Spread’, p. 13. 
14
 Cyprian Blagden, ‘The Stationers’ Company in the Civil War Period’, Library, 13 (1958), 1-17 
(p. 16).  
15
 Raymond, The Invention of the Newspaper, p. 252. 
249 
 
particular, whilst the regional ports of early modern England have been 
acknowledged as important centres for receiving news and intelligence 
(especially those involved in continental trade) forensic scrutiny of this fact has 
not been forthcoming.16 This is not to say that the circulation of information 
throughout the provinces of early modern England has not been studied. 
However, the overriding tendency has been to map the dissemination of 
information that emanated outwards from the capital rather than vice versa.17 
Indeed, even recent research conducted in relation to Elizabethan intelligence 
and espionage – which, by its very nature, demands an analysis of the ways 
and means that information flowed into London – has predominantly bypassed 
provincial intelligence networks and the important role played by local 
government officials as gatherers and purveyors of vital information.18 Robert 
Hutchinson, for example, acknowledges that ‘international intelligence was ... 
flowing into London ... domestically from the Lord Lieutenants of the counties’ 
and that customs searchers at the major English ports were responsible for 
‘stopping and questioning travellers from abroad’.19 However, he does not 
elaborate any further, preferring instead to provide a detailed account of Sir 
Francis Walsingham’s role as the Queen’s London-based spymaster at the 
centre of an international web of professional intelligencers.  
The focus of the remainder of this chapter is thus to chart and 
understand the verbal and written exchange of news and intelligence that 
flowed into the ports of late-Elizabethan Devon with the primary aim being to 
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broaden contemporary understanding of provincial news networks and the 
crucial role played by local government officials in servicing the localities, as 
well as the centre, with information. Specifically, it will survey how news and 
intelligence of the Spanish fleet arrived in Devon, highlighting the important role 
played by merchants, prisoners and eye-witnesses as purveyors of noteworthy 
information. It will scrutinise how the county gentry diligently transcribed the 
extensive amount of oral information available to them in order for it to be 
circulated locally and nationally via the postal networks discussed in chapters 
four and five. It will examine the motivational factors which incentivised them to 
do this in order to appreciate how the county’s news and intelligence network 
was glued together and upheld. Finally, it will discuss the extent to which the 
county’s general population had access to this information as well as the tactics 
deployed by the Crown for limiting this.  
 
Devon’s continental trade links 
 
On 14 March 1602 Sir Francis Godolphin wrote an appraisal to the Privy 
Council of the importance of fortifying the Isles of Scilly, which ‘lieth xxx[30] 
miles from the lands end of Cornewall west, south, west’.20 Part of Godolphin’s 
assessment stressed the role that the islands played with regards to continental 
trade: ‘being the nicest part of her Maiesties Dominions towards Spaine, It is as 
an Inne, by which Ships trading westerly or Sutherly, are to passe and retorne, 
whearby it both succoreth and secureth oure trafiques’. The south Devon ports 
of Plymouth, Dartmouth, Totnes and Exeter were equally well placed 
geographically  to  provide  both  foreign and domestic merchant shipping with a  
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Figure 6.1: A selection of noteworthy western European ports of trade.   
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haven in which they could stop off to take on food and water, seek shelter 
during rough weather, or obtain refuge from Spanish privateers. In addition, as 
Crofts notes, ‘it was the regular custom for ships ... to touch at Plymouth in 
order to land supercargoes and agents, who thereupon posted up to London 
with their bills of lading and letters of advice’.21  
However, merchants did not only utilise the ports of south Devon as a 
halfway house en route to their final destinations; some chose to operate 
directly in and out of the county and, by the late-Elizabethan era, a thriving trade 
existed between the merchants of Devon and their counterparts situated 
elsewhere in England as well as on the continent. The merchants of 
Elizabethan Exeter, for example, not only traded with other domestic ports in 
the south-west, Wales and London; they also had trade links with all of the 
Norman-Breton ports (including the Channel Islands), the ‘salt ports’ of Western 
France, Portugal, as well as further afield in Newfoundland.22 In Plymouth, 
similarly, by the 1580s the port books indicate that on average one hundred 
merchant vessels utilised the haven each year for foreign trade and a further 
sixty-four did so for domestic ‘coasting’ trade.23 Late-Elizabethan Devon’s 
exports were restricted primarily to just two commodities: woollen cloth and tin. 
However, the fact that the county’s ports also ‘functioned both as feeders to and 
redistributors of England’s trade with her European neighbours’ meant that 
there was a much more varied import and re-export business.24 Consequently, 
there was a daily influx of merchants arriving in the ports of Devon from across 
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England and throughout Europe and, in addition to the dried fruit, fish, salt, 
sugar, tin, wine, woollen cloth and the various other goods that appeared on 
their bills of lading, all of them carried another valuable commodity: news.  
 
News of Spanish invasion threats after 1588 
 
Following the Armada crisis the one topic of news that was of particular 
importance to all spheres of Elizabethan society was the whereabouts and 
intention of the Spanish fleet. As a result of Devon’s geographical location and 
continental trade links, the county’s ports all served as vital hubs for receiving 
relevant news of this nature, ‘with diuers intelligences being dayly broughte ... 
from sundry ports’ throughout the last fifteen years of Elizabeth I’s reign.25 Thus, 
in October 1597, Martyn Orgarsabal, a mariner from the port of St Jean de Luz 
in south western France (see figure 6.1), arrived at Plymouth and reported that 
‘eleven dayes sence beinge in Bayonnde [Bayonne] in Galesey [Galicia] there 
came a spanish souldier from Farould [Ferrol], whose newes was, that their 
fleete consistinge of 120 sayle greate and smale, weare gon from thens to the 
Groyne [La Coruña]’.26 Devon merchants such as Nicholas Bugans of Totnes 
arrived home similarly bearing oral information that they had heard on their 
travels to the continent. For instance, on his return from southern Spain in June 
1599, Bugans was able to recall that ‘At St Lucas there were 50 shipps, at Cales 
[Cadiz] 40 shipps, and 50 Gallies out of the straightes then daylie expected, and 
6000 souldiers lyeing in St Lucas & at Cales [Cadiz], readye to be shipped’.27 
Reports of this nature (abundant in the State and Cecil Papers) convey clearly 
the message that Elizabethan merchants served as ‘key purveyors’ of news 
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which would be circulated both within the locality as well as being carried 
beyond.28 
However, merchants were not the only group of people who operated as 
purveyors of news and intelligence for the inhabitants of late-Elizabethan 
Devon. Men who had been held prisoner by the Spanish were also common 
suppliers of information on their arrival in the county. Having been captured by 
Spanish privateers at sea, many of these men were taken to Spanish-controlled 
ports where they were incarcerated. During their imprisonment they often saw 
the Spanish making military and naval preparations and were able to gain 
knowledge, even if only rumours, concerning the reasons for such preparations. 
Once they secured their release, these men often obtained passage back to 
England in merchant shipping destined for Devon and so arrived in the county 
with an account, fresh in their minds, of what they had seen and heard.29 One 
such occasion occurred in February 1597 when a man who had been held 
captive in Lisbon was able to declare on his arrival in Devon that ‘(as he 
hearde) there be at Lisbone the Groyne [La Coruña] Cales [Cadiz] and Farroll 
[Ferrol] 240 sayle preparinge for the sea and That they [the Spanish] had a 
purpose to send 10000 men into Irelande.’, while on 19 March 1602, John 
Lattlye, who had endured two years imprisonment in Spain, arrived in 
Dartmouth claiming that ‘there were at St Lucas ... twelue sayle of the kings 
shipps neere readye, and eighteene other shipps which came thither out of the 
Straites, all which were reported to be bound for Ireland’.30 Foreign mariners 
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captured by English privateers were also transported to Devon where they were 
pressed to divulge what they knew of the Spanish fleet. Most notably, during the 
initial skirmishes between the English and Spanish navies in summer 1588 a 
Spanish vessel called The Rosario was captured by the English and towed into 
Tor Bay by Captain Jacob Whiddon in The Roebuck. From Tor Bay The Rosario 
was taken to Dartmouth where her Spanish crew were interrogated and billeted 
under the directions of Sir John Gilbert I and George Cary.31 Less high profile 
instances were, however, much more common, such as when Pedro Tamayo of 
Palermo, Sicily, arrived in Plymouth in July 1599 as the prisoner of John Stone 
(a Devon shipmaster) claiming that ‘the Lantado: with his wyfe his children and 
13000 men were bounde for Lyshbone [Lisbon]’.32  
Yet the inhabitants of Devon were not always obliged to await the arrival 
of merchants or prisoners from Europe with news of the Spanish fleet, because 
enemy ships were often sighted from land. Famously, on 21 July 1588 the initial 
skirmishes between the English fleet and the Spanish Armada were in ‘playne 
viewe’ of those watching on Plymouth Hoe.33 John Gibbons and Henry Wood 
were also watching the approaching Armada from their vantage point at Rame 
Head, before returning to Plymouth to report what they had seen.34 Thereafter, 
whilst there was nothing comparable to 1588, there were numerous eye-witness 
sightings of opportunistic Spanish raids at vulnerable inlets and creeks along 
the Devon coastline. Notably, on 15 March 1596 one eye-witness saw a 
Spanish pinnace arrive in Cawsand Bay in Plymouth Sound, and there land 
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about twenty-five men, all of whom were carrying ‘muskettes vppon theire 
shoulders’. The Spanish then proceeded to place ‘five barrelles of powder and 
brimstone to the dores of five ... howses, and two others, to two ... boattes and 
sett it on fier.’35 Those that manned the county’s beacons also reported 
sightings and the ‘speedye aduertisementes of the fleete discouered by suche 
as watche at Bewestocke Beacon’ were gratefully noted by the Earl of Bath on 
26 July 1599.36 There were also regular instances of brazen piracy taking place 
in view of Devon’s ports which provoked an exasperated John Howell to 
complain in April 1600 that ‘the Spaniardes & Dunkurkers are such heavie 
oppressors of the merchantes inhabitinge in all the westerne Coastes That they 
are in A manner enforced to neglect theire trades ... beinge Chased att the 
verye entrances of our Portes’.37 
Overt acts of Spanish aggression were not the only way that the war with 
Spain was brought to Devon’s doorstep. The county also served as a military 
holding area in which the commanders of Elizabeth’s navy and army, along with 
the men under their command, converged periodically between 1588 and 1603. 
They did so because Plymouth was the ideal rendezvous point for the English 
fleet to await the Spanish Armada in 1588 and to launch a pre-emptive strike on 
Cadiz in 1596.38 In addition, between 1591 and 1594, various ports along 
England’s south coast were used to victual and deploy troops to help Sir John 
Norris eject the Spanish from Brittany, whilst, as chapter three has revealed, 
between 1594 and 1602 the north Devon port of Barnstaple was similarly 
engaged as a military staging post for the embarkation and transportation of 
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English forces into Ireland.39 During these periods of increased military activity 
those who commanded England’s forces urgently needed news of the Spanish 
fleet in order to formulate and modify their tactics. Therefore, Charles, Lord 
Admiral Howard, and Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, are known to 
have ordered that pinnaces and other nimble vessels be dispatched from the 
county ‘to lye on and off betwixte Englande and that coaste of Spain to watche 
the comminge of the Spanishe forces’.40 Cruising between the Bay of Biscay, 
Brittany and Devon, the masters of these spy boats were ordered ‘to speake 
with all Fleminges or Easterlinges that shall Come from the Southwardes’.41 
Letters were also commonly dispatched to the Governor of Brest ‘to knowe what 
spanishe shippinge ... was alongest that Coast’.42 Once these reconnaissance 
expeditions had completed their missions they would return to Devon where the 
shipmasters would convey the information that they had acquired to their 
commanders.43 
In the absence of military commanders, reconnaissance expeditions 
were conducted by Devon’s gentry living in and around the ports of south 
Devon in a bid to obtain news of the Spanish fleet ‘on demand’.44 Robert 
Scarlett and Edward Hill were hired on a number of occasions by the mayors of 
Plymouth between 1588 and 1593 ‘to goe to discouer certaine shippes 
susspected to be Spaynyards’.45 In many cases these expeditions were ordered 
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by central government, such as in October 1596 when the Privy Council asked 
Lord Burghley to send a ‘letter vnto the Mayor of Plymouth and certaine others, 
for the present dispatche of three Pynnaces or Caravelles to be sent to the 
Coast of Spayne for discoverye’.46 Likewise, at the end of July 1601 Thomas 
Payne was able to confirm to Lord Admiral Howard (who by that time had been 
created Earl of Nottingham) and Sir Robert Cecil that he had ‘allready mande 
and sent out a pynnice of Captayne Parkers’ to discover the Spanish fleet and 
that ‘ther shalbe one more with all speed sent foorth’ in accordance with their 
orders.47 Indeed, during periods of acute uncertainty there was a concerted 
effort on the part of the Privy Council to utilise the services of the officials 
located in a number of different port towns along England’s south-western coast 
– from Penryn in Cornwall to Portsmouth in Hampshire – to deploy spy boats in 
a bid to seek out noteworthy information concerning the Spanish fleet.48  
Thus, throughout the final fifteen years of Elizabeth I’s reign, both local 
and central government officials rigorously exploited Devon’s frontline position 
proactively to seek out news about the Spanish fleet that might verify 
miscellaneous and fragmentary items of information that were daily brought to 
England from the continent aboard merchant vessels. However, the veracity of 
much of the information that was gathered was often questionable. Indeed, it is 
important to stress that the news arriving in Devon’s ports did not constitute ‘top 
secret’ intelligence in the modern sense, but was rather a combination of 
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hearsay and rumour.49 As Fox notes, the obvious issue with this sort of 
unprivileged and widespread information was that it was ‘highly prone to 
distortions and inaccuracies’.50 This problem was similarly recognised by John 
Dakyns who complained in November 1596 that the reason that ‘euery sodaine 
Rumoure procureth A suspicion of an Invation [invasion] to bee attempted by 
Spaine againste this country (the prevention wherof enforceth her Majestie to 
greate charge) ys the wante of perfect Intelligens’.51 Indeed, those who 
occupied positions in local and central government had to contend with the fact 
that many of the individuals who were either the original source or the 
secondary purveyors of the information that arrived in the ports of southern 
England were foreign strangers whose loyalty to the Crown was at best 
unknown. This was definitely a concern for Sir Ferdinando Gorges who 
complained to Sir Robert Cecil on 28 April 1597 that there was a ‘wante of 
intellygens from men of Iudgmente and reputacon’.52  
Obviously then the credibility of individual accounts supplied by 
merchants and prisoners, especially those who were not English, was 
questioned by the authorities on their arrival in Devon. This led the Earl of Bath 
to write despairingly on 26 August 1599 that ‘The vncerteinties of reportes do 
muche trouble me and I knowe not what to thinke of them’.53 Feelings of 
uncertainty were ameliorated to an extent by deploying English shipmasters 
proactively to gather news; however, the reports that they made on their return 
to Devon also relied heavily on the rumours and hearsay of foreign mariners. 
Yet, despite these inadequacies, it has been revealed in chapter three that in 
July 1588 and August 1599 central government did refer to the news and 
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intelligence that was available to them when deciding on where to concentrate 
their defensive forces.  Nevertheless, the Privy Council were prudent to retain a 
high degree of flexibility during both invasion scares. After all, as Gorges 
observed, it was ‘better not to say what they will doe, but what they may doe, 
and to prevente what is possible rather then to leaue yt’.54 By adopting this 
stance it did not matter whether individual reports were accurate or not, 
England’s governors would plan for the worst and hope for the best using the 
multitude of news and intelligence that they received as a rough gauge for 
measuring the perceived levels of threat.55 
 
Local government newsletters: production and transmission 
 
In order for the oral news and intelligence that arrived in the ports of southern 
England to serve as a barometer for measuring the perceived threat level of a 
Spanish invasion it first had to be transcribed and conveyed to the key decision 
makers at the court. Consequently, the Privy Council instructed local 
government officials (that is to say, deputy lieutenants, JPs, vice-admirals and 
the mayors of port towns) to examine all merchants, prisoners and other 
‘passengers’ that arrived in the ports of southern England – from Falmouth in 
the west to Dover in the east.56 In Devon, the Earl of Bath and his deputies 
formulated a clearly defined strategy to achieve this which is revealed by a set 
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of orders that were agreed upon during a meeting at Exeter on 20 March 1598. 
The four relevant orders make the following provisions:   
[1.] That straight orders be taken in all portes Creekes & other places 
that all passengers not knowne either outwarde bound or inward 
bound be straightly examined by the next Iustices of the peace 
according to former directions & Comaundement from the Llordes of 
the Counsell. 
[2.] That all Constables & other officers doe bring before the next 
Iustices of the Peace all suspected or vnknowne persons latelie 
come in this land to be examined. 
[3.] That Comaundement be gyven vppon great paine that all owners 
or maisters of Fisher boates bring before the next Iustices of the 
Peace all such persons as they shall happen to receaue or take in 
into their said boates at the sea to be examined. 
[4.] That the owners & maisters of any bryttayne [Breton] or French 
boates or other stranger vessells be examined what passengers they 
haue brought on shoare or sett on land in any place.57 
 
Accordingly, on their arrival at one of the county’s ports, individuals who claimed 
to have, or were suspected of having, noteworthy information were greeted by 
local government officials and were either asked, or forced, to impart the 
information they had obtained in the course of their voyage.58 Throughout these 
official examinations a written record was made of what was said and a copy 
was then enclosed within covering letters sent to central government officials.   
It is clear from the prevalence of these examinations in the State Papers 
that central government was inundated with information concerning the Spanish 
fleet.59 It therefore must have been helpful that covering letters were typically 
short and succinct. This no doubt enabled under-secretaries and clerks at 
Whitehall to sift and separate the multiplicity of reports that arrived on their 
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master’s desks.60 Examinations could then be grouped together (possibly by 
origin or date) and prioritised so as to limit the time that privy councillors spent 
reading them and ultimately quicken the process by which patterns and trends 
were discovered. Thus, the Mayor of Dartmouth, Gilbert Staplehill, wrote a brief 
covering letter to the Privy Council on 3 November 1596 notifying them of the 
fact that he had examined seven Flemish mariners. The examination had been 
recorded and attached to the covering letter so that the Council members could 
refer to the lengthier document should they so wish: 
Our duties Right Honorable most humblie remembred. Maie it please 
your Lordsh:pis to be aduertised, that this daie here aryued from 
Morles [Morlaix] in a small barke of Lyme [Regis], Seven Fleminges 
of Hambroughe [Hamburg], whose Shippe and goodes were 
confiscated by the Kinge of Spaine, who being examined of the 
newes and busines there, haue declared as appeareth by this 
scedule hereinclosed, whereof we thought it our duties to aduertise 
your Honors with all convenient speede. And so most humblye 
Craving pardon for our boldnes herein with farther remembrance of 
our duties, do most humbly take our leaue and committ your Lordshi:ps 
to the protection of the almightie. Dartmouth the third of Nouember. 
1596.61 
 
   
Likewise, on 3 May 1601 the Mayor of Plymouth, Thomas Payne, wrote a brief 
précis to Sir Robert Cecil of his examination of Thomas Halle – a Plymouth 
mariner who had been newly released from Spanish imprisonment. In addition, 
Payne ensured that the more detailed transcription of the examination was 
enclosed within his covering letter in the customary way: 
Right honorable my humble Duetie remembred, It maie please your 
honor to receave herewith the Examinacon of one Thomas Halle of 
our Towne Marrinor who hath byn prisoner in Spaine and is lately 
arryved as by thesame his examinacon may appeare. And so 
leaveinge the farther consideracon of the same to your honorable 
wisdom  And praieing thalmightie for your honours increase of all 
happines I humblie take my leave Plymouth this third of Maie 1601.62  
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Copies and extracts of these examinations were often circulated 
simultaneously to powerful men within the county in order to place them in a 
state of readiness prior to any official orders being sent by the Privy Council. 
For example, Sir John Gilbert I wrote to Sir Francis Walsingham from his home 
at Greenway on 7 November 1588 to inform him that a merchant named 
Richard Blackaler of Totnes had reported that ‘the Kinge of Spain prepares for 
another Fleete’ and that this fleet was to be supplied with ‘plentye of 
newfoundelande Fishe, & Pilcherds ... out of theis weste partes’. In addition to 
notifying Walsingham, Gilbert had also simultaneously circulated the news to 
local government officials located elsewhere in Devon and Cornwall in order for 
them ‘to make staye of the Pilcherds’ until further orders were received from the 
court.63 A similar episode occurred on 15 March 1596 when the Deputy Mayor 
of Plymouth, George Baron, wrote to the Privy Council to inform them of the 
Spanish raid at Cawsand Bay the previous day. As well as informing the 
Council of the raid, Baron also noted that he and his brethren had ‘given notice 
hereof eastewarde alongest the Coaste’ and ‘there is advertises hereof given by 
Mr Edgecomb westward’.64 Likewise, on 29 July 1599 the Mayor of Plymouth, 
John Blithman, wrote three letters containing information of the Spanish fleet 
extracted during the examination of Pedro Tamayo. One was directed to the 
Privy Council for their Lord’s ‘goode Consideracons’; a second was dispatched 
to Sir Richard Champernowne of Modbury together with a postscript from 
Blithman beseeching Champernowne to ‘advertise Mr Seymour ... and the Maior 
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of Dartmouthe’; and a third was conveyed to Tawstock Court for the Earl of 
Bath’s perusal.65 All three examples demonstrate the existence of an 
interlocking local news network which was used to broadcast important pieces 
of information from the initial point of contact to the key decision makers 
scattered across the county.  
Indeed, sending the same news to more than one local recipient not only 
ensured that the appropriate political actors within the county were alerted to a 
potential threat, but also it acted as an insurance policy against the possibility of 
letters addressed to central government being lost in transit. It seems that it was 
therefore customary for central government to receive the same information 
from multiple sources within Devon. This notably occurred in July 1599 when a 
merchant of Dartmouth named John Ashley arrived home from Brittany having 
heard whilst moored at Roscoff that there were ‘200 shypps and Gallyes in the 
Groyns [La Coruña] bownde for England ... carrying 22000 men’.66 Ominously, 
as well as reporting the 200 ships and 22,000 men that were apparently bound 
for England, Ashley had learnt ‘that the Spaniardes would be ready within 
Fifteene dayes.’67 Having interviewed Ashley following his return to Dartmouth 
on 27 July, the Mayor of Dartmouth, Robert Martin, hurriedly dispatched a 
written copy of his examination to the nearest available deputy lieutenant, 
Edward Seymour, who lived just over ten miles away at Berry Pomeroy.68 On 
receiving Ashley’s examination at Berry Pomeroy Castle, Seymour forwarded 
the information to Sir Robert Cecil at the court, the Earl of Bath at Tawstock 
Court and Sir Ferdinando Gorges at Plymouth Fort. Ashley’s examination was 
then copied again by Bath on 29 July and enclosed in a covering letter 
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addressed to the Privy Council, providing them with ‘a trewe transcripte’ of what 
the merchant had reported.69  
 To summarise, the way in which Devon’s political elite circulated and 
transmitted news and intelligence amongst each other, as well as across to 
central government officials at the court, did not have a permanently rigid or 
proscribed format. This meant that those who conducted the examinations of 
the merchants, prisoners and other ‘passengers’ that arrived in Devon (that is to 
say, the mayors and chief inhabitants of port towns, JPs and deputy lieutenants) 
had a discretionary choice to make as to which nodes of the political network 
they would notify and in what order. This choice was especially pertinent when 
the threat of a Spanish invasion appeared imminent, making the speedy 
advertisement of the threat a necessity.  In that instance information tended to 
be transmitted laterally and vertically amongst both local and central 
government officials simultaneously. In doing so, the time delay between 
newsgathering and notification was minimised. Consequently, Devon’s 
governors did not have to wait to learn news of the Spanish fleet from the Privy 
Council; instead they could place the county’s defences in a state of readiness 
prior to orders being received from central government. Thus, whereas Richard 
Cust has identified two types of early modern newsletter – the informal and the 
‘pure’ – this section has highlighted a third: the local government newsletter. 
Official in nature, local government newsletters were similar to ‘pure’ 
newsletters in the sense that they were entirely made up of news and 
intelligence, yet, they also differed in that they were non-profit making (at least 
in the monetary sense) and were intended for a small, elite and exclusively 
male readership. However, their most important characteristic was the fact that 
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they were produced provincially. They therefore provide historians with a solid 
documentary foundation from which to expose and explore the more complex 
sets of early modern news networks that operated in the first instance at a local 
level, but which also had connections with London. 
 
Trading news for patronage 
 
The evidence discussed in the previous section has shown that the entire 
framework of Devon’s news and intelligence network was readily connected to 
central government. However, what has not been made plain is why this 
connection was so strong. In contrast to the intricate networks of overseas 
intelligencers who received monetary recompense for supplying Elizabeth’s 
chief ministers with vital information from behind enemy lines, local government 
officials received no financial remuneration for supplying their superiors at 
Whitehall with news and intelligence from the frontline.70 Therefore, what 
motivational drivers did they possess for doing so? On a purely human level the 
acute fear of invasion that persisted throughout the late-Elizabethan era 
combined with an impassioned anti-Spanish sentiment to ensure that the supply 
of news and intelligence from Devon – as well as from other maritime counties – 
remained plentiful.71  Thus, on 17 July 1588 Captain Thomas Fenner saw the 
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opportunity to provide Sir Francis Walsingham with information as a way of 
doing ‘some effectuall service for my ... Country’ and ‘to breake downe the 
Spanish pride’; on 30 July 1599 Sir Ferdinando Gorges wrote to Sir Walter 
Ralegh to relay ‘the particulars of the spaniards preperation’, post scribing the 
words ‘God and St George: let them come an’ they dare’; while just a day later, 
Captain Matthew Bredgate wrote to Lord Cobham from Plymouth having ‘newlie 
com from Brest’ to inform the privy councillor that there were reportedly ‘som 
30000 Spanish soulderes’ at the Breton port. Bredgate accompanied this 
information with a defiant warning to the King of Spain that the ‘sucses his 
father had in :88: he shall now haue in :99:’.72 The strength of the sense of duty 
felt by local government officials is also plain in the letters of news and 
intelligence that they sent to central government. Thus, on 11 May 1589, 
Humphrey Fownes, William Hawkins and William Moys wrote that it was their 
‘bounden dewties’ to send news to the Privy Council; on 6 November 1590 
William Blande’s ‘humble dutie vnto’ Lord Burghley prompted him to send letters 
of intelligence from Plymouth;  on 25 July 1596 George Cary of Cockington 
stated that he thought it was his ‘duty to signyfy vnto’ Sir Robert Cecil the 
examination of a Scotsman; on 17 August 1599 the Earl of Bath, Sir William 
Courtenay, Sir William Strode and Edward Seymour reassured the Privy 
Council that they ‘alwaies remembred’ their ‘humble dueties’ unto their Lords 
when sending ‘creadible intelligence’; and on 23 February 1601 Sir Richard 
Champernowne believed it to be both his ‘duty & vowyd servyce’ to inform Cecil 
of the news which had been conveyed to him by a merchant of Kingswear.73 
                                                                                                                                         
Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, 
49:4 (November, 1969), 703-19. See also Cooper, ‘Propaganda and Censorship’, ch. 2. 
72
 SP 12/212 f.105; SP 12/271 f.206; SP 12/271 f.217. 
73
 SP 12/224 f.48; SP 12/234 f.7; SP 12/259 f.172; SP 12/272 f.82; SP 12/278 f.209. 
268 
 
However, local government officials were not simply driven by fear, anti-
Spanish sentiment and public duty. Indeed, whilst they did not profit financially 
from the information that they supplied, they did seek profit in a non-monetary 
sense. The fact that local government officials in Devon were situated so far 
away from the centre of government meant that it was much harder for them to 
acquire the patronage that they needed to further their political careers because 
they did not have regular face-to-face access to the principal patrons of the 
Elizabethan court. In contrast, their courtier counterparts enjoyed regular 
personal contact with these powerful men. Therefore, transmitting news and 
intelligence served as a tangible way of overcoming the disadvantages of 
distance and enabled men residing in peripheral counties such as Devon to 
trade information as a commodity that might earn them favour.74 Supplying a 
prominent courtier with news and intelligence of the Spanish fleet thus acted as 
a form of gift giving, a process that Linda Levy-Peck has identified as being 
‘among the glues which bound together superior and subordinate’.75  
Consequently, it was a common occurrence for local government officials 
in Devon to solicit for favours from powerful men such as Lord Burghley and Sir 
Robert Cecil when they sent local government newsletters and other noteworthy 
information concerning the Spanish fleet. Such an arrangement was equally 
appealing to these powerful politicians who relied on an extensive network of 
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informants to buttress their own standing with the Queen.76 This symbiotic 
arrangement of reciprocal benefit is clearly referred to in a letter that Cecil wrote 
to Edward Seymour in summer 1599:   
Sir I haue receaued a lettre from you dated ye xiiij[14]th of Iune wherby 
I fynd you haue a desire to contynue the same affeccon towardes me 
that it seemes you haue borne heretofore to my Lord: my Father 
[Lord Burghley], which I doe very thanckfully accept, with the desire 
that as occasion serves, you would make me partaker of such 
materyall Spanysh advyses as come to your handes, wherof I haue 
receaued some already, in your lettre, wherin was contayned ye 
examynacon of one Buggens [Nicholas Buggans of Totnes], assuring 
you, that your lettres shalbe very wellcome to me, and for requyttall of 
your kyndnesse, you shall ever fynd me your very assured frend.77    
 
Sir Richard Champernowne appears to have had his own similar bilateral 
relationship with Cecil which he revealed in a letter to the Secretary of State 
dated 23 February 1601 notifying him of ‘reports herd in saynt malloes [St 
Malo]’ by a merchant of Kingswear. Champernowne did so in order ‘to manyfest 
the same earnest affectyon’ to Cecil as he had hitherto shown Lord Burghley 
‘being thervnto bovnd throgh hys contynuall favors’.78 However, it was not just 
individual members of Devon’s gentry who sought to trade information in return 
for patronage, the county’s town corporations also regarded news and 
intelligence as a currency that could be used to purchase political backing. Such 
a transaction is revealed in a letter that Charles, Lord Admiral Howard, wrote to 
the Mayor of Plymouth on 2 October 1594:  
After my hartie comendacons: I haue by this bearer receaved your 
lettre of intelligence and the packeth you sent therewithall and haue 
caused such lettres as were directed to the merchantes to be 
delyvered to them. For your frendship in sendinge them to me I 
hartely thanke you and wilbe ready to requite it in any thinge I can 
                                               
76
 For a detailed survey of the Earl of Essex’s intelligence network – which was established to 
rival the networks of Burghley and Cecil – see Hammer, Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics, pp. 
152-98. 
77
 DRO, 1392M/L1599/40. 
78
 SP 12/278 f.209. 
270 
 
and soe I bid you farewell. From the court on the waye to Nonsuche 
the 2 of October 1594.79   
 
The competition to be the first to send a vital piece of information was no 
doubt fierce amongst Devon’s political elite; after all to lose out to a competitor 
in the race to notify a patron was a sure fire way of diminishing one’s credit-
balance of court patronage. This may well have been playing on the Earl of 
Bath’s mind when he wrote to the Privy Council from Tawstock on 29 July 
1599.80 Bath dedicated a section of his letter to explaining why he had failed to 
notify their Lords of ‘a late Fleete discouered neere vnto the shoare of Plymouth 
... supposed to be Enemyes’. His excuse hinged on the fact that the suspicious 
fleet turned out to be Flemish merchants which he apparently ‘alwaies tooke 
them to be: And therefore thoughte yt not good to trouble’ their Lords. Quite 
how Bath could have been so certain of this from his home in north Devon is not 
made clear. It therefore seems highly likely that Bath’s excuse was made to 
deflect any negligence that their Lords may have levelled at him and thereby 
preserve his political standing at the centre of affairs. Competing to be the first 
to send news and intelligence was certainly at the forefront of Sir John Gilbert 
II’s mind when he dispatched a local government newsletter to Cecil from the 
fort at Plymouth on 7 May 1601.81 Gilbert conceded in his covering letter that 
the enclosed examination was sent ‘rather for a Confirmation of what the Mayor 
of Plymouth hath allreadie enformed then anye hoope I haue to be the first’. He 
then proceeded to request Cecil to order the Mayor to make him ‘acquainted 
with suche intelligence as toucheth anye preparation of an Enemye ... so that 
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your honor may be the more assured, and the lesse trobled with frivilous 
intelligences’. Reading between the lines, it seems highly probable that Gilbert 
was attempting to monopolise the flow of news and intelligence that emanated 
from Plymouth in order to stockpile the resulting patronage for his own ends.  
The quest for patronage therefore encouraged Devon’s gentry 
proactively to gather and transmit information that daily arrived in the county’s 
ports. In return, central government enjoyed a web of informants situated on the 
frontline of England’s war with Spain who readily purveyed the multitude of 
predominantly oral reports concerning the Spanish fleet which would not 
otherwise have been accessible from the confines of the court. Thus, the news 
and intelligence network of late-Elizabethan Devon was a reciprocal relationship 
of mutual advantage to both spheres (local and central) of Elizabethan 
government. In addition, it provides an important case study to help exemplify 
how provincial regions, particularly ports, served the political nation as 
‘important nexi of news’ during the early modern period.82         
  
News circulating among Devon’s wider population 
 
From the above analysis of local government newsletters it might be supposed 
that the news and intelligence which arrived in Devon circulated only among 
local and central government elites. However, archival evidence reveals that 
this was not the case. A number of references survive for the last fifteen years 
of Elizabeth I’s reign which indicate a more widespread circulation of 
information concerning the Spanish fleet throughout the lower echelons of 
Devon society. Thus, when the Mayor of Plymouth, John Sparke, wrote to the 
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Privy Council in February 1593, he articulated his concerns that ‘sondrie of 
thinhabitauntes were putt into suche feare’ as a result of the reports made ‘by 
divers Englishmen and manye other straungers that are come latelie out of 
Spaigne’. On 12 April 1596 Sir Ferdinando Gorges similarly complained in a 
letter to Lord Burghley that the ‘daylye rumores of thEnimies intent, to put for 
theise partes to burne and spoyle theym’ was causing most men to be ‘full of 
feare & in doubt what to doe’. And, on 29 July 1599 the Earl of Bath likewise 
informed the Privy Council that there was ‘some feare and terror putt into the 
myndes of those of Plymouthe and the rest of the southe Coaste by reason of a 
late Fleete discouered neere vnto the shoare there aboute supposed to be 
Enemyes’.83  
The Privy Council responded to letters of this nature by ordering the Earl 
of Bath ‘to apprehend & Comytt to prison the aucthors & spreaders of such fals 
idle & mutynous reportes’, suggesting that he should ‘appoynte a Provoste 
martiall who may haue authoritie to apprehend such ... vagrant persons that goe 
vpp & downe the Country, lyeing losslye without labouring & to see them 
Comitted to pryson’.84 Such an order reflects the Elizabethan government’s 
concern that the passage of rumour and news among the general population of 
England was politically destabilising. Thus, just as it was an offence to 
speculate on the health of the Queen, it was also an offence to speculate on the 
perceived threat of Spanish invasion.85 For that reason it seems highly unlikely 
– in contrast to what Lindsay Boynton has argued for earlier periods in relation 
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to Hampshire – that during the late-Elizabethan period Devon’s beacon network 
was ever ‘fired’ to convey messages within and beyond the county’s borders.86  
To elucidate this viewpoint it is helpful to provide a case study. On 25 
July 1599 the threat of Spanish invasion appeared to have become a reality for 
the inhabitants of Plymouth when an unidentified fleet was spotted offshore. At 
seven o’clock that evening Lieutenant Edward Dodington chose not to fire 
Plymouth’s beacon.87 Instead he wrote a hurried note to the Privy Council in 
which he informed them that there ‘is a Fleete athis instant cominge in vpon vs 
the wind at north west, by all liklyhoode it should be the enymy’. Having 
scribbled his signature and sealed the letter Dodington dispatched it post haste 
to the Council utilising the royal post-stage service outlined in chapter four.88 
However, Dodington had been too hasty in his dispatch and, shortly afterwards, 
with some embarrassment, he wrote again to the Council to explain that the 
fleet he had feared as hostile was in fact merely ‘Fleminges bounde for Rochell 
[La Rochelle]’.89 Had Plymouth’s beacon been lit on this occasion Devon and 
the rest of the south-western counties would have no doubt been mistakenly 
placed on alert, and panic would have ensued. As has been shown, the Privy 
Council were at pains to ensure that this sort of widespread chaos was 
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minimised. It was therefore ordered by the Earl of Bath that Devon’s beacons 
were only to be fired ‘upon show of 10 sail of ships that shall offer any attempt 
of landing’.90 As it transpired such a large force never actually attempted a 
landing in Devon and therefore the county’s beacons evidently remained unlit 
throughout the late-Elizabethan period.91 Thus, the romantic notion that the 
intricate network of beacons strategically positioned in each of England’s 
counties was used to relay the news that the Armada had arrived off the coast 
of Devon in July 1588 would appear unfortunately to be nothing more than a 
myth.92 In reality, firing the beacons was a measure of last resort to be used in 
the event of an actual landing, not an offshore sighting, in order to alert the local 
authorities and initiate the immediate mustering of the county militias.93  
Consequently, because the Spanish never landed an invasion force in 
Devon (or, for that matter, anywhere else in England) the news and intelligence 
that arrived in the county’s ports was conveyed to local and central government 
officials ‘confidentially’ via the various postal infrastructures outlined in chapters 
four and five. Nevertheless, such attempts to restrict the circulation of 
information likely to engender panic among the ordinary people of Devon was 
often futile given the fact that the sources of much of the alarming talk shared 
by the county’s inhabitants were the land-based sightings of the supposed 
Spanish fleet. Indeed, the evidence used throughout this chapter has 
demonstrated that much of the information circulating in the county was largely 
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unprivileged and so by implication it can be inferred that it was readily 
accessible to a broad spectrum of Devon’s society in one form or another, 
especially those living in and around the county’s ports where land-based 
sightings of the Spanish were most common.  
Thus, by identifying a number of references that were made by the 
political elite in their correspondence concerning the widespread fear and 
anxiety that was endemic among the county’s ordinary folk, this section has 
been able to offer more than just an inference of widespread circulation. Indeed 
it has provided an important, albeit indirect, glimpse at a much broader network 
of news and intelligence to the one which is predominantly depicted in the 
extant documents. This is crucial as it sheds light directly on the issue of 
whether or not the general population was folded within local news networks; 
providing some rare concrete evidence to confirm that which would intuitively 
have been expected. Moreover, by briefly outlining central government’s 
attempt to ‘censor’ or restrict the dissemination of this information among the 
general populace, this section has supported Natalie Mears’ argument that ‘we 
cannot just push back the chronological boundaries of the public sphere to 
1558’.94 A central plank of Jürgen Habermas’s ‘public sphere’ theory (which he 
dated as beginning in the coffee houses of late-seventeenth-century England) 
was the concept that those who engaged in political debate did so without fear 
of reprisals from the state.95 Appointing provost marshals to apprehend and 
commit to prison those who spread reports of the Spanish fleet therefore 
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undermines a fundamental aspect of his theory. Thus, while it is possible to 
date the development of certain elements of a Habermasian ‘public sphere’ to 
the Elizabethan era, essential aspects of the model will always be absent.       
 
 
 
By focusing on late-Elizabethan Devon’s news and intelligence network this 
chapter has examined one of the key ways in which the county was exploited by 
local and central government officials during the Elizabethan war with Spain. 
Because of their geographical location and extensive continental trade links the 
ports of south Devon all served as vital hubs for receiving information 
concerning the whereabouts and intention of the Spanish fleet. While the 
veracity of this information was often questionable it was nevertheless diligently 
pooled, recorded and circulated by Devon’s political elite in the form of local 
government newsletters in order to measure the likelihood of the worst case 
scenario: a Spanish land invasion. The presence of many local government 
newsletters in the State Papers and other centrally held archives provides 
historians with a substantial documentary platform from which to expose how 
other provincial news networks served the localities, as well as the centre, with 
information. Indeed, this chapter has revealed that part of the reason why local 
government newsletters exist in such large quantity is because they provided 
the political elite living in Devon and other counties distant from the court with a 
mechanism for acquiring patronage from Elizabeth’s chief ministers. The 
chapter has also briefly discussed the social depth of late-Elizabethan Devon’s 
news networks. Central and local government attempted to restrict the general 
population’s access to information likely to instil panic by ordering the 
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appointment of provost marshals, choosing not to fire the beacons during times 
of emergency and utilising the various postal delivery services identified in 
chapters four and five to convey news ‘confidentially’ to each other. 
Nevertheless, this was largely futile in light of Devon’s frontline location and the 
unprivileged nature of early modern intelligence gathering. Thus, by exposing 
the complex, multi-faceted and socially inclusive intelligence network that 
operated in the first instance within late-Elizabethan Devon, but which also had 
connections with the capital, the vital role played by merchants, prisoners, eye-
witnesses, spy-boats and local government officials in servicing the localities, as 
well as the centre, with information has been recognised and the current 
London-centric model of early modern news has been shown to be somewhat 
one dimensional.   
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7 
Conclusion 
 
Focusing on Devon between 1588 and 1603, this thesis has investigated 
political-military networks, postal infrastructures, scribal culture and the flow of 
information within and beyond the county. It has been highlighted that over the 
last thirty years or so ‘new’ Tudor political historians, such as David Starkey, Eric 
Ives, Simon Adams, Barbara Harris and Stephen Alford, among others, have 
sought to reconstruct the multiplicity of personal relationships that formed the 
basis of power at the epicentre of the Tudor state in order to confirm the 
importance of informal linkages in a political system where the line between the 
public and the private was so conflated. However, much still remains unclear 
about how political networks operated at regional and local levels, and how 
these networks were connected to other local groups and institutions, as well as 
with central government and the court. Thus, by concentrating on late-
Elizabethan Devon this thesis has provided answers to many hitherto 
unanswered questions on issues relating to governance and connectivity in an 
English county and in doing so has explained the ways in which a county 
community (in its widest sense) communicated at an inter-regional and intra-
county level. 
The final fifteen years of the Elizabethan era have been portrayed 
throughout this study as being a crucial period in the development of the 
English nation state. The deployment of lord lieutenants on a more widespread 
and permanent basis, the professionalisation of the county militias, the 
extensive engagement of a state-funded postal service, a heightened degree of 
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contact between all tiers of government and an apparent rise in the flow of news 
from the localities into London are the most notable advances that have been 
identified. The two main catalysts for these developments were the Elizabethan 
war with Spain and the Nine Years’ War in Ireland and it has been demonstrated 
consistently that Devon provides an ideal case study for analysing the impact 
that each had on central government’s ability to govern the realm whilst being 
spatially anchored at Whitehall.   
By conducting a detailed reconstruction of the personal connections of 
Devon’s lieutenancy it has been revealed that an informal ‘social network’ 
underpinned and facilitated the functioning of the county’s government. 
Acquiring a place on Devon’s lieutenancy commission did not hinge on the 
talent or military aptitude of the appointee. Instead, familial contacts, wealth, 
status, geographical location of residence, court connections, personal ambition 
and local prestige all functioned in concordance with specific strategic issues 
resulting from the conflict with Spain and the insurrection in Ireland to assist 
central government when they made their appointments. Thus, the loyalty to the 
Crown that each member of Devon’s lieutenancy felt as a result of their 
selection was counterbalanced by the loyalty they felt to their regional power 
base within the county. This dual allegiance was of vital importance to the 
success of the Elizabethan regime because on the one hand it provided the 
Queen and her chief ministers with a group of loyal local agents, while on the 
other hand it gave the inhabitants of Devon an institutional mechanism for 
communicating any grievances to central government.  
As well as explaining how and why Devon’s lieutenancy functioned as an 
important ‘point of contact’ between the centre and the locality, this study has 
gauged the success the Earl of Bath and his deputies had as commanders and 
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co-ordinators of the county’s militia. In doing so, the high strategic value that 
central government attached to Devon throughout the late-Elizabethan period 
has been underlined. From 1585 onwards the Privy Council increasingly turned 
to the lieutenancies to secure the realm’s military resources. In Devon, as in 
other counties, the local power and influence of the lieutenancy served as the 
basis from which the militia was organised. This encouraged allegiance and 
unity, as well as acknowledging early modern thoughts on honour and 
reputation. However, when the number of suitable positions within the militia did 
not match the number of aspirants (a problem experienced in Devon’s South 
Division) such a system made discord inevitable and highlights a fundamental 
weakness in a system that did not prioritise personal aptitude. Nevertheless, for 
the majority of the time Devon’s lieutenancy worked hard to implement the 
Crown’s defence policy. This was a comparatively straightforward task during 
times when the threat from Spain was acutely felt. However, during periods 
when the perceived threat was low it was necessary for Devon's lieutenancy to 
adapt the centre’s demands in an effort to secure the cooperation of the 
county's overburdened population.  
A central argument in the thesis has been that, as England’s conflict with 
Spain and the rebellion in Ireland persisted, there was an increased necessity 
for central government to communicate rapidly with local government officials 
situated in Devon as England’s conflict with Spain and the rebellion in Ireland 
persisted. Consequently, the study has revealed exactly how this was 
accomplished. Between August 1595 and March 1603 the Tudor south-west’s 
royal post-stage service constituted the principal method by which Queen 
Elizabeth I and her chief ministers maintained rapid and reliable 
communications with those local officials at the apex of Devon’s government. 
281 
 
The speed and reliability of this mode of communication has so often been 
portrayed as woefully unable to meet the ever increasing demands of the Tudor 
state. However, by utilising a large sample of postal endorsement data this 
thesis has been able to rehabilitate the reputation of the service. Specifically, it 
has confirmed that this relay system facilitated significantly better inter-urban 
travel times in comparison to those that were achieved during the late-fifteenth- 
and early-sixteenth-century when such an arrangement was not engaged. Thus, 
by the end of the sixteenth-century political elites at the pinnacle of Devon’s 
government could regularly communicate with their superiors in London in less 
than forty-eight hours – a speed rarely, if ever, achieved in earlier periods.  
As well as looking at inter-regional postal arrangements, this thesis has 
also elucidated late-Elizabethan Devon’s internal postal infrastructure. When the 
south-west’s royal post-stage service was engaged official mail was dispatched 
to and from Devon’s royal post-masters via a combination of foot-posts, 
horsemen and shipmasters. Conversely, for private business or when an 
Exchequer-funded service was not in operation, Devon’s gentry and town 
corporations paid personally known letter-bearers to transport their letters to the 
capital via horse or on foot. This informal system was also used to carry 
government mail on an intra-county basis. However, as a direct result of the war 
with Spain, a speedier link between the Earl of Bath and his associates living in 
south Devon became critical. Consequently, an intra-county post-stage service 
was established enabling Bath to communicate on a daily basis with his 
contacts in Exeter, Dartmouth and Plymouth. In addition, a parish-to-parish 
postal network provided Devon’s governors with an additional means of 
maintaining regular contact with each other and allowed them to dispatch 
instructions rapidly down the chain of command. The smooth-running of this 
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communication network depended greatly on the secretaries of Devon’s political 
elite. One should therefore view secretaries as being the linchpins of early 
modern provincial post and communication networks not only in Devon but 
throughout the realm. Indeed, an important scribal duty for any secretary was 
making copies of circular missives. This constituted an important way of 
minimising the delay between policy formation and implementation and was 
practised by the constables of the hundreds who produced multiple copies of 
the precepts that they received. These copied precepts were then read aloud 
during church services thus ensuring that even the most humble members of 
late-Elizabethan Devon’s society were engaged in a national political culture. 
Having laid out the various modes of letter delivery available to late-
Elizabethan Devon’s political elite for communicating with each other, their 
superiors at Whitehall and their subordinates within the county, it has been 
possible to investigate the county’s news and intelligence network with a clear 
understanding of how information travelled on an intra-county and inter-regional 
basis. Indeed, by focusing on the flow of news, one of the primary ways in 
which local and central government officials exploited Devon’s frontline location 
and continental trade links during the Elizabethan war with Spain has been 
identified. The ports of south Devon all served as news ‘hotspots’ throughout the 
conflict and while the accuracy of much of the news was uncertain the 
information was nevertheless recorded and circulated by Devon’s political elite 
in the form of local government newsletters. Part of the reason why they did this 
was to secure political backing from the leading politicians of the Elizabethan 
court. However, it must be emphasised that the intelligence contained in these 
newsletters did not constitute classified information in the modern sense. As a 
result, the extent to which late-Elizabethan Devon’s general population was 
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aware of Spanish naval activities was significant. Central and local government 
attempted to restrict access to reports likely to engender alarm but this was 
unsurprisingly ineffectual. Devon during the late-Elizabethan period therefore 
functioned as the arena for a socially democratic provincial news network. 
Indeed, by examining the extensive flow of information within and beyond the 
county this study has added another dimension to existing research on early 
modern news which has hitherto adopted a predominantly London-centric 
focus.  
The thesis has thus fundamentally contributed to a reassessment of the 
nature of Tudor politics at a local and national level. In particular, it has 
demonstrated that between 1588 and 1603 the inhabitants of Devon were not 
distant and cut-off from events that were unfolding on a national and 
international level. On the contrary, in spite of their geographical remoteness 
from the centre of affairs, those who lived in the county were well aware of and 
participated in a national political culture. This was encouraged by Devon’s 
strategic importance, vulnerability to invasion and continental trade links which 
collectively necessitated the establishment of a complex postal network 
designed to maintain relatively speedy and sustained connectivity between all 
tiers of government. This conclusion has been made by focusing on events 
within Devon rather than from a central government perspective. In other words, 
in order to understand more fully the nature of governance in Devon at the end 
of the sixteenth-century, this thesis has used the same ‘centre-periphery’ 
methodology that Steven Ellis deployed to such great effect in relation to Tudor 
Ireland and the English borderlands.  
The Devon analysis articulated in the thesis could not have been 
achieved without the newly discovered Seymour Manuscripts – the 
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documentary platform from which this study has developed. These papers have 
been utilised extensively throughout this study in tandem with an array of 
primary material from other locally and centrally held archives. The receivers’ 
accounts of Barnstaple, Dartmouth, Exeter and Plymouth have been particularly 
useful in pursuing a ‘centre-periphery’ methodology. Indeed, it has been a 
central purpose of this thesis to exemplify how a sufficiently detailed set of 
receivers’ accounts can be utilised to help to expand present-day understanding 
of the ‘sinews of power’ in an early modern English county. 
Of course it is inevitable that there are certain questions and issues not 
covered by the primary sources used in this thesis. For instance, there is a 
much greater amount of evidence in the Seymour Manuscripts for the late-
1590s and early-1600s. This has been counterbalanced by accessing earlier 
evidence from other locally and centrally held collections although these too 
tend to have more material dated post-1595 which presumably is a 
consequence of the availability of better postal services from thenceforth. 
Another limitation with the available evidence is its predominantly official 
character. Consequently, this thesis has largely focused on the ways and 
means that central and local government (at all levels) sustained a dialogue 
with each other in a governmental context. That said socio-cultural issues have 
been considered wherever they were especially germane. Most notably, the 
study has emphasised the importance of personal relationships to the 
Elizabethan political-military system, explained how Devon’s general population 
was co-opted into a national political culture, identified the importance of 
newsgathering as a mechanism for securing patronage and highlighted the 
socially democratic nature of late-Elizabethan Devon’s intelligence network. 
Nevertheless, further avenues of enquiry will inevitably need to be pursued in 
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future work in order to achieve a fuller understanding of the political and societal 
culture of Devon during the Armada years.  
For example, one important topic that has not been discussed in very 
great detail in this study is religion. In particular, it would be very useful to 
establish precisely the religious perspectives of the Earl of Bath and thereby 
better understand his personality. At the start of the seventeenth-century Bath 
sought assistance from the Bishop of Exeter in quelling the Puritanical 
tendencies of certain townsfolk in Barnstaple. It might therefore be supposed 
that he was a strong supporter of the Elizabethan Settlement and that the 
religious conservatism displayed by his father-in-law, the second Earl of 
Bedford, and other members of the Russell family had not had much influence 
on him. However, it is equally feasible that in tackling the issue of religious 
conservatism Bath was merely adopting a pragmatic approach and would have 
conformed to Puritanism or indeed Catholicism should circumstances have 
demanded such outward expressions of adherence. Certainly if his uncle, Sir 
Thomas Kitson, is to be believed Bath had no qualms in marrying into the 
Catholic Cornwallis family in 1577. Successfully ascertaining Bath’s religious 
beliefs would therefore help to verify an important issue surrounding the Earl’s 
character and career. Was he a loyal servant of Queen Elizabeth I and an 
ardent supporter of the Elizabethan Settlement? Or, was he a shrewd political 
tactician content to alter his religious beliefs in concordance with the prevailing 
political winds at the centre of affairs in order to preserve the power and 
prestige he enjoyed as lord lieutenant of Devon?  
Whereas the issue of religion has received some attention in this thesis, 
the matter of literacy has, unavoidably, not featured at all. This omission is a 
result of a lack of available evidence coupled with the fact that an examination 
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of literacy rates in late-Elizabethan Devon was beyond the purview of this study. 
Nevertheless, looking at levels of literacy in the county during the 1590s would 
enrich some of the findings that have been presented in this thesis. For 
instance, the fact that the constables of the hundreds were required to make 
copies of the precepts that they received from Devon’s lieutenancy and then 
circulate those copies to the petty-constables of the parishes implies that they 
were able to read and write at a fairly advanced level. However, what is less 
certain is what level of literacy existed among Devon’s petty-constables. Did 
they personally read out loud the copied precepts that they received from the 
constable of their hundred to their parish church congregation? Or, more likely, 
was their level of literacy such that they were forced to ask a member of the 
clergy to read the document from atop the pulpit on their behalf? Whatever the 
answer one thing is certain, the availability of reading material pervaded all 
social strata in late-Elizabethan England. It is therefore highly likely that literacy 
rates among the lower echelons of society improved significantly as a result.  
In addition to the lack of evidence pertaining to religion and literacy, other 
limitations with the source material have been acknowledged where applicable. 
For example, the inherent difficulties of using postal endorsements have been 
discussed, the patchy content of receivers’ accounts recognised and the 
Seymour Manuscripts’ lack of clarity in relation to the locations of Devon’s intra-
county post-stages highlighted. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings the 
documentary evidence utilised throughout this thesis has collectively enabled 
the first comprehensive survey of a county’s official communication 
arrangements during the late-Elizabethan period. Indeed, it should be noted that 
but for the extant material in the Seymour Manuscripts, receivers’ accounts, 
borough records, State Papers, Cecil Papers, Declared Accounts of the Master 
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of the Posts and other locally and centrally held manuscript collections an 
accurate reconstruction of Devon’s communication infrastructure and practices 
would not have been possible. It therefore must be reiterated that by using 
Devon as a case study this thesis has exploited a rare opportunity to observe 
how the inhabitants of a frontline ‘maritime’ county rapidly communicated with 
central government officials at Whitehall and each other during the critical years 
that followed the Armada crisis of 1588. 
Finally, looking to the future, it is appropriate to identify how the research 
undertaken in this thesis can be taken forward and developed. Because there 
exists such a large quantity of relevant primary material, Devon constitutes an 
ideal case study for excavating the operational mechanics of governance at the 
periphery of the Tudor state during the late-sixteenth-century. However, to 
develop further modern understandings of how local political networks 
functioned and expose the postal services that connected these networks to 
each other and the centre additional studies of other counties and regions need 
to be conducted. The approaches adopted in this thesis should therefore be 
regarded as a blueprint for analysis in other areas of the country. A particularly 
fruitful avenue of inquiry would be to compare and contrast the communication 
arrangements that were available to the inhabitants of Devon with those that 
were available in other frontline ‘maritime’ counties as well as less strategically 
vital ‘inland’ counties. The benefit of this would be twofold. First, it would 
address how typical the situation in Devon was in comparison to other tactically 
important locations. And second, it would confirm whether or not the 
circumstances of the late-Elizabethan period brought the inhabitants of 
strategically vital, yet peripheral, regions of the realm effectively closer to the 
centre than those who lived in less important, yet more geographically 
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proximate, areas. Investigating local political networks and postal connectivity 
during other time periods would also further enrich contemporary understanding 
of the nature of early modern political networks. While the war with Spain and 
the Nine Years’ War in Ireland necessitated an increased level of interaction 
between central government and the inhabitants of Devon, during peacetime 
there was much less need for centrally based political actors to communicate 
with the county’s population – a fact that is reflected by the temporary nature of 
the Tudor south-west’s royal post-stage service. Thus, by looking at multiple 
regions during a period that encompassed both war and peace it would be 
possible to assess the extent to which different peripheral areas of early modern 
England were periodically brought ‘closer’ to the centre via more elaborate 
modes of postal services before becoming more ‘distant’ again once the political 
situation had been resolved. Thus, as well as making an important contribution 
to ‘new’ Tudor political history in its own right, the findings of this thesis are 
offered as a springboard for future academic research. 
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